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Abstract of Dissertation
The purpose of this research is to reconsider Korean judicial mediation as a part of alternative
dispute resolution (“ADR”) and to discuss the possible legal transition of Korean judicial
mediation into private sector mediation.
Similar to other states’ judicial problems, Korea has also faced overloaded case dockets,
congestion of the civil process, an expensive legal process, and emotional stress on parties during
the procedures. The Korean judicial authority continuously developed the Korean mediation
programs, which can be categorized as court-related mediation, including court-annexed and courtconnected mediations. Based on enactment of the Judicial Conciliation of Civil Disputes Act of
1990 (“JCCDA”) , the Korean Supreme Court launched the Court-annexed Mediation Center
(“CMC”) as a pilot program in 2009 and expanded this program in 2011 in order to reduce the
overloaded caseworks and provide better legal services to the public. This dissertation reveals that
the Korean judicial authority could not achieve its goal of reducing high caseloads under the
current court-annexed mediation programs. Therefore, this dissertation proposes the possibility of
adopting a private mediation program while reviewing obstacles of transition into private
mediation.

vi

Chapter I. Introduction of Korean Civil Mediation
The purpose of this research is to reconsider Korean judicial mediation as a part of
alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”), based on the demand for achieving justice, and to discuss
the possible legal transition of Korean judicial mediation into private sector mediation. 1

2

1

See generally MARC GALANTER & JAYANTH KRISHNAN, DEBASED INFORMALISM: LOK ADALATS AND
LEGAL RIGHTS IN MODERN INDIA (Erik Jensen & Thomas Heller et al. eds., (2003)) [hereinafter GALANTER
& KRISHNAN, DEBASED INFORMALISM]; See generally Marc Galanter & Jayanth Krishnan, “BREAD FOR
THE POOR”: ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE RIGHTS OF THE NEEDY IN INDIA, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 789 (2004)
[hereinafter Galanter & Krishnan, Bread for the Poor]; NORMAN METZGER ET AL., INDIANA LEGAL
SERVICES, INDIANA BAR FOUNDATION, & INDIANA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, UNEQUAL ACCESS TO
JUSTICE: A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF THE CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF THE POOR IN INDIANA, 99-104 (2008)
[hereinafter METZGER, UNEQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE]; Minjung Kim, Minsasajungwa ADR [Civil Cases
and ADR] 26 JEONBUK L. REV. 21, 23 (2008) (Korean) (In Korea, there are a few researches for a linkage
between the judicial mediation and private sector mediation. Some professors just mention that it is
necessary for us to develop the private ADR or private mediation).
2

(Table 1)

Year

1979

1981

1986

1991

1996

1998

2001

2006

2011

2015

Total Number
79,328
of Civil Cases

183,634 320,922

308,806

563,740

915,448

838,473

1,288,987

1,048,963

1,078,873

Total Number
640
of Judges

687

887

1,188

1,388

1,878

1,738

2,124

2,844

2,851

Average Cases
124
per Judge

267.3

361.8

259.9

406.2

487.5

482.4

606.9

368.8

378.4

Number
Attorneys

1,058

1,414

2,258

3,188

3,521

4,618

7,602

10,976

20,531

of

940

Prior to 1990, the Korean Supreme Court began the process of reforming the current mediation laws,
because the Court recognized that there would soon be too many cases for the system to tolerate (Sungtae
Kim, Bubwonjojeongcenter Baljeon Hyunhwang [Present Condition of development of Court Mediation
Center] 33 SOONGSIL L. REV. 51, 55 (2015)
The table above shows how the dramatic increase in the number of civil cases filed in Korea over time, and
how the number of cases per judge, corresponds to those statistics. As seen above, the number of civil
cases, judges, and lawyers have gradually and steadily increased since 1979.
The table above indicates that the number of civil cases continuously and significantly increased in two
years: 1998 and 2006. The sudden increase of cases filed in 1998 was caused by a financial crisis under
IMF control, and, in 2006, the global financial impact also caused a financial crisis in Korea. For such
1

a. Urgent Need for Adopting Judicial Mediation
It is necessary to briefly review why Korea, despite its current and firmly-organized
litigation system, needs alternative ways for resolving disputes. The most urgent reason for Korea
to adopt additional judicial mediation is to reduce an already overloaded case docket.

In the

current Korean legal system, court trials are expensive, 3 cause congestion and delays, and create
additional emotional stress. 4
To understand the need for alternative dispute resolution reform in Korea, it is first
necessary to examine the challenges facing Korean judges and mediators in the current system.
This chapter now explains the difficulties of working in the congested environment of the current
Korean court system, and then reviews that system to determine how to reform the current ADR
process in light of traditional methods of mediating and arbitrating disputes.

reasons, the number of civil cases might rapidly increase. The number of civil cases increased from 8,837
in 1952, to 1,288,987 in 2006. Furthermore, while each Korean judge in the civil courts handled 329 civil
cases in 1985, the caseload had increased to 566 civil cases in 2006. (Hong-Suck Cho, Sunjinkum Jinip
Jeonjeroseoyi Shinroiwa Wonchic: Beobchijuyiyi Hyunsilgwa Jeon [The Trust and Principle as the
Precondition for an Advanced Country: The Reality and Suggestion of the Rule of Law in Korea] 12-4
PUBLIC L. J. 331, 335 (2011) (Korean)) According to the data above, the number of civil cases has
dramatically increased over time: reaching 1,288,987 as of 2006. The total number of legal professionals,
including judges, has gradually increased in response, but judges are nonetheless overwhelmed by their
extremely large caseloads.
3

Younghoa Jung, Hankukyi Beobmunhwa Byonhwaeseo Beobwongwa Beobryulgayi yeokhwal:
Beobwonyongae Minsajojeongyi Hwalsunghwabangan [The Role of Court and Lawyers in the Change of
Legal Cultures: The Revitalization of Court-Annexed Civil Mediation], 42 KANGWON L. REV. 443, 454
(2014) (Korean) (There are two different aspects toward the cost of litigation. First, the court would take
responsibility of operating the Korean legal system, such as fees for maintenance of court building and
facilities, and salaries for judges and court officers. In other, the parties also would pay for legal assistance
fee for lawyer and filing fee for pursuing a litigation).
4

Generally see Warren Burger, Isn’t There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A.J. 274, 274-75 (1982); Sungtae Kim,
supra note 3, at 52-53; Soo Jong Lee, ADRyi Sahoitonghapjeok Kinung [The Social Integrative Function
of ADR], 134-3 THE JUSTICE 225, 236 (2013) (Korean); In Joo, Minsajojeongyi Hwalsunghwawa
Sajeokjachi [A Study on the Private Autonomies of the Disputes in the Process of Conciliation] 13-2
ARBITRATION 613, 613 (2004) (Korean).
2

A simple explanation for the overloaded case docket and hard working conditions for the
civil bench trials is provided in the Table 1. To provide an equivalent number to handle the total
civil cases filed, the judiciary has gradually increased the number of judges. Both numbers of total
civil cases and number of judges have continuously and gradually increased. Therefore, it seems
that the number of judges has only slowly increased in comparison to the total number of civil
cases that has rapidly grown.
The statistics present above are not exact, because they were calculated using the total
number of civil cases and judges per year, and they do not factor in criminal litigation; they do,
however, accurately represent the correlation between a rapid increase in cases and the judiciary’s
lagging response. 5
Because the Korean judiciary does not release the number of civil judges, it is difficult to
calculate the number of cases loaded per judge. This dissertation indicates that it has not been
adequate to catch up with the total number of civil cases even though the number of judges has
gradually increased. 6 The number of non-criminal cases per judge in 2006, for instance, was

5

Year
2006
2015

Korean Populations
48,991,000 (100)
51,529,000 (105.2)

Total Number of Cases in Korea
18,870,971 (100)
20,609,851 (109.2)

For 10 years, while Korean population increased in 5.2%, cases filed also increased in 9.2%. It means the
increasing rate of cases filed was almost double than increasing rate of population in Korea.
6

For example, in 2004, the total number of available judges was 1660 and each ruled on an average of 971
official civil cases; however, the actual number of cases each judge was assigned in 2004 averaged around
3782, because, according to Professor Dohyun Kim’s research, each judge officiated an extra 2811 cases.
Even though the number of judges has gradually increased, it has not been adequate to catch up with the
total number of civil cases. The number of non-criminal cases per judge in 2006, for instance, was almost
sextuple that of 1979, and current trends generally indicate that Korean judges will continue to be burdened
by an ever-increasing supply of cases over time (Dohyun Kim, Byunhosa Baechulgwa Sosongdaeriyulyi
Hamsu Gwangae, [Massie number of lawyers and Legal Services] (Korean) (not published in Law
Journal)).
3

almost sextuple that of 1979, and current trends generally indicate that Korean judges will continue
to be burdened by an ever-increasing supply of cases over time.
Second, it is necessary to investigate whether the number of civil cases handled per judge
has increased or decreased after the JCCDA was applied for adopting several mediation programs.
The judiciary recognized that current legal problems would not be overcome through the
current legal system for two reasons: first, judges are overloaded, which diminishes the quality of
legal services; and, second, the judiciary could not expect productive work from judges because
apprenticeship training for judges would not be sustainable into the near future. 7 Therefore, the
judiciary concluded that one of the most effective methods for reducing the number of otherwise
overloaded cases would be to adopt the U.S. model of mediation. 8 Therefore, my argument posits
that the Korean judiciary cannot not successfully achieve its desire to reduce its casework under
the current civil mediation programs because the court-annexed programs that are currently in
place proceed in a manner much like that of other civil court processes. 9 In order to provide better

7

Interview with Korean judge on Apr. 15, 2015 (The U.S. type of law school system was adopted in 2008,
The Judicial Research & Training Institution, which provides the training programs for two (2) years to
persons who passed the state law examination, would be closed soon. And experienced lawyers would be
appointed for the position of judges without the similar apprenticeship of training and the judiciary expects
that the judges appointed in near future could not make rulings as much as current judges do).
8

Siyoon Lee, Hankookeseoyi ADRyi Kyunghumgwa Jinjeon [Experience and Improvement of ADR in
Korea] 19-1 CIVIL PROCEDURES 479 (2015) (Korean).
9

Actually, the Korean judiciary have used the mediation programs prior to the enactment of JCCDA. In
order to understand Korean ADR programs, it is necessary to first review both settlement and mediation
programs in civil matters. In Korea, there are two different types of settlement (compromise) programs:
settlements under civil law and in-court settlements. First, settlements under civil law are treated as
contracts. (Korean Civil Law, art 731, “a compromise shall become effective when the parties have agreed
to terminate a dispute between them by mutual concessions”) The processes of settlement and mediation
are similar and these two programs have the same legal effects. What is difference between settlement in
the court and civil mediation in Korea? Basically, the succeful and compromised outcomes from settlement
and mediation would have a same legal effect of irrevocable judgment. But, settlement should be reviewed
4

legal services and achieve the judiciary's aim, the Korean judiciary should consider the
implementation of private mediation program that are both party-oriented and able to meet the
parties’ needs and expectations.
Disputes have always existed in every society and community, and the governing authority
tries to provide proper and efficient methods for resolving disputes. 10 ADR has gradually become
a favored method of problem solving in the world. 11 Also, the Korean Supreme Court has been

by the judge in a trial date and mediation process should be set in a new mediation date or reviewed by the
judge. Therefore, the mediation process is not open to the public unlike the public-open trial.
Therefore, this type of settlement would be enforceable, but would not have a claim-preclusive effect. In
this sense, it would be similar to U.S. settlements or mediation governed by the contract law. Second, incourt settlement has a legal effect of res judicata because it should take place in a trial date before a judge.
In-court settlements have two different types of settlement: Settlements before trial and settlements during
trial. Settlements before trial have a special character: Before filing a suit, in either a post-dispute or a predispute circumstance, parties make an agreement before a judge with the settlement with the effect of res
judicata. Settlement during trial means that, after filing and during a trial, both parties compromise before
the judge. These settlement processes are operated in trial date and have a claim-preclusive effect.
The Korean civil mediation programs are led by courts. In this regards, I proposed to call Korean civil
mediation as court-led mediation. All civil mediation cases go through court process and regulated by the
courts. In addition, the claim-preclusive effect is rendered to mediated agreements and mediator’s nonbinding decision which is not objected by either party in two weeks. Unlike enforcement of U.S. mediation,
outcomes of Korean civil mediation have a same legal effect of a final and irrevocable judgment. The
reason that I could define Korean civil mediation as a court-led mediation is the judiciary provides mediated
settlement or undisputed decision of recommendation could have a claim-preclusive effect as same as a
final and conclusive judgment. This legal effect might prevent participant from appealing based on the
defenses in contract, such as mistake or fraud.
10

Deborah R. Hensloer, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement is Resharping Our Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 165168 (2003); OSCAR G. CHASE, LAW, CULTURE, AND
RITUAL: DISPUTING SYSTEMS IN CROSS-CULTURAL CONTEXT, 1-6 (2005); Soo Jong Lee, supra note 4, at
227.
11

KIMBERLEE KOVACH, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE, 1-2 (2000): Herry T. Edwards,
Alternative dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668, 669 (1986); Marc S.
Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What we know and don’t know (and this think we know)
about our allegedly contentious and litigious society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 37 (1983); Deborah R. Hensloer,
supra note 10, at 165-66; Stephen G. Bullock & Linda Rose Gallagher, Surveying the State of the Meditative
Art: A Guide to Institutionalizing Mediation in Louisiana, 57 LA. L. REV. 885, 889-92 (1997); Soo Jong
Lee, supra note 4, at 237.
5

deeply involved in the adaptation and development of ADR since 1987, 12 specifically through its
collaboration with a court-annexed program 13 —judicial mediation—enacted by the Judicial
Conciliation of Civil Disputes Act of 1990 (“JCCDA”) (민사조정법, 民事調停法). 14 In addition,

12

Sungtae Kim, supra note 2, at 60.

13

In Korea, civil mediation could be classified into three different types: In-court, court-annexed, and courtconnected mediation programs. In-court mediations are led by judges and mediation judges. A significant
difference from settlement during trial is that judges should set a new mediation date as well as obtain a
mediator position.
In Korea, as mentioned above, mediation programs are operated in three categorized places: mediation in
court, court-annexed mediation, and court-connected mediation. Also, there is no exact definition of courtannexed and court-connected mediation programs. In general, ADR programs are classified into two types:
private ADR or court-annexed ADR program. According to Anne Morgan, “Private ADR is consensual
and can be individualized by the parties to suit their needs.” However, Morgan mentions that “courtannexed [ADR] is ordered and/or conducted by the trial judge,” such as “judicially-managed.” (Anne
Morgan, Thwarting Judicial Power to Order Summary Jury Trials in Federal District Court: Strandell v.
Jackson County, 40 CASE W. RES. 491, 493-94 (1990)) Under the Black’s law dictionary, court-annexed
ADR programs are “taking place in accordance with a court order.” (BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 95
(Bryan Garner et al, 10th ed.) But, the other explains that mediation occurs only by consent of the parties.
(Jack Weinstein, Some Benefits and Risks of Privatization of Justice through ADR, 11-2 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 241, 285, footnote 196 (1996)).
Black’s definition of mediation could not be applicable to explain the Korean court-mediation process
because the complaint could voluntarily file a mediation case into CMC. Also, judge Weinstein’s definition
could not be held applicable because the judge could refer a case to mediation process without parties’
consent in Korean civil process. Therefore, I propose that court-annexed means that the mediation
programs are strongly tied with court, such as using court buildings, obtaining financial supports from the
court, and sharing court officers in order to operate the programs. The court-connected mediation program
is relatively less close than the court-annexed. Because a judge refer a mediation case to the outer-council
mediation organizations, the programs are operating outside court buildings and does not share human
resources with the court. It might classify court-annexed and court-connected programs with a view of
physical appearance of court relationship, such as places and financial/human resources of mediation.
According to a judge Jung’s article, he categorizes CMC and Mediation council as court-annexed mediation
and outer-mediation programs as court-connected without explaining reasons. In Korea, court-annexed
civil mediation programs are strongly tied to the court. E.g., programs are operated within court-buildings
and share human resources with the court. (JUNYOUNG JUNG, MINSAJOJEONG JEDOYI HYUNHWANGGWA
JUNMANG [CURRENT REVIEW AND PROSPECT OF THE CIVIL MEDIATION] 71, 103 in THE OFFICE OF COURT
ADMINISTRATION, CONFERENCE OF 20 YEAR ANNIVERSARY OF KOREAN JUDICIAL CONCILIATION OF CIVIL
DISPUTES ACT (2010) (Korean)).
14

According to the Korea Ministry of Government Legislation, it uses a term “conciliation” in “Judicial
Conciliation of Civil Disputes Act of 1990 (“JCCDA”).” I will use this term without changing to
“mediation” available at
http://www.law.go.kr/engLsSc.do?menuId=0&subMenu=5&query=%EC%98%81%EB%AC%B8%20%
6

the Korean Supreme Court launched the Court-annexed Mediation Center (“CMC”)
(법원조정센터, 法院調停 Center) as a pilot program in two major cities, Seoul and Pusan, in
2009—then expanded into four other large cities, Daegu, Deajeon, Kwangju and Incheon, in
2011. 15 The program was expanded with the expectation of reducing an extremely overloaded
case docket. 16
Pursuant to the goal of lightening the court’s caseload, the Supreme Court launched the
CMC, and, in 2009, outsourced “early mediation” programs to outer-council mediation
organizations. 17 While the Korean “court of first incident” 18 transfers the cases to mediation
programs, more than ninety (90) percent of mediation cases are still handled by the court of first
incident. 19 The Korean Supreme Court recognized that judges were under a lot of pressure and
attempted to find alternative methods to reduce the judges’ caseloads, although there are mediation
programs in the Korean legal system. 20

EB%AF%BC%EC%82%AC%EC%A1%B0%EC%A0%95%EB%B2%95#liBgcolor0 (last visited in Jan.
10,2017); Soo Jong Lee, supra note 4, at 225-26; Soonil Kwon, Mikukyi Multi-Door Courthousejedoe
Gwanhan Gochal [Critique of the Washington, D.C., Superior Court’s Multi-Door: Courthouse
Experiments and Its Screening Method]s, 26 JUSTICE 76, 78 (1993) (Korean).
15

Generally see, Nohyoung Park, Court-Annexed Mediation in Korean, 17-3 ASIA PACIFIC L. REV. 151
(2009); Sungtae Kim, supra note 2, at 58.

16

Sungtae Kim, supra note 2, at 58.; Interviewed current standing mediator on June 12, 2013 and current
judges on Apr. 15, 2015.

17

Sungtae Kim, supra note 2, at 63-64.

18

Instead of using the term “court” in this dissertation, I will instead use the term “court of first incident.”
I want to emphasize that the court that originally take a case refer to mediation by itself. The same judge
refers a case by himself or herself and turns into the mediator.

19

JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 76.

20

Sang-Chan Kim & Young-Hwa Yang, Sang-Chan Kim & Young-hwa Yang, Urinala ADRjejoyi
Hwalsunghwa Bangan [The Methods How to Activate Korean ADR System, 45 KOR. L. ASS’N 247, 248
(2012) (Korean).
7

There is the question of whether the several mediation programs adopted by the JCCDA
enacted in 1990 will be insufficient to resolve the overloaded work on the bench. To the contrary,
the rate of civil cases is increasing too fast to catch up. In order that the judicial authority in Korea
should provide better legal service by reducing the overloaded caseload on the bench, the authority
should reconsider the current civil mediation programs. This dissertation reveals that the Korean
judicial authority could not achieve its goal of reducing high caseloads under the current courtannexed mediation programs as discussed in chapters III, IV, and V. This result is primarily based
on the ‘customer-exclusive’ policy that the current court-annexed mediation programs in Korea
pursue in relation to judicial-management practices.

Because of the mediator’s judge-like

behavior, court-annexed mediation programs are unable to improve in their efficiency. Therefore,
this dissertation proposes the possibility of adopting a private mediation program while reviewing
obstacles of transition into private mediation.
b. Value of Dissertation
Korean scholars merely have to-date contributed to the improvement of commercial
arbitration, instead of providing a theoretical foundation for the critical movement of judicial
mediation. 21 In previous research, legal scholars attempted to distinguish differences between
programs in ADR-programs: such as mediation, early neutral evaluation, summary jury trial, and
mini trial. 22 Unlike the development of ADR programs in the U.S., Korean court-led mediation

21

Seok-Beom Choi, Kukgajudohyung ADRgwa Minganjudohyung ADRe Gwanhan Yeongu [A Study on the
National Leading ADR and Private Leading ADR], 29-3 ARBITRATION 71, 73 (2010) (Korean); Nohyoung
Park, supra note 13, at 151.
22

Chin-Hyon Kim & Yong-Kyun Chung, Mikukyi Sabeobhyung ADRjedowa Gu Hamyie Deahan Youngu
[A Study of the Court-Annexed ADR and Its Implications in the United States] 21-3 ARBITRATION REV. 55,
56-57 (2011) (Korean).
8

did not gain significant ground with scholars and legal professionals, but was only attractive to
judicial systems. 23 Unlike the U.S. empirical research, Korean legal research is focusing on the
theoretical approach. This dissertation adopts both theoretical and empirical approaches to review
ADRs, emphasizing the Korean mediation programs related to court-annexed and court-connected
mediation. In the following sections, it provides interviews with judges along with observations
of both Korean mediation and U.S. mediation—especially mediation programs within the State of
Indiana, District of Indiana, and 7th Circuit Court—to expose how courts may abuse judicial
authority in the mediation process and go against the traditional spirit of self-determination.
While gathering the information necessary for this study, I conducted a series of personal
interviews and observations over a three-year period, in both Korea and the United States. I also
interviewed civil court judges and disputants in the Korean Court Mediation Center, spoke with
certified mediators from Indiana, and observed mediation cases in both jurisdictions.
In Korea, I personally interviewed two (2) civil court judges in 2014, one (1) standing
mediator of the Court Mediation Center (“CMC”) in 2013, two (2) commissioners of outer courtconnected mediation organization in 2015.

I also interviewed 20 disputants in the CMC and

observed twelve mediation cases in 2013. Furthermore, in America, 24 I interviewed two (2) U.S.

23

Generally see Warren Burger, supra note 13; Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L. J. 1073 (1984);
Amy J. Cohen, Against Settlement: Twenty-five Years Later: Revisiting against Settlement: Some
Reflections on Dispute Resolution and Public Values, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1143 (2009); Sungtae Kim,
supra note 2, at 55.
24

In order to provide justification for the selection of U.S. mediators and mediation programs, I carefully
select the Indiana area (including its corresponding U.S. Federal 7th Circuit) for three reasons: First, Indiana
has a similar size compared to S. Korea (similar shape of juridiction). Second, both Indiana and Korea's
legal cultures are relatively conservative, yet but proactive to adopt ADR processes. Both judiciaries are in
the transitional period of establishing mediation program into their civil matters. (I want to exphasize that
Indiana has successfully transited into the private mediation in the conservative legal environment. Then,
Korean judiciary needs to review how Indiana judiary smoothly launched the private mediation program)
9

mediators certified by the State of Indiana, two (2) magistrate judges in the Southern District of
Indiana, and two (2) Conference Attorneys of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh (7th)
Circuit. I observed two (2) mediation cases in the Southern District of Indiana and one (1)
conference settlement in the Seventh (7th) Circuit.
I received IRB approval for this study, and I additionally participated in the basic mediation
and restorative justice program hosted by the Community Justice & Mediation Center (“CJAM”) 25.
At the end of the program, in September 2015, I received certification as a community mediator
for civil and restoration programs.
There is currently no empirical scholarly research published on Korean mediation,
particularly regarding the CMC. 26 Several judges have, however, released the articles with
statistical information, but they did not compare those mediation statistics with those from other
countries: such comparison is needed in order to effectively criticize the process of Korean
mediation. 27 Therefore, my empirical research will be valuable to examine critiques and causes
of the misuse of civil mediation in Korea, while showing possible solutions to improve the Korean
mediation process. 28

Third, Indiana has the advantage of providing easy access to survey material and data: After obtaining a
certification as community mediator, I could participate in actual mediation cases in Indiana.
25

http://www.cjamcenter.org/ (Last visited in Nov. 1, 2016).

26

Cf. Sungtae Kim, supra note 2, at 54.

27

Several current and former judges published articles related with current Korean mediation programs of
court-annexed and court-connected mediations in “Conference of 20 year anniversary of Korean Judicial
Conciliation of Civil Disputes Act” published by the Court Administrative in 2010.
28

I believe my dissertation would be the first empirical research regarding to Korean mediation programs
in Korea.
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c. The Meaning of Mediation
Before moving any further, and in order to discuss the possible legal transition of Korean
mediation into private mediation, it is necessary to understand the difference of private and courtannexed mediation. ADR programs could be categorized as either private or court-annexed. 29 The
characteristics of private ADR could be described below:
“the parties can design process that determine not only who will host their
negotiations, and what role he or she will play, but also what kinds of information will be
considered, whether the information will be subject to the filtering of the rules of evidence,
what the tone of the proceedings will be, in what order various elements of the program
will be placed, when the events shall occur, whether and what purposes they shall be
interrupted. In other words, the parties enjoy a level of freedom in shaping processes to fit
their situation that is without parallel in formal, public adjudication.” 30
It is important to define the meaning of private mediation. First, to better understand the
ADR process, it is important to distinguish between private mediation and private negotiation
based on the involvement of a neutral-third party. 31 Private negotiation is operated by the parties
without a third party. Private mediation means that a neutral third party would be adopted from
the private sector. 32 Second, mediation also could be divided into court-related (public) and out-

29

Stephen G. Bullock & Linda Rose Gallagher, supra note 11, at 892, footnote 37.

30

Id. (reciting Anne C. Morgan, Thwarting Judicial Power to Order Summary Jury Trials in Federal
District Court: Strandell v. Jackson County, 40 CASE W. RES. 491, 493-494 (1990)).

31

Elad Finkelstein & Shahar Lifshitz, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Mediator: A Communitarian Theory
of Post-Mediation Contracts, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 667, 684 (2010).

32

Leon E. Trakman, Commentary Appropriate Conflict, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 919, 929 (2001).
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of-court (private) processes. 33 This distinction could be explained not only by the location of the
place of mediation, but also the independency of the mediator from the judicial authority. 34
In Korea, without distinguishing private mediation, court-related mediation could also be
divided into court-annexed or court-connected mediations, based on the level of tightness toward
court interference, including the location of the mediation place. 35

For example, when the

mediation case is referred and released to the outer-council mediation organization, such as a
regional Korean bar association or law school and the mediation is held in out-of-court territory:
this mediation is still categorized as court-connected because the process is firmly regulated by the
judicial authority. 36 Unlike the U.S. private mediator program, the court refers the mediation cases
to a certain organization, which could handle the mediation cases, and the organization could
distribute the mediation cases to each member of the organization. 37

33

Frank E. A. Sander & Lukasz Rozdeiczer, Matching Cases and Dispute Resolution Procedures: Detailed
Analysis Leading to a Mediation-Centered Approach, 11 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2006)
(Professors Sander and Rozdeiczer distinguish between different types of mediation procedures, including
between court-related [public] mediation and out-of-court [private] mediation).
34

Anne C. Morgan, supra note 13, at 494.

35

JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 103 (In Korea, as mentioned above, mediation programs are operated
in three categorized places, mediation in court, court-annexed mediation, and court-connected mediation.
Also, there is no exact definition of court-annexed and court-connected mediation programs. But, according
to a judge Jung’s article, he categorizes CMC and Mediation council as court-annexed mediation and outermediation programs as court-connected without explaining reasons); Cf. Stephen G. Bullock & Linda Rose
Gallagher, supra note 11, at 892, footnote 37 (reciting Anne C. Morgan, Thwarting Judicial Power to Order
Summary Jury Trials in Federal District Court: Strandell v. Jackson County, 40 CASE W. RES. 491, 493
(1990).
36

Stephen G. Bullock & Linda Rose Gallagher, supra note 11, at 892, footnote 37 (reciting Anne C.
Morgan, Thwarting Judicial Power to Order Summary Jury Trials in Federal District 1Court: Strandell v.
Jackson County, 40 CASE W. RES. 491, 494 (1990)).
37

JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 128.
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Contrary to U.S. private mediation, the Korean judiciary does not recognize a private
mediation program yet. 38 Because the judiciary has not established a mediation training program,
it could not adopt a private program. According to the U.S. theoretical approach for private
mediation, the judiciary is responsible for the mediator’s conduct in mediation proceedings when
the neutral third party is from the private sector. 39 Per the JCCDA, there is currently no article to
regulate the protection for outer council’s member, nor the judiciary’s responsibility for
malfunction or misconduct by the outer council during the mediation process. 40
In sum, after discussing the distinction between public and private mediation programs, the
Korean mediation programs could be categorized as court-related mediation, including courtannexed and court-connected mediations. 41 Furthermore, the outer-council mediation program
could be classified as court-connected mediation, because it is still regulated by the court of first
incident that referred the case. 42 In order to establish private mediation, the judiciary needs to set
up training and educational programs. Because the judiciary should take responsibility for the
private mediator’s function during the mediation process, it is necessary to prepare these training
and certification programs. 43

38

Cf. JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 72.

39

Leon E. Trakman, supra note 33, at 929.

40

Please see JCCDA (There is no article for protection of mediator).

41

Please see infra Chapter III.

42

JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 113.

43

Sungtae Kim, supra note 2, at 60.
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Chapter II. Characteristics of Korean Mediation Programs
Civil mediation programs have been continuously applied for resolving disputes in Korea
since the contemporary Korean legal system was established—after achieving independence in
1950. Although Korea has ADR programs under the contemporary legal system, the Korean ADR
programs, particularly Korean mediation, typically have characteristics that would distinguish
them from the textbook definitions. These distinctions extend to both terminology and usage of
the term. This chapter reviews the definition of Korean mediation and whether Korean mediation

14

is correctly named “Jojeong,” (조정, 調停) comparing the term with the U.S. definition of
“mediation.” Second, to better understand the characteristics of Korean mediation, it briefly
reviews a history of Korean mediation regulations. Third, it reviews the common characteristics
of contemporary Korean mediation programs—comparing their strengths and weaknesses.
a. No Definition of Mediation
While the term “ADR” is an acronym for alternative dispute resolution and represents the
most popular term of method of resolving dispute, 44 some scholars are calling it “DR,” or dispute
resolution: therefore taking out “alternative.” 45 In addition, “DR” could be divided into “judicial
dispute resolution” (“JDR”) and “non-judicial dispute resolution” (NJDR). 46 I agree with
classifying ADR as JDR and NJDR for three reasons. First, the term “alternative” means a
“negative” or “second best” under the contemporary judicial system. 47 Second, the current ADR
programs have been used for a long time. 48 Third, according to the interviews in Korea, the
outcome of mediation would not be different from a judge’s ruling, because experienced lawyers
or retired judges take on the position of mediator. 49 Fourth, the mediation case should be filed into
the court system and the court and mediation judge have the authority to distribute these mediation

44

John T. Blankenship, Developing your ADR attitude: Med-Arb, a template for adaptive ADR, 42 TENN.
B.J. 28, 28 (2006).
45

Jennifer W. Reynolds, The Lawyer with the ADR Tattoo, 14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 395, 413-14
(2013).

46

Id.

47

Id.

48

Id.

49

Interviewed with a standing mediator on June 12, 2013.
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cases to other mediation organizations. 50 Therefore, the litigation and court-annexed mediation in
Korea should be classified as “JDR,” because the entire process of mediation is operated inside
the court territory and the outcome of mediation has the same effort of a judge’s ruling. The other
mediation process, such as administrative ADR would be classified as “NJDR,” because the
programs are not operated by the judicial authority.
Even if there is no distinction between the terms mediation and conciliation, there are two
distinguishable types of mediation: such as facilitative and evaluative mediation. 51
According to the JCCDA, 52 “the purpose of mediation is to settle civil disputes according
to a simple procedure based on the mutual concession between the parties, common sense and
actual circumstances.” 53

Some scholars state that Korean mediation could be classified as

“evaluative mediation”—which focuses on the parties’ alternatives to settlement—but not as

50

Minsajojeongbeob [Judicial Conciliation of Civil Disputes Act] art. 2 (S. Kor.) (Parties of a civil dispute
may file an application for conciliation with a court); Some of Administrative mediation and arbitration
have same effect of court ruling.
51

Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and Professionalism in Non-Adversarial Lawyering, 27 FLA. ST. L. REV.
153, 175 (1999); Lo-Ri Yi, ‘Mediation’gwa ‘Conciliation’yi Gaenyome gwanhan Bigyobeobjeok Yengu,
[A Comparative Study on the Concepts of Mediation and Conciliation], 19-2 J. OF ARB. STUD. 27, 34
(2009).
52

Generally see YOUNGJU HAM, BUNJEANGHAEGYULBANGBUBRON [DISPUTE RESOLUTION] 171-74
(2013); The term of mediation and conciliation are not exactly defined in Korea. Mediation is used together
with conciliation by legal scholars and judges in the legal area. The Ministry of Government Legislation
provides the translation of Civil Mediation Act in English naming ‘Korean Judicial Conciliation of Civil
Disputes Act.’ According to Professor Sungtea Kim and Lo-Ri Yi, because Korean mediators aggressively
propose their opinions and push parties to accept and settle, a term of ‘conciliation’ might better to explain.
(Sungtae Kim, supra note 2, at 54 footnote 6) However, majority of scholars mention that there is no
benefit to distinguish two terms. Majority of articles and books are using ‘mediation’ instead of
‘conciliation.’ For example, the CMC mediator is translated as a standing mediator in his business card.
This dissertation adopts to use a term of ‘mediation,’ except a name of Act in order for readers to easily
find the Act.
53

Minsajojeongbeob [Judicial Conciliation of Civil Disputes Act] art. 1 (S. Kor.).
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“facilitative mediation,” because mediators of the court-annexed mediation category can make a
binding decision, unlike in facilitative mediation. 54 While facilitative mediation is focused on
facilitating communication between disputants in a neutral manner, evaluative mediation allows
mediators to aggressively intervene in the communication between mediating parties, so that
parties will be pressured into accepting the mediator’s proposal and rapidly reach an agreement. 55
For example, mediators in court-annexed mediation in Korea can make a binding “executive”
decision when they determine that negotiation is at a deadlock. 56
Professor Yi states that a general Korean mediation model could be classified as an
evaluative mediation without explaining the reason, such as a judge-like authority. 57 Under Yi’s
explanation, because the mediator persuades the parties using the common sense and actual
circumstances, and the mediator could evaluate the facts and propose possible solutions for both
parties, the Korean mediation could be classified as “evaluative mediation.” 58 Furthermore, there
is another theoretical approach regarding mediation process: the mediation-judgment approach and
mediation-settlement approach. 59 According to the mediation-judgement approach, mediation

54

MICHAEL MOFFITT & ANDREA K. SCHNEIDER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION, EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS,
(2008); YOUNGJU HAM, supra note 52, at 195; Lo-Ri Yi, ‘Mediation’gwa ‘Conciliation’yi Gaenyue
Gwanhan Bigyobubjeg Yongu [A Comparative Study on the Concepts of Mediation and Conciliation] 192 ARB. RES. 27, 39, 41 (2009) (Korean); Authority and problem of biding decision by mediators, it will
criticize the problems caused by the authority of binding decision by mediators in the court-annexed
mediation system in Korea.
55

YOUNGJU HAM, supra note 52, at 194; Lo-Ri Yi, supra note 51, at 41.

56

JCCDA, art. 30; YOUNGJU HAM, supra note 52, at 190.

57

Lo-Ri Yi, supra note 51, at 41.

58

Lo-Ri Yi, supra note 51, at 41.

59

YOUNGJU HAM, supra note 52, at 194-95 (the mediation-judgment approach could be related with courtcentered and the mediation-settlement approach is related with party-centered).
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seems to be a court-centered process that aggressively proposes possible solutions with a focus on
efficiency. 60 In the other, mediation-settlement approach, it refers to a party-centered mediation
process that considers the neutral’s authority to be limited to facilitating or mediating. 61 Professor
Ham states that Korean mediation might be classified as mediation-judgment because the judgemediator and the standing mediator can and should make a binding decision when the authority
could not find reasonable reasons not to provide the decision. 62 Even though the term “mediation”
is frequently used as a legal term, there are several different opinions about its definition. 63
Currently, some scholars conclude that the Korean definition of mediation is similar to that of the
U.S. mediation. 64 In the U.S., the terms mediation and conciliation are not distinguished, because
the third-party neutral does not propose the binding decision and both parties endeavor to resolve
dispute. 65
There is a conflicting meaning in the term: mediation. 66 Some scholars used “jojeong,”
(조정, 調停) in Korean, as the term that is the same as the U.S. mediation: a neutral third party

60

Id. at 194.

61

Id. at 194-95.

62

Id. at 194.

63

Lo-Ri Yi, supra note 51, at 28; This dissertation does not distinguish the difference of terms of
‘mediation’ and ‘conciliation’ because there is no benefit to translate a Korean term of ‘Jojeong’).
64

Id. at 171-74.

65

Lo-Ri Yi, supra note 51, at 33-34.

66

YOUNGJU HAM, supra note 52, at 171-74; MENKEL-MEADOW, LOVE, SCHNEIDER & STERNLIGHT,
DISPUTE RESOLUTION BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL MODEL 223 (2011) (“Mediation is a process in which
an impartial third party acts as a catalyst to help others constructively address and perhaps resolve a dispute,
plan a transaction, or define the contours of a relationship); RISKIN, WESTBROOK, GUTHRIE, REUBEN,
ROBBENNOLT AND WELSH, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 16 (2009) (“Mediation is an informal
process in which an impartial third party helps others resolve a dispute or plan a transaction but does not
impose a solution. In other words, mediation is facilitated negotiation. The parties often enter into
18

assisting both disputing parties in reaching their own consensual agreement. 67 However, in the
context of mediation in judicial programs, “jojeong” is analogous to judge-like arbitration. 68 For
example, the naming of the “Beobwon Jojeong Center,” (법원조정센터) (法院調停 Center)
which could be translated as “Court Mediation Center.” 69 But the role of the standing mediator in
the court-annexed mediation center is similar to that of a med-arbitrator because the mediator has
the authority to make binding decisions when the negotiation between both parties is at a

mediation voluntarily, but many courts have programs that require parties to mediate before proceeding to
trial”).
67

Sungtae Kim, supra note 2, at 56-58.

68

YOUNGJU HAM, supra note 52, at 189-90.

69

JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 103; I could not agree to use a term of “court mediation center.” This
term does not explain an exact meaning of the center. Furthermore, it is necessary to correctly rename it.
Because there is no fine definition of mediation, CMC should invent a term including med-arb. In this
dissertation, I call it as “Court-annexed mediation center” because it is located in the court-buildings.
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deadlock. 70 Therefore, some Korean mediation should be called mediation but “Med-Arb,”71
because the Korean mediator is acting not only as a mediator but also as an arbitrator. 72 Therefore,
I propose that contemporary “court-annexed mediation” should be called “court-annexed medarb.” 73

70

Med-Arb is an acronym for mediation-arbitration and the hybrid method of combining skills of mediation
and arbitration as part of the dispute resolution process (Carrie Menkel-Meadow, supra note 51, at 176;
Brian A. Pappas, Med-Arb and the legalization of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 20 HARV. NEGOTIATION
L. REV. 157, 159, (2015) (reciting Martin C. Weisman, supra note 13, at 40); John T. Blankenship, supra
note 44, at 28 (reciting Emilia Onyema, The Use of Med-Arb in International Commercial Dispute
Resolution, 12 Am. Rev. Int’l. Arb. 411, 411 (2001)); Susanna M. Kim, The Provisional Director Remedy
for Corporate Deadlock: A proposed Model Statute, 60 WASH & LEE L. REV. 111, 131 (2003); James T.
Peter, Med-Arb International Arbitration, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 83, 88 (1997))
“Med-arb is designed to bring together the benefits of both mediation and arbitration in one forum. The
parties use one neutral person as both mediator and arbitrator. Med-arb is a two-step process, first using
mediation and then using formal arbitration to decide any issues not settled at the mediation stage. Because
the med-arbitrator has more authority than the traditional mediator, the parties are encouraged to be more
honest with each other during the mediation stage, knowing that the neutral person will resolve all
remaining unsettled matters. The final result of med-arb is a binding decision which includes the agreements
achieved during the mediation phase and the arbitration decisions.” (John T. Blankenship, supra note 44,
at 29)
It provides the combined process of mediation and arbitration; at first, the third-party neutral assists both
parties to voluntarily reach an agreement. And if they fail to reach a consensual agreement, the same-neutral
takes an arbitrator’s position in order to finalize the dispute (Martin C. Weisman, supra note 13, at 40).
71

RISKIN, WESTBROOK, GUTHRIE, REUBEN, ROBBENNOLT AND WELSH, supra note 66, at 17 (“Med-arb
begins as a mediation. If the parties do not reach an agreement, they proceed to arbitration, which may be
performed either by the person who mediated or by another neutral”).

72

DONGWOOK KIM, HANKOOK BUBWONMINSAJOJUNGCENTERYI JOJUNG, [MEDIATION OF KOREAN
COURT-ANNEXED CIVIL MEDIATION CENTER], 308, 308-309, in THE OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION,
COURT MEDIATION CENTER COLLECTION (2011); supra note 10, JCCDA art. 30 (“Where agreement has
not been made or where the terms of agreement are unreasonable, a conciliation judge shall make a decision
on cases for fair resolution of the case, considering interests of parties and all the relevant circumstances ex
officio, unless unreasonable, to the extent of the purport of the application”).
73

DONGWOOK KIM, supra note 62, at 308,; Chin-Hyon Kim & Yong-Kyun Chung, supra note 22, at 78
(reciting Barry Bartel, Med-Arb as a Distinct Method of Dispute Resolution: History Analysis and Potential,
27 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 661, 665 (1991); contra Sungtae Kim, supra note 2, at 51 (Profess Sungtae Kim
and Professor Lori Yi argue that a Korean mediator not only facilitate negotiation between both parties, but
also aggressively propose the possible agreements for resolving dispute. Therefore, Korean mediation could
be called as conciliation, instead of mediation); contra Si-Chang Ryu, Hankukeseoyi Sosonge Yihaji Anihan
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b. Development of the Characteristics: History of Korean Mediation Laws
ADR has a deep root in human history and a major role in resolving problems in
communities and cultures across the globe. 74

For example, several Asian countries have

developed traditional settlement processes handed down from ancient times. 75 However, unlike
in China and Japan, Korean legal culture has not successfully connected the ancient to the current
legal system: due to rebuilding after the forty-five year Japanese occupation and the following
Korean civil war in 1950. 76 Korean legal culture is instead strongly affected by the Japanese and
American legal systems, and Korean civil laws are typically influenced by Japanese laws which
came from German legal background. 77 But, unlike other Korean laws, the Korean civil mediation
regulations have developed with keeping the typical Korean legal characters, but not succeeded to
the traditional Korean mediation.
While Korea has traditionally been classified as a “non-litigious” society, the Korean court
system has been pressured by overloaded caseloads for the past several decades. 78 One of the

Bunjaenghaegyuljeolchayi Hwalseonghwa Bangan, [A Study on the Program of Activating Alternative
Dispute Resolution in Korea], 47-4 KYUNGHEE L. REV. 557, 572 (2012) (Korean).
74

JEROME T. BARRETT, A HISTORY OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE STORY OF A POLITICAL,
CULTURAL, AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT 2 (2004).
75

Tania Sourdin & Archie Zariski, Judicial Dispute Resolution: A Global Approach, 2012 GLOBAL LEGAL
ISSUES 171, 176 (2012); JACQUELINE M. NOLAN-HALEY, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN A
NUTSHELL 74 (2013, 4th ed.).
76

HEEGI SHIM, HANKUKBUBJESA [KOREAN LEGAL HISTORY] 28(Author states that the traditional law is
not succeeded to the current Korean Laws under the substantial law view, but the traditional legal
consciousness is succeeded); JUNGHUN LEE, BUBGWA BUBSASANGSA [LAW AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY] 297
(2011) (Korean).
77

Sundong Lee, Hankukyi Minsajojeonghwahaejedo [Korean Civil Mediation and Settlement] 1 (not
published, the author uploaded the exclusive inner-website of Korean court and personally gave it to writer).

78

Cf. Galanter and Krishnan, “Bread for the Poor,” supra note 1, at 790, Footnote 1.
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main reasons for the traditional classification may be that Koreans have been influenced by
Confucianism, and people tolerate neither expressing their emotional feelings, nor revealing their
conflicts to other people. 79
The Chosun dynasty (1392~1897) had a strong feudal caste system, and this social system
urged people to obey the social and political authorities—because the Chosun dynasty was strongly
governed by Confucianism. 80

Because this Chosun society ruled by Confucianism, they

emphasized social harmony and integration, 81 and people in the Chosun society might have been
uncomfortable to reveal disputes in the community. 82 Then, Korea might be categorized as a nonlitigious society.
However, recent research reveals a new approach: that the Chosun was not a society that
contained its litigation, nor, per the traditional viewpoint, were Koreans trying to escape from

79

YOUNGJU HAM, supra note 52, at 365 (Professor Ham emphasize the face-saving culture in Confucian of
Asia); Younghoa Jung, supra note 3, at 444, footnote 1; Veronica Taylor & Michael Pryles, The Cultures
of Dispute Resolution in Asia, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN ASIA 1, 4 (Michael Pryles ed., 2002); Professor
Sooyoung Kwon explained that the positive meaning for Korean is a social solidarity and the negative
meaning for Korean is to be excluded from the solidarity of community or group. available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TGsZT7t6heY (last visited on July 3, 2016).
80

Generally see Young-Do Park, King Sejong’s Confucian Rule by Law: Focusing on the relationship
between law and rule by benevolence, 9-3 REV. OF KOR. STU. 103 (2006) (Korean).

81

Benjamin L. Read & Ethan Michelson, Mediating the Mediation Debate: Conflict Resolution and the
Local State in China, 52-5 J. of Conflict Resol, 737, 740 (2008); Young-do Park, supra note 80, at 113;
Junsup So, Jungkukyi Bibeobchijuyi Jeontonge Daehan Yugasasangyi Younghang [Effects of Confucianism
by Chinese non-Rule of Law legal tradition], 31 CHINESE STUD. 251, 252 (2005) (Korean); Jong-Khil Lee,
Jeontong bubsasang Jungkukbubmunhwayi Suyonggwa Chosunjoyi Bubbaldal [The Reception of Chinese
Legal Culture and the Advancement of Laws in Chosun Dynasty] 114 JUSTICE 298, 302-305 (2009)
(Korean) (This article interprets that Confucianism emphasized the ethics and morality rather than laws and
put law as a subset conception) (Korean); Jisoo Kim, Sunjinsidae Bunjaengyi Yaebangwa Pyonghwa
Haegyuyi Chulhaksasang [Prevention of disputes and Peaceful resolution of Pre-Jin Period] 23-2 L. &
ADMIN. STUD. 10-13(2003) (Korean).
82

Jisoo Kim, Jeontong Beobmunhwayi Hyundaejeok Baljeon [Contemporary Promotion of Traditional
Legal Culture], 27 KOR. J. OF L. HISTORY 283 289 (2003) (Korean).
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revealing disputes; instead, there was the Wae-Ji-bu (외지부, 外支部), a private organization to
help people file suits and represent them during litigation. 83 In order to file a lawsuit in the Chosun
dynasty, the plaintiff and the defendant had to lead the process of the litigation. 84 The Wae-ji-bu
not only represented the case for their clients but also provided additional services, such as filling
out legal documents. 85

The Wae-ji-bu had deep legal knowledge and could advise their clients

during the law suits in order to get rewards. 86 The Chosun dynasty prohibited the Wae-ji-bu from
representing parties in 1478, because it thought the Wae-ji-bu increased the number of lawsuits
and caused unnecessary disputes; furthermore, it was against the Chosun’s philosophy and
Confucianism ideals: such as, their emphasis on non-confrontationism. 87 According to Professor
Han, people would complain about the Wae-ji-bu, because it might cause unreasonable delay in
the litigation process. 88 But the Wae-ji-bu still had work under the table until the nineteenth (19)
century, because people in the lower level in the Chosun could neither read nor write documents
for filing litigation, therefore they needed the Wae-ji-bu’s assistance. 89

83

Cf. Sangkwon Han, Chosunsidae Sosonghwa Waei-bu: 1560yun Kyengjubugyulsongibanbunseok
[Lawsuits in the Chosun dynasty and the Waeji-Bu entities: Analysis of the 1560’s Gyeongju-bu Lawsuit
Document], 69 HISTORY AND ACTUALITY 255 (2008) (Korean) (This article initially introduced the
existence of the private legal professional organization in Chosun dynasty); Geung-Sik Jung, Aspects of
Nineteenth-Century Chosun Society As Observed through a Legal Proceeding: Analysis of the 1816 Soji
filed by the Munhwa Yu Descent Group in Kurye, 5 J. KOREAN L. 97, 103 (2005-2006) (Korean).
84

Han, Id, at 284-85.

85

Id, at 286, 288.

86

87

Id, at 287.
Id, at 286, 290.

88

Id, at 286, 288 (The Wae-ji-bu sometimes caused the delay by filing the complaint of a local
administrative who dealt with the case).

89

Id, at 264, 289.
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At the beginning of the Chosun dynasty, the ruler suffered from the massive number of
lawsuits. In order to reduce the filing number, Hyang-Yak (향약, 鄕約)—which originated from
the Song dynasty of China and local autonomy organizations—was established to provide similar
mediation programs, by selecting the elders of local villages as mediators or arbitrators. 90
However, the traditional mediation program was criticized, because the plaintiff could file
a lawsuit with malicious purpose and they would be forced to make an agreement at the mid-point
between plaintiff and defendant. 91 Because they were not educated in mediating disputes, there
were also limits in getting respectful settlement outcomes from the disputants based on their social
power, such as age. 92
However, it is an important fact that, even though the Chosun dynasty based its rule on the
non-litigious ethics of Confucianism, there was still plenty of litigation regardless of social or
political level in society, and people in Chosun might be aggressive to gain their legal rights. 93
In sum, despite the traditional view, the Chosun could not be categorized as a non-litigious
society, even though it was governed by Confucianism, because the Chosun suffered from
excessive number of civil lawsuits. While the Chosun dynasty emphasized the prevention of
disputes and peaceful resolution, the traditional mediation program was not perfectly operated by
the elders. Even though people in Chosun dynasty had lived in strong confusism society, they did

90

Young-do Park, supra note 80, at 110.

91

Jisoo Kim, supra note 81, at 10-13 (At the beginning of Chosun dynasty, every claims were ruled to share
50:50. Then, this 50:50 resolution brought false claims based on malicious plaintiffs).

92

Id, at 13.

93

Han, supra note 83, at 286, 291.
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not neglect to pursue their rights, using Wae-ji-bu, former legal expert in Chosun. In the other
words, they did not sleep on the rights, but aggressively and litigiously gain legal rights, by filing
a suit.
Before the contemporary legal system was established, there were different types of
methods existed for resolving disputes, such as traditional types of civil laws, mediation, and
arbitration. 94 Even though it seemed like Korea had several traditional dispute resolution methods
in its long history, the current Korean legal system has unfortunately failed to succeed the Korean
traditional ways of resolving dispute. 95 As such, the current Korean civil mediation programs are
not affected by the traditional Korean way but were newly invented by the contemporary
judiciary. 96 The first Korean mediation law was enacted in 1962 and was called “ChajichagaJojeong-Beob” (차지차가조정법, 借地借家調停法) regulating disputes related to the leasing or
renting of properties. 97 Initially, it was applied in seven larger cities to regulate their disputes
related to the leasing of properties, but it was expanded to the entire state in 1987. The other law
was enacted to regulate small claims in 1973. 98 These mediation-related laws allowed the court
to refer cases to mediation, where the judge who referred the cases acted as the mediator; however,
94

Generally see Tania Sourdin & Archie Zariski, supra note 75, at 176; Stephen G. Bullock & Linda Rose
Gallagher, supra note 11, at 889-90; Hong-Suck Cho, supra note 2, at 339-343; Minjung Kim, supra note
1, at 21.
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Sang-Chan Kim & Young-hwa Yang, supra note 20, at 248; Laurie A. Lewis, Law Student Mediators
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JEROME T. BARRETT, supra note 74, at 9 (“The early Yi Dynasty (Chosun Dynasty) in Korea (13921910) is remarkable for its longevity and its extensive use of arbitration. Because of its isolation, the regime
did not employ arbitration in international disputes, but it was widely practiced in a variety of commercial
and civil dispute between citizens”).
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JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 73.
Id; Lee, supra note 77, at 5-6.
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civil mediation has not been successfully used by disputants. 99 While civil mediation was not
popular in trials, the Korean Supreme Court released an internal regulation to promote mediation
in 1987. It strengthened the council of mediation and expanded the application of earlier mediation
laws (enacted in 1962 for seven cities) to the entirety of Korea. 100
However, in recent years, judges have been hesitant to settle disputes in the courtroom. 101
If they persuaded parties to mediate rather than ruling on the case, judges would be accused of
doing so to escape from writing a ruling sentence or from being suspected of making an unfair
decision in favor of one of the parties. 102 Although the Supreme Court put effort into enhancing
the mediation process, usage of that system was still very low. 103 To remedy this, JCCDA was
put into place, then amended eight times to unify the related laws and clarify the range of
application. 104 With the JCCDA, it is instead possible for parties to circumvent the court of first
incident entirely and proceed directly to a “textbook” type of mediation. 105
The JCCDA of 1990 has been amended five (5) times to undermine the value of mediation
and strengthen the court’s authority. 106 For example, under this Act, the court of first incident
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JUNG, supra note 13, at 73; Lee, supra note 77, at 6.
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JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 73; Sundong Lee, supra note 77, at 6.
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JUNSEO PARK, SEOUL BUBWONJOJEONGCENTER GAESOSIC INSAMALSUM [OPENING SPEECH OF SEOUL
COURT MEDIATION CENTER], 7 in THE OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION, COURT MEDIATION CENTER
COLLECTION (2011) (Korean). [hereinafter JUNSEO PARK, OPENING SPEECH OF SEOUL COURT MEDIATION
CENTER]; Please see infra Chapter III, “tiger judge.”
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JUNSEO PARK, Id, at 7.
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Sundong Lee, supra note 77, at 6.
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JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 74; Sundong Lee, supra note 77, at 7.
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JUNYOUNG JUNG, Id, at 73.

106

Sundong Lee, supra note 77, at 7.
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could refer a case to mediation without the consent of the parties, or the court could mediate the
case on its own without referral. 107 At the beginning of this phase of mediation development, the
law did not allow courts to refer cases to mediation without both parties’ consents. 108 Then,
contrary to the purpose of the Mediation Law and against the Supreme Court’s expectations, the
number of mediation cases shrunk: the number of mediation cases was gradually shrinking because
mediation referrals were significantly fewer following enactment of the law. 109 Following the
Supreme Court investigation, the Court determined that there was no significant fault on the part
of the Mediation Law, and they attempted to increase the number of mediation cases by allowing
the court to refer. 110 The Supreme Court again amended the internal regulations in 1991 and
amended the Act in 1992 under the revitalization policy. 111
Under the fifth (5th) amendment, the court-annexed mediation center (CMC) program was
established by empowering a standing mediator with an authority equivalent to a mediation
judge. 112 According to this amendment, Korean mediation could step forward to a “pure”
mediation, which is not governed by the court of first incident. 113
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JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 74.
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Sundong Lee, supra note 77, at 7.
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Minsajojeongbeob [Judicial Conciliation of Civil Disputes Act] art. 7 (4) (S. Kor.) (“The standing
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JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 72 (Koream mediation programs are gradually and steadly transiting
from court-centered to party-centered).
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In my opinion, enactment of the JCCDA and its several amendments has gradually
improved two different mediation programs, such as regulations for leases and small claims,
reflecting the current difficulties of applying mediation programs toward resolving disputes. 114
However, during the amendments to the JCCDA, the court of first incident would become a main
actor of the mediation programs. Because the court kept not only the authority to make a ruling,
but also the authority to operate the mediation programs at the same location, the role of mediation
shrunk in the court. Before the 2009 amendment to the JDDCA, it was thought that the JCCDA
would regulate the mediation programs in the courts. The Supreme Court mistakenly calculated
the number of mediation cases that would be settled, to reduce judges’ caseloads, as most
mediation cases are nevertheless handled by the court of first incident. Additionally, the Supreme
Court ignored the possible abuse of mediation by the court of first incident. Before the first
amendment to the JCCDA, the Supreme Court found that the number voluntarily filing mediation
cases had declined, and the courts needed to forcibly refer civil cases to the mediation process
under the judges’ official authority. 115 Some scholars criticize that parties would be forced by a
judge to make agreements, because they may be unwilling to reject a judge’s proposal in front of
him or her. 116 Although the Supreme Court put effort into implementing several mediation
regulations, those laws did not provide detailed procedures, some laws conflicted with each other,
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Id, at 74.
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JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 74.
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Contra. Youngki Kim, Beobwonnae Jojeong Hwalsunghwarul Wihan Jeyeon: Jojeongwiwonhoirul
Tonghan Jojijojeongjedo [Proposal for Improvement of Court-annexed Mediation: Early Mediation
through Council of Mediation] 4 (2013) (Korean) (not published, writer get this article in the inner and
exclusive source of Korean Superme Court wet-site).
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and all mediators suffered because they were required to mediate cases without the benefit of
precedent or traditional mediation training practice. 117
c. Sub-par Justice in Current Korean Mediation
Some critics argue that Korean mediation would be secondary justice, because the courtled mediation programs were operated to reduce the overloaded casework on the bench. 118 Under
this theory, the judiciary would take all the benefits rather than promote the mediation programs.
Judges could save their time in mediation process; when parties could reach an agreement or a
judge render a binding decision without parties’ objection, a judge does not need to write a full
document of ruling. And then, the rate of appeal could lower based on the consensual agreement
in the mediaiton process.

However, the judiciary could counter-argue that, per the Fifth

Amendment to the JCCDA in 2009, they lower the financial barrier by reducing the filing fee for
voluntary filings.
The major characteristics of Korean mediation are laid forth below. First, unlike the U.S.—
which has primarily private mediation in Indiana, U.S.—the Korean court strongly controls the
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Cf. Sundong Lee, supra note 77, at 7.
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JAEHONG LEE, ADR [ADR] 7 (2012) (Korean); Korean court and legal department focused on reducing
the overloaded cases in the courts and increasing the number of legal professions. It could be stated that the
Korean focused on the efficiency of the role of law and, somehow, ignored the effectiveness or fair justice.
Also, under the Green Paper published by Minister of Justice and General Attorney of the British Columbia,
Canada, the certain cases are taking longer even though the total number of cases is declined and investment
is increased. In this regard, the report proposed that the culture of delay and complex legal system cause
the
unexpected
delay
of
procedure.
available
at
http://www.ag.gov.bc.ca/public/JusticeSystemReviewGreenPaper.pdf (last visited on Oct 2, 2012)
According this data, it might be deduced that the complicated system is not helpful to access to justice for
the ordinary or the poor.
Therefore, I could argue that, in Korea, there is still gap between the expectation of investment and current
circumstance of legal justice. In addition, it is necessary to consider the quality of legal professions would
be a major role to figure out the delayed procedure and provide the better legal service to all. (See
GALANTER & KRISHNAN, supra note 1, at 5-7). In this regard, it is necessary to consider the relevance of
quantity and quality of legal professions and enhancement of access to justice.
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process of judicial mediation. 119 Mediation operates within the territory of the courthouse, because
this legal reform was led by the Korean Supreme Court. 120 Under the policy, based on court-led
mediation programs, lawyers in society and the general public did not approve of the court-oriented
mediation program, because the process and outcome of mediation were similar to those of
litigation under the Korean legal society. 121 Therefore, courts were the primary beneficiary of the
new judicial mediation system through reduction in the number of cases. Some critics call this
program “alternative judgment” instead of “alternative lawsuit,” because judges rule in either case;
the only difference is that judges are not required to write down official rulings in mediation—a
practice adopted to save time to review other cases. 122
Second, most judicial mediation cases in Korea are still handled by court of first incident,123
and because the judge of the court becomes the mediator in the same case, parties might be under
pressure to make an agreement. 124 The Supreme Court recognized the potential for coercion by
judges and tried to expand the mediation program to include court-annexed and court-connected
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The Korean civil mediation programs are led by courts. In this regards, I proposed to call Korean civil
mediation as court-led mediation. All civil mediation cases go through court process and regulated by the
courts. In addition, the claim-preclusive effect is rendered to mediated agreements and mediator’s nonbinding decision which is not objected by either party in two weeks. Unlike enforcement of U.S. mediation,
outcomes of Korean civil mediation have a same legal effect of a final and irrevocable judgment. The
reason that I could define Korean civil mediation as a court-led mediation is the judiciary provides mediated
settlement or undisputed decision of recommendation could have a claim-preclusive effect as same as a
final and conclusive judgment. This legal effect might prevent participant from appealing based on the
defenses in contract, such as mistake or fraud.
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mediation programs. 125 The judiciary explained that the CMC, successfully linked with early
mediation, would be a milestone in the development of Korean judicial mediation, because it
would be a first attempt for judges to release their cases outside of the courtroom under the JCCDA,
which was enacted in 1990. 126 Shortly after the adoption of the JCCDA, the Supreme Court
established a new pilot program to refer certain mediation cases to outer-council mediation
organizations. 127
However, one might criticize how, unlike the process of referral to the CMC, the court
currently refers cases to those mediation organizations without the parties’ consent and question
how such an organization is qualified to mediate cases outside the court. 128 Even though the
Supreme Court’s effort to promote mediation programs in Korean legal system, some judges and
other legal professionals continue to resist the application of ADR in court, based on arguments
that Koreans are not familiar with mediation or arbitration, do not have a tradition of ADR, and
that Korean lawyers are hesitant to use ADRs instead of litigation—because with ADR they cannot
award a sufficient “contingency fee” 129 When the U.S. began to adopt ADR programs, mediation
proponents faced similar opposition akin to that in the current Korean system. 130 However, in the
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Interviewed with a former judge on Dec. 12, 2014; Sumi Kang, Japan Yoiyi Bunjaenghaegyuljedoe
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(Korean).
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SANDER, & NANCY ROGERS, DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESS
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U.S., this problem was resolved through the gradual introduction of mediation and through test
cases. 131
For example, in Indiana, when the courts adopted some forms of mediation, judges,
lawyers, and parties all strongly resisted its application in civil cases. 132 Judges, in particular,
thought it their duty and authority to rule on each case, and were dubious whether civil cases could
be resolved through mediation. Lawyers, on the other hand, were afraid of losing their role in the
legal profession and of losing money. The civil court decided to test whether these concerns were
valid by closing the county courthouse for one day, during which judges would use mediation
only. During that day, over 96% of the cases tried settled successfully. 133
According to the ADR movement, several state and federal courts tried to launch pilot
mediation programs and considered whether to adopt one of the ADRs. 134 After they got a
successful settlement rate in the mediation process, the resistance would decrease gradually and
young lawyers preferred to be involved in mediation fields. 135 Contrary to the U.S. circumstances,
it is doubtful that the Korean judiciary has a similar result with successful settlement rates in the
mediation process. 136
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Interviewed with U.S. mediators in Bloomington on Oct. 23, 2014 and Indianapolis on Nov. 24, 2014;
GOLDBERG, FRANK SANDER, & ROGERS, supra note 130, at 597.
133

Interviewed with U.S. mediator on Nov. 24, 2014.

134

Soonil Kwon, supra note 14, at 79-83.

135

Interviewed with U.S. mediators on Nov. 24, 2014; generally see GOLDBERG, SANDER, ROGERS, &
COLE, supra note 130, at 597-609.
136
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successfully reduce the caseworks and provides greater satisfaction for the parties with better service than
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Unlike in the U.S., even though the Korean Supreme Court has only adopted the judicial
mediation program, they did not properly pilot the mediation program, or did not survey judges
and lawyers before enact the JCCDA. 137 Since the Supreme Court tried to promote the judicial
mediation program by enacting the JCCDA in 1990 and establishing the court-annexed mediation
center, it looks like continuously expending the judicial mediation as it appears. 138
i. Removing Barriers to Access the Courts
The judiciary allows more liberal access to the courts through early mediation, with lower
financial barriers and shortened processing times. 139 Despite those efforts, the public still widely
disregards judicial mediation and lawyers still prefer to go to trial over mediation. 140

The

following provides a description of methods the court might use to convince the public to instead
use the mediation system.
First, the filing fee for voluntary mediation is 1/10 that of civil litigation. 141 The judicial
authority advertises that by utilizing more voluntary mediation, it could lower the financial barrier

litigation. Professor Youngju Ham mentions that the benefits of CMC should be calculated by the
participants’ satisfactions during the process and outcome of mediation).
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Mungu Kang, Minsajojeong Halsunghwa Bangane Gwanhan Silmunot [Promotion of Civil Mediation],
509 BAR ASSOCIATION, 213, 217 (2005) (Korean) (Kang mentioned that he tried test the mediation
programs in different places which were invented by himself).
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and provide an easier way for Korea’s “have-nots” to access the courts. 142 Most Korean scholars
concur that judicial mediation provides a more expedited and less expensive process than
litigation, in part because the filing fee for judicial mediation is 90% lower than the filing fee for
civil litigation, and early mediation could shorten litigation overall, because more parties would
settle before a trial begins. 143
The judicial authority needs to advertise that judicial mediation provides a more expedited
process than litigation. 144 Judicial mediation usually adopts an early mediation process, which
can lead to a final, consensual agreement before the first trial date. 145 Even if a case is referred to
the mediation process by a judge, the trial would not be delayed by the early mediation process. 146
When a party strongly expresses that it wants a judge to review the case, the mediator in that
scenario would immediately release the case and return it to the court. 147

More than 10 M~ less than 100 M Korean Won (Requesting
won)*1/10
Morea than 100 M~ Less than 1 Billion Korean (Requesting
Won
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Su-Hye Cho, Minsajojeonge Yihan Jojengjeolchayi Gongjeongsunggwa Dangsajayi Jeolchajeok Jiwiyi
Bojang [ Procedural Fairness and quality of judicial mediation in the Korean Judicial Conciliation of Civil
Disputes Act] 19-1 CIVIL PROCEDURES 393, 414 (2015) (Cho found that most early mediation programs in
the court-connected and annexed mediation currently completed their mediation cases within 40 days).
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More than ninety (90) percent of mediation cases are handled by court of first incident.148
In these mediation cases, the plaintiff is obligated to pay the full filing fee for civil litigation. Even
if a case is referred by the court of first incident to other mediation organizations and the parties
reach an agreement, 9/10 of the filing fee is never refunded to the plaintiff. 149 Parties also lack
financial incentive to use mediation, because the filing fee is non-refundable: first, if the judge
refers the case to the mediation process, the fee is non-refundable; second, the portion of small
claims is reaching seventy (70) percent of civil litigations and the filing fee is relatively low. 150
From a practical point of view, Korean judicial mediation may prove helpful for both the
court and the parties involved, because not only could the court reduce the burden of cases by
having them settle, but the disputant parties could save expense and time: all in a less-stressful
environment. 151 Some scholars, however, worry about whether Korean judicial mediation
adequately provides access to the courts, even though the Supreme Court tried to carefully design
the process of judicial mediation and firmly settle those programs during the transition period. 152
ii. Possibly Depriving Parties of Access to Courts (Justice)
As previously mentioned, increasing access to judicial mediation in Korea would improve
efficiency in the courts, because it is relatively less expensive than litigation and can be expedited
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Civil Disputes and Applicability of the Grounds for Quasi-Retrial], 108 JUSTICE 300, 308 (2008) (Korean);
Sungtae Kim, supra note 2, at 61.
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much more quickly. Compulsory referral to mediation may, however, potentially put such a
program at odds with certain readings of the Korean Constitution and Civil Procedures, as it might
infringe on access to justice when the parties wish to file civil matters in court. 153 From the
standpoint of the court, it is beneficial to have the authority to refer cases to mediation
organizations without the parties’ consent, because it dramatically reduces their litigation
caseload. 154 On the other hand, it might lead to discontent, because parties want the judge to
review their case, not to negotiate or mediate with other parties. 155
First, we will examine whether compulsory referral to mediation without parties’ consent
would infringe on their right of access to courts, as guaranteed in the Korean Constitution.156
Parties can request to confirm their rights or obligations through application and interpretation of
the acts, per judicial procedures by an independent and qualified judge. 157 Mediation referral itself
would not prevent parties from filing cases in courts, because they have the right to return to the
court by expressing the desire to do so. 158 However, any interruption of access to the court also
might infringe on their rights. 159 A conservative judge should carefully refer the case to mediation,
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inquire about the parties’ intentions and opinions on the referral, and not transfer the case without
their consent. 160 While our social system tried to balance two fundamental legal theories, such as
“stability and justice,” the main purpose of the law is to provide equal protection and justice for
all. Under the court’s function, mediation process might be considered as a bypass of court and
some scholars consider that there is no sefety net. But, referral itself could not be a barrier to
access to justice because parties in the mediation process could go back to the courtroom at anytime
at their will. However, in practice, some scholars criticized the formal court system for being
ineffective, costly, and subject to significant delay. Under the early mediation method, although
a case is referred without consent, rights to access the court are not interrupted, because parties
can return to court without delay. 161
For the first two years following passage of the JCCDA, compulsory referral to mediation
by court of first incident was still prohibited, in favor of voluntary mediation, but when the number
of voluntary filings for judicial mediation did not meet the court’s expectations, the judiciary
requested that the Act be amended to allow referral without parties’ consent. 162 Korean mediation
at that time was still not developing toward court-connected or private mediation, instead simply
turning judges into mediators. 163 Currently, the judiciary does release mediation cases to outside
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organizations, but this mediation program is distrusted and reveals problems, such as lack of proper
mediation training, and distrust in the quality of mediation services in general. 164
There are two viewpoints regarding the legal effects of in-court settlement: The first posits
that, since all in-court settlements—including both a consensual agreement by parties and a
binding decision by a standing mediator—enjoy both res judicata and a claim-preclusive effect,
these firm legal effects could provide for an effective means of implementation following the
mediative process.
The second viewpoint cautions against the possibility of depriving a right to trial by the
parties. As mentioned supra (footnote 9), both in-court settlements and standing mediators’
binding decisions share the same legal irrevocability of judgment if either party does not make an
objection within two weeks of the judgment. After this period, the claim-preclusive effect on
mediated agreements and mediators’ binding decisions is rendered. Given that this would hardly
constitute an element of retrial or quasi-retrial under Korean Civil Procedure Act, 165 it might be
an obstacle to deprive the right to trial.
In summary, there is an urgent need to adopt more court-led mediation in Korea. Until now,
judicial mediation has been directly court-annexed or court-connected, such as through the CMC
and outside organizations. 166 Mediation has transitioned through a wide spectrum of systems.
The establishment of judicial mediation would be helpful for both the courts and the public,
because the court caseload would be reduced and participants would save time and money.

164

Interview with Korean mediators on June 12, 2013 and Apr. 15, 2015.

165
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Applications of mediation have revealed different aspects of public and judicial opinion on the
subject; people tend to disregard mediation contrary to the judiciary’s expectation. Because of the
similarity of environment between a court’s trial and mediation processes, judicial mediation
should complement self-determination when making a consensual agreement.
The Korean judiciary did not experience private mediation, contrary to the U.S.-type
mediation taught in ADR textbooks.167 When judicial mediation was adopted by the court, the
judiciary and the scholars had only an illusion of mediation, because they did not consider the
differences between U.S. private mediation and Korean judicial mediation. 168

Therefore, the

efficiency of the Korean judicial mediation does not meet expectations and the public and legal
professional associations distrust the quality of mediation services. We should consider how
mediators in judicial mediation programs ought to guarantee both parties’ self-determination, as
guaranteed by the “pure” definition of mediation.
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Chapter III.

Korean Mediation

a. Overview
This chapter reviews the typical characteristics of Korean civil mediation. It will examine
different court-led Korean (court-annexed and court-connected) civil mediation organizations
within the category of Judicial Dispute Resolution (“JDR”) 169 and explain the detailed distinctions
between each of the mediation authorities, such as court-annexed versus court-connected
mediations.

It will examine five primary actors that participate in mediated disputes and the

problems faced by each, including the following: (1) court of first incident; (2) mediation judges;
(3) court-annexed mediation centers (CMC’s) 170; (4) inner council of mediation, court-annexed
mediation; and (5) outer-council mediation organizations. 171
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Younghoa Jung, , supra note 3, at 466 (Professor Jung mentions that the U.S. federal ADR programs
which is regulated by the Federal ADR act would be categorized as court-connected ADR. Furthermore, he
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Because the CMC program is the most outstanding and transitional mediation program in Korean civil
mediation in promotion of ADR. This dissertation will review the CMC program in Chapter IV.

There is Sanggun (상근, 常勤) mediation program provided by the court of first incident. But, this
program is currently operated by the court, but there is no regulation or civil mediation code to regulate it.
Therefore, this dissertation does not cover this program, but only mention an existence of this mediation
program.
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(Table 2) (Factors of Court-led Korean Mediation) 172
Court of first incident

Judge

Same as judge

Court-Led

Court-

Mediation Judge

Judge

Same as judge

Mediation

Annexed

Court Mediation Center

Standing Commissioner

Same as judge

Council of Mediation

Inner-Commissioner

Occu. Professionals

Council of Mediation

Outer-Commissioner

Lawyer Association

CourtConnected

Unlike voluntary mediation programs, court-related mediation programs have been
standardized and legalized. 173

Korea has adopted a primarily court-led mediation system; I

classify such mediation as “court-led” because most mediation programs are established by, led
by, or annexed onto the court. Court-led mediation can legally influence the parties to make a
decision, while the few private mediation programs in practice cannot. 174 Korean mediators can
be divided between those with authority to make binding decisions without parties’ consent (civil
judges, mediation judges, and CMC mediators) and those without that same authority (mediation
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Court-annexed mediation means that the process is operated inside of court territory and court-connected
mediation means that the process is operated outside of court territory.
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council members and outside mediators). Mediation judges and CMC mediators act with authority
to make binding decision of mediation without parties’ consent. 175
There are different types of court-established mediation, and because of these differences,
each type has its own unique processes. 176 According to Article 7 and 8 of the Judicial Conciliation
of Civil Disputes Act, there are five different types of official mediation organizations in Korea:
(1) court of first incident; 177 (2) mediation judges; (3) civil judges; (4) standing commissioners;
and (5) mediation councils. 178 It is also possible to categorize mediation according to where it
proceeds: if it occurs on the courthouse grounds, for example, it is categorized in a different way
than if it is conducted inside the court building with full court staff support. 179
The judicial authorities introduced the Mediation Act to the legislative in order to improve
the mediation process. Reviewing the development of the JCCDA, the judicial authorities were
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strongly involved in the promotion of the civil mediation programs. 180 Because there is a binding
decision, through either process, by the judge-mediators and the standing mediators, disputants’
self-determination is potentially weakened by judicial authority. 181 Generally, judges are proud
of the practice of court-based mediation, because, in the past, judges suffered greatly from lack of
time and manpower under the extreme pressure of their dockets, 182 but mediation lessens that time
constraint. It is possible to criticize civil mediation as being weakened by judicial authorities, but
the concept of private mediation has not been considered before now—therefore, the effects of
private mediation have yet to be evaluated. 183
There are at least five legal entities for civil mediation programs in Korea. 184 In addition,
there are settlement programs, before and during the trial, after filing a suit. 185 Furthermore,
because there are several different administrative ADR programs in Korea, 186 several scholars and
lawyers who were interviewed complained about the number of ADR programs and that the
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number of programs might cause confusion among lawyers or disputants when they decide to file
a complaint. 187
The courts still operate the Sanggun mediator who fully works on certain days, but is not
a full-time position.188 In addition, administrative governments, including the central and local
governments, operate the several different ADR programs. There are complaints, according to the
interviewee-scholars and lawyers, that there are too many mediation or arbitration programs in
Korea. An interviewee-lawyer mentioned that he sometimes got confused over which program
was suitable for filing a complaint for his client. 189
While it is generally believed that mediation would be more productive, and provide for a
more efficient pretrial, 190 the role of mediation in the current Korean legal system sees scholars’
approaches including the illusion of a mediation “advantage” and judges often tempted to resolve
disputes without uncovering hidden issues that may help the parties’ future relationships. 191
Several scholars have proposed the possibility of increasing development of mediation by using
alternative methods of dispute resolution and, in turn, decreasing the number of cases per judge.192
However, the courts respond that they are able to provide the most dynamic legal services within
their judicial territories through court-established mediation, which could not exist without their
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support. 193 Professor Greenebaum emphasized in my CJAM training manual that a mediator
might be tempted to develop all possible issues which directly and indirectly caused a dispute and
resolve hidden or unrelated problems at the same time. 194
I propose that encomiasts of mediation should not [untruthfully] influence the public in
order to make the myth of ADR as the primary method of resolving disputes, but we simply
understand that mediation might provide more diverse approaches than only the court’s ruling in
litigation. 195
b. Civil Court of First Incident
This section introduces the contemporary circumstances of the court of first incident and
reviews its character. According to the theoretical approach and interviews with retired and current
judges, this section reviews both strong and weak points of the court of first incident.
Regardless of whether a civil case is litigated or mediated, judges still have a duty to resolve
it: either through ruling or settlement. For example, in 2009, there were 1,074,236 civil cases filed,
and civil courts referred 58,672 of those cases to mediation, but judges from the court of first
incident handled 56,446 of them; in sum, 96.2% of referred mediation cases were handled by the
same judges who acted as mediators. 196
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Professor Tae-han Kim stated that the mediation process by the court of first incident could
not be categorized as ADR, because an ADR solution should be produced by the third-party
neutral, who does not have the authority to make a final decision. 197 Like Professor Kim, some
scholars critically mentioned that the judge-mediator in a court of first incident should abstain from
intervening in the process of mediation. To the contrary, the judicial authority and judges in the
civil courts counter-argued that the judge-mediator, like a same-neutral in the med-arb process,
would be efficient because the same-neutral could continuously review the case. 198
The court of first incident have still taken about ninety (90) percent of mediation cases in
Korea, even though the civil mediation programs have promoted since the enactment of JCCDA
of 1990. 199 Although the mediation programs have been externally developed and promoted by
the judicial authority, the court of first incident take a main role in the mediation process in Korea.
A judge in a civil court may choose to mediate a case in that court if he or she deems it
appropriate so do so. 200 Judges in Korean court of first incident have been traditionally hesitant
to release their cases to other locations, because it is considered a virtue for the court of first
incident to rule on disputes without outside help. 201 Therefore, in practice, the majority of cases
are resolved by court of first incident through mediation. 202 In 2009, when the judicial authority
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adopted the CMC, only 11,382 out of 1,074,236 cases filed in civil courts (about 1.06% of the
total) were filed by the parties directly to mediation. In that same year, the court of first incident
handled 56,446 cases referred to court-based mediation, which totaled about 96.2% of the total
mediation. 203
Even though the Korean Civil Mediation Law was enacted in 1990, the court of first
incidents mainly handled the civil mediation cases, because the law permits the judge to become
a mediator of the civil case from his or her court of first incidents. 204
Some scholars and judges state that mediation of suits has worked properly in Korea for
some time and that there is advantage to the speed and continuity of process between mediation
and trial. They argue that because a mediating judge provides his or her proposal after having
already reviewed the case file, it will save time and effort for both the judge and parties. 205
Because the same judge-mediator could review the same issue, even if both parties face deadlock,
the same judge could continuously review it. In addition, the same judge-mediator could have an
opportunity to provide the final solution to the same case. 206
Contrary to previous arguments, several concerns arise about judges in the court of first
incident playing such a major role in Korean mediation. 207 Because the same judge will both refer
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and mediate a case, parties might feel pressured to obey the judge’s proposal without considering
further negotiation. 208 This indistinguishability between ruler and facilitator is sometimes referred
to as “Wonmim Jaepan” (원님재판), from a tradition harkening back to the Chosun dynasty, when
officials acting as local governors were called upon to judge as well. 209 Parties must also consider
whether rejecting a judge’s proposal at one stage will necessarily change that same judge’s opinion
in the next stage of mediation. In other words, the judge might also face pressure to make a
different proposal based on discordance from an identical authority in the same case. 210
Before the judiciary adopted judicial mediation in the 1980s, the term “trial only,” instead
of “trial first,” was commonly used to describe Korean legal society, because the court was
considered the only public organization that could resolve disputes. 211 The JCCD Act was
promulgated in 1990 to combat the flood of cases assigned to each judge. Even after its enactment,
however, many Korean judges still hesitate to release cases to organizations outside the trial
process or to allow others to mediate their cases, out of fear that other judges or members of the
public will laugh at them as “tiger judges.” 212 The term “tiger judge” developed during Korea’s
occupation by the Japanese Empire and spread by word of mouth through early Korean legal
society. As the story goes, during the occupation a certain man bribed a high-ranking officer with
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a tiger skin in return for being appointed to the judgeship. When the new judge took the bench,
however, he discovered that he had no capability to write official rulings or opinions for his cases
because he had no legal education background. To make rulings without creating an official
record, he resorted to mediating almost every case he received. Thereafter, whenever a judge
mediates a case instead of creating an official ruling, other judges may call him or her a “tiger
judge”: indicating that he or she is unwilling to do the work associated with drafting an opinion. 213
As a consequence, Korean judges’ concern for being traditionally considered and called a
tiger judge, which means a lazy or an unqualified judge who refers cases into the mediation
process, resulted in some judges suffering from overloaded workloads. 214 Thus, there is a practical
reason to reduce judges’ overloaded cases.
The judicial system gradually recognized that judges were overloaded and that legal service
in courtrooms needed to be improved. 215 One example of such an “overloaded” year was 2008,
during which 1,259,031 civil cases were filed on the lower level of the civil courts. There were
only 2,307 judges at the trial level, so each judge handled about 545.7 cases. 216 The regional
lawyers’ association reported that some judges led civil proceedings in an authoritarian manner
and treated the parties unkindly. According to my interviews with Korean judges, most judges are
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under time pressure and cannot give parties sufficient time to express their opinions in the
courtroom. 217
This article draws upon interviews with two Korean judges, each of whom had more than
ten years of judicial experience. 218 One judge mentioned how Korean court cases are currently
controlled through an exclusive internal network. When he logs into his account, every case’s
schedule pops up on the screen, and he can determine how long he will spend on a case. If a case
will require more than one year to complete, it is automatically “red-flagged” for the judge to
expedite it. 219 This means that Korean judges are under pressure through both self-monitoring
and supervisory reviewing by the judicial authority.
One Korean judge explained his hard work. According to his statement, he opens his court
once a week. He usually sits up all night in his office in order to write the ruling on his cases the
day before the court date. After the judge comes back from his house, where he took a shower and
had breakfast, he spends the entire day hearing and ruling on cases. By the late afternoon, he grows
impatient and will likely interrupt an attorney or party if he thinks a statement is irrelevant to the
case. 220
Gathering from an article written by a different judge (Judge Kwon), I uncovered that,
while Korean judges made rulings on 68.9% of civil cases filed in 1991, in that same year only
217
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about five percent of civil cases went further into the trial process and only about seven percent of
civil cases filed were resolved through settlement. Judge Kwon opined that a U.S. judge would be
astonished at how the Korean legal system can tolerate such a large number of civil cases with so
few judges. 221
However, in my opinion, Judge Kwon underestimated the capacity of Korean civil courts
when he mentioned the seventy percent ruling rate above, because, after the Korean Civil
Mediation Law was enacted in 1990, judges in the court of first incident still handled both civil
trial and mediation cases. 222
According to a recent survey of judges, seventy-two percent of those who participated said
that mediation should remain primarily in the court of first incidents, while only twenty-eight
percent of judges did not agree. 223 The majority of civil court judges prefer to mediate cases in
their courtrooms rather than release them to other mediation organizations. In addition, seventyone percent of judges agree that it is reasonable to seek an alternative way of resolving disputes
filed in court, such as through mediation. 224 This means that there is still some portion of civil
court judges, though they are a minority, who still hold very conservative or negative opinions
toward mediation. Furthermore, fifty-nine (59) percent of judges agreed to release mediation cases
to the outer mediation organizations while forty (40) percent of judges disagreed with releasing to
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the outer. 225 This means that almost half of judges want to keep their authority to rule and mediate
in their courtroom. Because judges are conservative not to release their cases, the cases could
remain to go through and the number of civil cases could not be reduced. It would be discordant
with the Supreme Court’s purpose in initiating the legal reform in 1990 and 2009. Therefore,
Korean judges are still under deep pressure beneath overloaded caseloads. Because the judges
alternate position as mediator for the same cases in the same courtroom, the judges still take care
of almost the same number of civil cases.
c. Mediation Judge
Mediation judges (Jojeong Jeondam Pansa, 조정전담판사, 調停專擔判事) have the
same authority as judges of the court of first incident. 226 As a main role of mediation judge,
mediation cases referred by civil judges are filtered through mediation judges. Mediation judges
are responsible for “filtering” mediation referred by civil judges, and for distributing those cases
to CMC or outside organizations.227 As of 2012, there were only about ten mediation judges in
Korea, and those ten also hold additional positions in the court system. 228
Mediation judges hold a similar position to U.S. magistrate judges in a District Court,
because they have the same authority to handle mediation cases as a civil judge. 229 Whereas a
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magistrate judge uses facilitative mediation, without the authority to make a binding decision, a
Korean mediation judge might have the authority, the same as a judge in a court of first incident,
to make a binding decision. 230 The authority of the mediation judge is also similar to that of a
med-arbitrator, because the mediation judge would be a same neutral in a med-arb case and hold
the authority of arbitrator when both parties face deadlock in negotiation.
Also, a retired Supreme Court judge argued to increase the number of mediation judges in
order to promote civil mediation. 231 To the contrary, instead of expanding the court-annexed
mediation programs—including the mediation judges’ program—I propose a private mediation
program as a court-connected mediation program. Because the CMCs are handling too small
numbers of mediation cases while the court of first incident still mainly operates the civil mediation
programs inside of the court territory.
In my opinion, this program is currently not properly working in court-annexed mediation
and should instead be incorporated into court-mediation centers, due to the small number of
mediation judges.

In order to properly distribute civil mediation cases into the CMC, court-

annexed and outer mediation organizations, and court-connected mediation programs, I guess the
CMC and mediation judge programs should be transform the character of organization for auditing
and training. 232
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d. Mediation Council (Bisangim-Jojeongwiwon, 비상임조정위원, 非常任調停委員)

Although the number of mediation council members is greater than any other organization,
the portion of entire mediation cases handled by them is pretty small. And, it is criticized that
some members are unenthusiastically working or improperly mediating cases. Although the
mediation council has been used for a long time, it is still considered “lesser” than other mediation
processes, because it is an extrajudicial process under the viewpoint of the judicial authority. 233
Because a member of mediation council does not have authority to make a binding
decision, the facilitative method is used during the typical mediation process. 234 Facilitation is
meaningful in the history of Korean court-led mediation, because the council of mediation could
provide better method of self-determination during the mediation process. 235 The value of both
inner and outer council mediation programs is much closer to a ‘pure’ mediation type, such as selfdetermination and informal process in the court-led mediation. 236
Each council of mediation shall be comprised of at least two commissioners (mediators),
as well as a judge of a court of first incident or a mediation judge. 237 A council of mediation
consists of two sub-councils: the “inner council,” court-annexed; and the “outer-council,” court-
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connected. 238 Chief judges of courts usually appoint to the councils professionals who have
advanced knowledge and high moral reputations. 239 Inner councils are made up of commissioners
personally appointed by the chief judge and a chief commissioner, who is a civil-court or mediation
judge. 240 Outer councils of mediation are used for early mediation, and are appointed from a
group or association, such as the Korean Bar Association or the Korean Commercial Arbitration
Board (“KCAB”). 241
As of 2014, there were around 6,200 Inner-members in mediation councils. 242 Unlike the
requirement for becoming a standing commissioner—first being a mediator—there is no specific
requirement to be appointed as a member of a council of mediation. 243 However, the court has
usually selected members from the professions or professors, based on the expectation that council
members will have advanced knowledge and high moral reputation. 244 Despite having such a
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high number of council members, in 2009 the council of mediation handled only 2,226 mediation
cases out of 1,074,236 total civil cases, and fewer than three mediation cases were handled by each
commissioner. 245
According to one interview with a previous mediation council mediator, the chief
commissioner (judge) typically only takes part in the initial meeting and introduces the
commissioners to the parties, then has the two lower commissioners facilitate the mediation.246
For that particular judge’s cases, before he went to the court he simply reviewed copies of each
file to prepare his proposal for each mediation case. During mediation sessions, he did not urge
the parties, but did explain his opinion on a possible agreement when parties were deadlocked. 247
He usually conducted mediation after his regular work, during the late afternoon, because most of
the commissioners had their own professional jobs and were only available after work. 248
According to that judge’s statement, he received about 90 U.S. dollars per day: a number based
not on the number of cases, but on the number of days he attended mediation hearings. 249
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Managing and operating a mediation council creates several problems. First, officers of the
court must put in additional effort to run the mediation process, such as making copies and
scheduling appointments for each commissioner and disputant in a mediation case. 250 Second,
judges have serious question regarding councils’ operations, because judges believe that
commissioners only rarely or involuntarily participate in the mediation process: 251

some

appointed commissioners will only handle one mediation case per year, because that is the
requirement to be reappointed for another two-year term. 252 Third, judges and lawyers have not
been trained to conduct any other method of dispute resolution besides trial, 253 and, according to
the commissioners whom I interviewed, they also had no special mediation training before being
appointed. 254 The interviewed commissioner went on to say how one of the other commissioners
spent more time speaking from his experience and scolding parties than facilitating mediation.
Outer-council mediation program is the most experimental attempt in Korean judicial
history, because it is the first time for the court to release its cases outside of court territory. 255
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This mediation program has jointly operated with the ‘early mediation’ program that court releases
cases to a case by the first trial date. 256
The authority of outer-council mediators is similar to that of inner-council mediators,
because they could mediate a case referred by the court of first incident and do not have the
authority to make a binding decision. 257
Although several private mediation organizations are involved with civil mediation cases,
there is no statistical data for research on the achievement of these private groups. 258 Currently,
several law schools, the Korean Bar Association, the KCAB, and other professional associations
for specific industries have joined the mediation council. 259
In Japan, according to the Japanese Act on Promotion of Use of ADR, which was enacted
in 2004 and effective in 2007, 260 several private-service entities—sponsored by a specific industry,
a local bar association, or an association of experts, and other ADR services—provide private ADR
services. 261 Unlike Japanese authentication for private mediation entities, the Korean judiciary

256

Id. at 71, 95, 113-14.

257

Id. at 71, 113-14 (Hon. Judge Jung mentions that the JCCDA does not exactly indicate the outermediation council as a mediation council. But, it is generally considered as mediation council).
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Minjung Kim, Sabeobhyung ADRyi Baljeonbanghyang [Promotion of Court ADR] 181, 214 in THE
20 YEAR ANNIVERSARY OF KOREAN JUDICIAL

OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION, CONFERENCE OF
CONCILIATION OF CIVIL DISPUTES ACT (2010) (Korean).
259

Id. at 204, 212, 215-220.
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http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/AOP.pdf (last visited in Oct. 11, 2016).
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Shusuke Kakiuchi, Regulation of Dispute Resolution in Japan: Alternative Dispute Resolution and its
Background, in REGULATING DISPUTE RESOLUTION: ADR AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE AT THE
CROSSROADS 269, 274 (Felix Steffek and Hannes Unberath ed.,2013).
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does not prepare a certification program for private-mediation providers. 262 According to the
JCCDA, article 6, the court of first incident could refer the civil case into the mediation process. 263
But this article does not provide a list of possible legal entities. According to the JCCDA, article
8, a chief mediator and two or more mediators are needed to comprise the council of mediation. 264
Unlike the CMC, a chief mediator (judge) should compromise two outer-council mediators who
are qualifying under JCCDA article 9. 265
In sum, this outer mediation could be a bridge to private mediation programs, because it is
the first trial to release civil cases to outside of court territory. However, it is necessary to prepare
a unified ADR promotion act, like the Japanese Act on Promotion of Use of ADR, in order to
promote the dispute resolution programs in private area.
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Jeong-Il Suh, supra note 161, at 40.

263

JCCDA art. 6, (“A court of a suit may, if deemed necessary, refer a case pending therein to conciliation
(mediation) by a ruling before a judgment in an appellate trial is given”).
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JCCDA art. 8, (“A council of conciliation (mediation) shall be comprised of a chief commissioner and
two or more commissioners”).

265

JCCDA art. 9, “A chief commissioner (mediator) shall be as follows:
1. In cases under Article 7 (2), a conciliation (mediation) judge or a standing commissioner;
2. In cases under article 7 (3), the chief judge of the court of the suit;
3. In cases under article 7 (5), a commissioned judge or an entrusted judge;
4. In cases under a Si/Gun Court, a judge of the Si/Gun court.”
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Chapter IV. Court-annexed Mediation Center (“CMC”, 법원조정센터, 法院調停
center)

CMC programs were experimentally established in Seoul and Busan in 2009, then
expanded to three other major cities in 2011. 266 For this new program, several retired Supreme

266

MUJE CHO, BUSANBEOBWONJOJEONGCENTER GAESOSIK INSAMALSUM [OPENING SPEECH OF BUSAN
COURT MEDIATION CENTER] 10, 13 in THE OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION, COURT MEDIATION
CENTER COLLECTION (2011) (Mediation centers are currently established in Seoul, Pusan, Daegu,
Deajeon).
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Court judges were appointed as standing commissioners, and CMCs were located in high appellate
courts. 267 There were a total of thirty standing commissioners in the CMC in 2014. 268 According
to JDDCA article 10, the standing mediators are hired as full-time bar-licensed mediators with at
least fifteen years of legal experience each. 269
CMC mediation is similar to “med-arb,” 270 because a CMC mediator has authority to make
a binding decision without participants’ agreement at the end of a proceeding. 271 According to
JCCDA article 30, 272 a current standing mentions that mediator could make a decision based on
the interests of both parties for a fair solution of conflict, without conflicting with the applicant’s
reason for proceeding. 273
As the judiciary concluded that the CMC program in Seoul and Pusan was successful, it
has expanded the CMC programs to other cities. However, it is doubtful whether the CMC
program was well-operated in the first two cities. As seen below, the number of referrals from the
court of first incident to the CMC was generally less than the number voluntarily filing for most
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parties and all the relevant circumstances ex officio, unless unreasonable, to the extent of the purport of the
application”).
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DONGWOOK KIM, supra note 62, at 308-09; JCCDA, art. 30.
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of the first year. Contrary to the first year of the CMC, the number of referrals dramatically
increased in the second year; for example, the court of first incident referred 681 cases in April of
2009. However, comparing the voluntarily filing in the first two years, it seems that the number
voluntarily filing would slightly decline in the second year. Then, total number of mediation cases
in the CMC would be increased by the referral. Therefore, the number of cases dealt with by a
standing mediator also increased; for example, the average number of mediation cases per standing
mediator reached more than 100 cases in April of 2009.
In sum, it seems that the public might not fully recognize the CMC as a mediation
organization when the judiciary tries to expand to other cities. Even though it looked like the total
number handling mediation cases would increase, it is based on referrals by the court of first
incident, not by the voluntary filing.

(Figure 1) Seoul CMC
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(Table 3) Seoul CMC
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Referal…

Voluntary
Filing
a

Referral
b

Total
a+b

number of cases per
mediator
(a+b)/8

4
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10.875

5
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However, as seen below, it might be counter-argued that the judiciary had just established
the experimental program and the public did not recognize the existence of the CMC due to lack
of advertisement. Furthermore, the counter-argument would assert that the rate of settlement by
parties is almost always higher than the rate of binding decisions by standing mediators. This
means that the CMC program might be close to the core values of ADR, such as self-determination:
both parties would reach a consensual agreement, while the standing mediators contain themselves
to making binding decisions.
(Figure 2) Comparison of Percentage of Settlement and Binding Dedision
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But the success rate of reaching settlement is reaching beyond forty (40) percent during the
first two years. Unlike the rate of successfully reaching agreement in the Korean CMC, the Indiana
mediation program reached more than ninety (90) percent successfully reaching an agreement
during the experimental period.

Comparing the two rates of settlement between the mediation

programs in the U.S. and Korea, it is hard to conclude that the CMC program is efficient or
successful at reaching settlements.
(Table 4) Comparison of Settlement in CMC

Comparison of settlement in CMC

Year

Number of
cases
in Settlement
Month CMC

Binding
decision
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Furthermore, it seems that there is an internal problem in the CMC program; even though
the rate of settlement is beyond that of binding decisions, as seen below, the rate of settlement by
the parties has been decreasing from forty-nine (49) percent to thirty-four (34) percent.
(Table 5)
Seoul CMC

Filed by parties

Referred by courts

% of settlement

2009

119.8/month

85.1

49%

2010

115.1

375.4

43%
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2011

91.1

461.3

37%

2012

About 80

About 500

34%

Although the CMC has stated that the number of mediation cases filed to the CMC has
increased by 50% compared with the period prior to its establishment, and that satisfaction with
CMC service exceeds 80%, it also indicates that the public still widely disregards mediation
services offered by the CMC. 274 According to the released information, there are several problems
with CMC operation: the number of cases filed by parties is shrinking, the number of referred
cases is growing (as seen above), and the percentage of cases reaching agreement is shrinking
drastically.

(Table 6)
FY 2012

Filed by parties

Referred by courts

Number of cases in CMC

2013

7589

% of reaching agreement

43%

37%
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JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 89; Interview with parties in CMC in June and July 2013 (Majority
of parties express that they are satisfied with the process of mediation in CMC, but not outcome of
mediation).
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As seen above, the percentage of mediation cases concluded through agreement is a little
higher when filed by parties rather than when referred by courts. Therefore, we may draw the
conclusion that the percentage of cases ending in agreement is shrinking because of the increase
in referrals and decreased public interest in the CMC’s mediation service.
In sum, court-annexed mediation would save litigants time and money, if the program was
well-designed and managed, 275 but it cannot be said that current Korean mediation will be accepted
by the general public or be suitable for settlement in the place of trial. 276 First, the percentage of
mediations by the court of first incident remains too high and parties may be pressured to accept
the judge’s proposal of agreement. Second, the mediation process within current court-annexed
mediations is too similar to a trial, because mediators make binding decisions, like a trial judge,
when parties are in a deadlock. 277 Third, although the Supreme Court tried to expand its service
program into court-connected mediation, the number of mediations by outside council was too
small to establish self-determination. 278 By establishing early mediation, courts should start to
release mediation cases to outside organizations as part of court-connected mediation, and
therefore take a significant step toward developing self-determination. 279
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Chapter V. Characters of CMC
Chapters III and IV generally review the Korean civil mediation programs and indicates
the characters of each mediation program, comparing them with U.S. mediation programs. This
chapter theoretically reviews CMC because the CMC illustrates the typical character of Korean
civil mediation programs. 280 Because the CMC is the first independent entity from the court
mediation program, it is meaningful to understanding the character of this body. After the CMC
program was beginning in Seoul and Pusan of two major cities as a pilot program in 2009, it has

280

In this chapter, I emphasize that the characteristics of a standing mediator are similar to a med-arbitrator
and that the environment of the mediation-conference is becoming courtroom-like. In addition, the legal
effects of CMC mediation are the same as the judge’s ruling.
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become a stable status and expanded four (4) other major cities, such as Daegu, Incheon, Kwangju,
and Deajeon in 2011. 281
Chapter V will review the historical background of the CMC and the qualification of
mediator and compare this with the U.S. mediators who work as private mediators and also courtconnected or court-annexed mediators at state or federal levels. Second, I compare the reference
from the court and voluntarily filing by the party. Third, I review the data of reference and
voluntary filing to the CMC and investigate the current and possible issues of CMC in order to
survive in the current harsh legal environment in Korea. Fourth, I review the typical characteristics
of the CMC, comparing it with U.S. mediation programs in Indiana and the 7th Circuit Court
through an empirical approach, such as interviews and observation of the CMC and U.S. mediation
programs. Fifth, I review the characteristics of each participant in the CMC process, such as the
mediator, party, and lawyer, including reviewing the legal theoretical and empirical approaches of
each.
a. Qualification of Standing Mediator
The CMC hired full time bar-licensed mediators with at least 15 years of legal experience
each. 282 Several retired Supreme Court judges were appointed as standing commissioners for this
new programs 283 and there were a total of 30 standing commissioners in the CMC in 2014. 284
According to the article 10 of the JCCDA, the qualification of the standing mediator in the CMC
is that of a licensed attorney with certain type of career determined by the Supreme Court

281
282

Sungtae Kim, supra note 2, at 58.
DONGWOOK KIM, supra note 73, at 309, 311.

283

Sundong Lee, supra note 77, at 10.

284

Id, at 10, 14.
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Regulation. 285 Because the CMC is the first legal entity that could independently make a binding
decision without the judge’s review or instructions under the current Korean legal system, the
Supreme Court hired the over-qualified judges in order to legitimate the CMC system as soon as
possible. For this reason, the majority of the standing mediators are highly-ranked retired judges,
such as retired Supreme Court judges. 286
While the Supreme Court expanded to include four (4) other major cities after being
satisfied with the outcome and processes of the CMC, it did not reveal how the CMC exactly
produced these outstanding mediation results. I believe that there are two mythic promises that
are established by the Supreme Court in order to expand the CMC programs. 287
First, the CMC might reach almost 50 percent of successfully resolved agreements. 288 But
it inherently has a weak point to be criticized because the standing mediators have authority to
make a binding decision as an arbitrator. The CMC might produce a better mediation program
than any other mediation organizations. When the standing mediator could make a binding
decision without either party’s protest, it could be counted as a successful consensual agreement. 289
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JCCDA art. 10 (“a standing commissioner (mediator) shall be appointed by the Minister of National
Court Administration from among persons who are a licensed attorney with certain careers determined by
the Supreme Court Regulations”).
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JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 72.
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Generally see Brian A. Pappas, supra note 70.
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JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 90-91.
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JCCDA. Art. 30 (“Where agreement has not been made or where the terms of agreement are
unreasonable, a conciliation judge shall make a decision on cases for fair resolution of the cases, considering
interests of parties and all the relevant circumstances ex officio, unless unreasonable, to the extent of the
purport of the application”).
70

It might be incorrectly assumed that the CMC and the standing mediator resolved more agreements
than other mediators who do not follow this same process.
Second, the CMC hired several retired Supreme Court judges and highly-ranked judges as
standing mediator for this new program, expecting that the CMC would rapidly and successfully
be settled as a mediation program. 290 Also, the belief was that the highly-ranked retired judges
and experienced lawyers would perform as well as mediators. 291 But this proved to be a myth
because the mediator’s role is totally different from the judge’s performance. 292 In addition, there
is no educational program for any mediators in Korea. There is a seminar in an annual meeting
for sharing information and techniques for providing better service. But there is no official
program for training candidate mediators as either a standing mediator or mediator. 293
Because a retired judge has an abundant experience of mediation in the courtroom, it might
seem that there is no need to educate him or her. 294 But several U.S. mediators report that retired
judges receive certification in mediation after completing a mediator education program. 295 Even
though they put their name on the mediator’s list in the harsh mediator’s market, they are rarely
selected based on the free market system. 296 Based on this, it could be inferred that the judge is
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Sundong Lee, supra note 77, at 10.
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Interviewed Korean judges on Dec 12, 2014.
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Interviewed U.S. mediators on Oct. 23, 2013.
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Interviewed with a standing mediator on June 12, 2013.
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Interviewed Korean standing mediator on June 12, 2013 (I emphasize that he was proud of having more
than 15 years of legal professional experience even though he do not have a regular mediation training. But,
I want to emphasize that a good mediator are a good listener who has a active listening skill).
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Interviewed with a U.S. mediator on Oct. 23, 2014.
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Interviewed with a U.S. mediator on Oct. 23, 2014.; http://www.in.gov/judiciary/cle/2331.htm (last
visited on Dec. 11, 2016)
71

accustomed to making a ruling based on legally gathered evidence instead of facilitating the
sharing of information and opinions between adversarial parties. Then the private mediator, who
has recently retired from the bench and is new to the practice of mediation might be looked upon
less favorably by the potential customers, possibly to the point of withdrawing from the mediationlegal market system. 297
In sum, the majority of the standing mediators currently consists of retired Supreme Court
or retied highly-ranked judges based on that, due to high standards and strict expectations, majority
of the standing mediators in the CMC were appointed from the pool of retired judges. They could
be an elite for evaluating the legal issues because they devoted their entire legal careers to the
courtroom, although they are less skillful at facilitating mediating without re-education of
mediation. Similarly in the U.S., retired judges serving as mediators might be unaccustomed to
the practice of mediation.

I could not indicate whether the standing mediators would be

unaccustomed or inexperienced in the mediation field. But similar to the free legal market system
in the U.S., the CMC had better regularly provide educational or training programs for standing
mediators with long-term view of adopting private mediation program.
Because a standing mediator has the same authority as a judge during the mediation process
in the CMC, 298 a standing mediator’s qualifications are considered higher than those of average
lawyers. However, there is no typical training program for either standing or general mediators.299
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Interviewed with a U.S. mediator on Oct. 23, 2014.

298

JCCDA art. 7. (4), (“the standing commissioner (mediator)...shall have the same power as a conciliation
(mediation) judge”).
299

Interviewed with a standing mediator on June 12, 2013.
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While I interviewed one of the standing mediators in the CMC, who was proud of his
qualifications, including his educational and legal backgrounds. 300 And the standing mediator
explained that there have been several annual seminars since 2009 so that the entire body of
standing mediators gathered and shared their experiences and techniques for better mediation
service. 301 In addition, the standing mediator provided books that were published by the CMC as
the editorial seminar books. But, because these books are neither well known nor released to the
public, the CMC is still not well known by the public.
There is no training course or re-education program for standing mediators. Therefore,
before beginning work as a standing mediator, they are not trained for mediation. It is doubtful
that the retired judges could successfully facilitate communication between adversarial parties.
Even though they have an outstanding legal background, they are not experts in the process and
performance of mediation, as I mentioned above.
Before I critique the lack of training course for the standing mediators, I will compare the
training course or re-education program for U.S. mediators. First of all, the process is not easy
because training programs and standards of qualification for mediators and conference attorneys 302
vary widely in each state and federal courts. Therefore, I only focus on the mediation programs in
Indiana and the 7th Circuit. Similar to standing mediators in the CMC, magistrate judges of the
appeals court of Indiana and settlement attorneys in the 7th Circuit Court are not trained in the role
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I found that several standing mediators obtained more than legal master degrees in Laws; Interviewed
with a standing mediator on June 12, 2013.
301

Interviewed with a standing mediator on June 12, 2013.

302

In 7th Circuit Court, the standing mediator is called as a “conference attorney.”; Please visit the website
for settlement conference in the 7th Circuit, available at http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/Scoprgm.htm (last
visited on Oct. 1, 2016).
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of mediator. Both magistrate judges and settlement attorneys are hired as mediators, similar to
Korean standing mediators, and those whom I interviewed also indicated that they graduated law
school received state bar certification, and had more than 10 years of legal work experience. 303
However, before taking a position as mediator, they did not have experience or specialization in
the mediation or negotiation fields. Furthermore, they explained that the law schools which they
attended had not provided any negotiation or mediation related curriculum when they were in
school. 304

It could be inferred that both magistrate judges and settlement attorneys had not

completed any mediation related training courses before they obtained the position of mediator in
court-annexed mediation.
With this in mind, the Korean standing mediators in the CMC are similar to the magistrate
judges or the settlement attorneys in the United States. It is possible that the Korean standing
mediators have more legal experience in the courtroom than the U.S. mediators. Then it might
argue that the CMC standing mediators do not need to be trained in the same way as the U.S.
magistrate judges and settlement attorneys.
However, unlike the U.S. mediators, the majority of standing mediators are retired judges
and some of them are from the Supreme Court. Therefore, majority of the standing mediators still
do not have enough knowledge to mediate the adversarial parties because their primary legal
experience has been based on ruling as a judge, not representing parties as a lawyer.
In sum, the standing mediators in the CMC consist of the best judges and lawyers who
have legal experience and knowledge in Korea. During interviews with Korean scholars, former
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Interviewed in Indianapolis and Chicago Nov. 10, Nov. 20, and Nov. 24, 2014.

304

Interviewed on Nov. 10, Nov. 20, and Nov. 24, 2014.
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and current judges, and mediators, all of them indicated that the Supreme Court has a strong
intention to improve mediation, especially the CMC. 305 But it is doubtful that the Supreme Court
has its own volition to activate the CMC mediation for two reasons: the CMC’s portion of
caseloads is minor, and most of the public do not yet recognize the existence of the CMC. 306
Furthermore, the standing mediators might have gathered vast experience in mediation
despite not having any previous special training in mediation since 2009. They could serve as
trainers to provide a special educational mediation program for lawyers for a lower level. In the
appeal level, they could take the less number of cases and put enough time to mediate a case for
better service. 307 There is no typical negotiation or mediation culture in Korea. 308 Because the
standing mediators already have had a vast mediation experience in the CMC, they could serve as
guides to establish the Korean mediation method.
b. Operation of the Korean Court-Annexed Mediation Center
The CMC gets mediation cases in two ways: referred by the court or voluntary filing by a
party. 309 When a party voluntarily files a mediation case, they should file in the court. Then the
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Interviews on Dec. 12, 2014 and Apr, 14, 2015.
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Interview with Korean lawyer on Arp. 14, 2015.
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JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 95; Interviewed on Arp. 15, 2015; I want to emphasize that standing
mediators have tremendous mediation experience and they could newly build Korean mediation tradition.
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It already explained that, in Confucian culture, Koreans have been trained not to reveal a conflict to a
group or community. In addition, in Korean culture, commercial and merchant groups were disparaged
during the Chosun Dynasty. At that time, many Koreans were inexperienced in commercial dealings and
no traditional way of negotiation. Furthermore, some scholars guess that they are shameful to negotiate the
price to purchase products.
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JCCDA art 2. 6. (“Parties of a civil dispute may file an application for conciliation with a court”) and
art. 6 (“A court of a suit may, if deemed necessary, refer a case pending therein to conciliation by a ruling
before a judgment in an appellate trial is given).
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case is transferred to the CMC by the court clerk. Likewise, when the court decides to refer the
case to the mediation process of the CMC, the court clerk transfers a copy of the case to the
CMC. 310 Therefore, it is not only connected with the court system but also annexed with the court
system because all mediation cases go through the court system. During the interviews and
observations, I found typical characters of CMC.

I found five (5) problems that prohibit

participants and standing mediators from approaching a consensual agreement.
Instead of using two conference room for separate session, CMC uses a single conference.
Unlike U.S. mediation, the Korean mediation programs have used only one (1) mediationconference room. 311 I found this significantly different to using a mediation-conference room
between Korea and the U.S. Not only the different number of conference rooms, but also the
attitude of the mediator to mediate the case and to treat the parties in the conference room provides
a tremendous difference based on the role of mediator.
In the separate session of the U.S. mediation process, the mediator locates the two parties
in two adjacent rooms which do not share a wall. Then the mediator, regardless of private or courtconnected mediation, or the magistrate judge or settlement attorney of the court-annexed
mediation, moves between the two conference rooms in order to convey the party’s offers and
counter-offers during the session. 312
When I observed a certain mediation case in the court, the magistrate judge located one
party in the courtroom and the other party in a conference room. These rooms shared the rest area
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JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 95.

311

Observation on June 12, 2013.

312

Observation in Indianapolis on Nov. 20, 2014 and in Chicago on Nov. 10, 2014.
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and were not too close. However, during the separate session, the magistrate judge came and went
between the conference rooms more than 30 times. 313
However, in the separate session of the Korean court-annexed mediation, the standing
mediator occupies one mediation-conference room and askes each party to come in and go out of
the room. At that time, the standing mediator calls the other party with a loud voice to come in
and, in addition, asks the party who was in the conference room to leave the room and notify the
other party to come in. 314
In sum, it might cause unexpected problems or uncomfortable circumstances for the
parties. Regardless of using one conference room during the joint session, using one mediationconference might cause the parties to feel inconvenient during the separate session. First, the
mediation parties could be put into an awkward environment. After each party tries to resolve
conflict in vain, they may become upset by the unresolved problem, so that they do not want to
meet each other even in passing during the separate session. But the standing mediator might push
them to look at each other each time they enter and leave the room. 315 Second, there is no stable
place for parties to consider and discuss the issues. One of the parties should be out of the
mediation-conference room and wait in the hallway or resting area next to the room during the
separate session while the standing mediator works with the other party in the room. The party
outside the room does not have an isolated or secure place to talk with a lawyer or any other person
because they do not know when the standing mediator will call them to come in. Therefore, the
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Observation in Indianapolis on Nov. 24, 2014.
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Observation in CMC on June 12, 2013.

315

Observation in CMC on June 12, 2013.
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parties could not get secure advice from the lawyer. Furthermore, they might be exposed in the
open space with other parties who are in the other mediation cases in the adjacent mediationconference rooms. 316 The parties could not focus on their own issues because, according to my
observation, everyone in this space is chatting. During the separate session, it is important for
each party to consider the other party’s offer and make a counter-offer while the other party is with
a standing mediator. However, the party who is located outside of the conference room might be
distracted based on the unsecured and unfriendly environment. 317
However, because there are two different types of mediators in the U.S., each mediator has
slightly different approaches to prepare the conference rooms. Regardless whether the mediator
is a solo or law firm-practitioner, before the mediators are selected by the parties, they prepare at
least two conference rooms. 318 When I interviewed a U.S. lawyer who was registered on the
private mediator list, the mediator showed me six conference rooms in a row in his firm. The
conference room was prepared for 5 people with enough space. 319 To compare and contrast with
private mediators, I also interviewed non-private mediators, including magistrate judges,
settlement attorneys, and mediators for a non-profit mediation organization in Indiana. Magistrate
judges in Indiana also used the courtroom as a conference room based on a lack of suitable
available rooms in the courthouse. The settlement attorney in Chicago, Illinois, and the mediators
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Observation in CMC on June 12, 2013.
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Interviewed with a mediator on Oct. 23, 2014.
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Observation and interview with a mediator on Oct. 23, 2014.
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Observation in two different law firms in Bloomington on Oct. 23, 2014 and Indianapolis on Nov. 24,
2014.
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for a non-profit organization in Bloomington, Indiana, had enough suitable available conference
rooms in their locations. 320
(Picture 1)

According to my observations in Korea, the conference rooms in the CMC are almost twice
the size of the U.S. conference rooms, with seats for up to 10 people and located adjacent to the
standing mediator’s office.

During the separate session, the CMC could divide the large

conference room into two rooms or temporarily share the available courtroom for the mediation
process without interrupting other activities. 321 A picture illustrates that Korean CMC mediation
room is for at least 12 peoples.

320

Observations on Oct, 23 and Nov. 20, 2014 (Seoul neighborhood mediation center prepares at least two
conference rooms for each case for separate session).
321

Observation in CMC on June 12, 2013 and in Indianapolis on Nov. 20, 2014.
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Third, the Korean standing mediators are still in the authoritarianism because they are
acting like a judge on the bench. In contrast with the Korean standing mediators who use one
conference room, all of the U.S. mediators use at least two different conference rooms during the
separate session. When I observed the U.S. mediation in Indianapolis, Indiana, the magistrate
judge moved in and out two conference rooms more than thirty (30) times in the separate-morning
session. 322 The judge extended the morning session after obtaining both parties’ consent and put
her efforts to mediate the issue with physical hard work. 323 While I interviewed the magistrate
judge after the observation, I questioned how the magistrate judge could endure a physically hard
work. The magistrate judge simply answered that she believed it is the calling and she never
guessed that the ‘moving around’ was physical labor. Furthermore, she explained that it is a just
her job to help both parties reach a consensual agreement based on her work. 324
Fourth, the Korean standing mediators could not frequently move in and out of the
conference room because they have an abundance of documents that have been submitted by the
parties. As mentioned above, the CMC’s mediation is similar with an evaluative or med-arb
process. 325
In contrast to U.S. mediation, such as facilitative mediation, Korean mediation is,
generally, evaluative mediation. 326 Furthermore, because the standing mediators could make a
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Observation on Nov. 24, 2014.
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During the interview, I found that the U.S. mediators or magistrate judges, regardless of private or nonprivate, schedule on one mediation case in morning or afternoon session. In contrast to the Korean
mediation, they are not under the time pressure during the session.
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Interview in Indianapolis in 2014.
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Please see chapter II.
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Please see Ch. II.
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binding decision when two parties could not reach a consensual agreement, the role and the
authority of the standing mediators is similar to the med-arbitrator. Therefore, because the Korean
standing mediators should bring significantly large stacks of documents to the conference room, it
is almost impossible for them to move in and out of two different conference offices. 327
In sum, using only one mediation-conference room during the separate session is not proper
even when the court and the CMC have limited financial and building resources. While the CMC
focuses on the improvement and promotion of the mediation, it also might consider to also give
some attention to investment. When the CMC provides a comfortable environment during the
separate session, both parties would have a better chance to reach an agreement because they have
enough chances to consider and discuss the deal of negotiation. Therefore, the CMC should
consider that the purpose of the separate session and provide the proper environment for each party
when they are not with the standing mediator.
Standing mediators’ daily schedule is already set in one and half hour per case in CMC.
During the observation of both Korean and U.S. mediation, regardless of private or non-private
mediators, I found that the duration per session for Korean mediation is shorter than that of the
U.S., even though both of the Korean and the U.S. mediation programs do not have a specific
regulation to limit the duration of session. 328

327

Observations on June 12 & June 14, 2013.

328

Observation of the Korean court-annexed mediation cases and the U.S. private mediation cases in
Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana, and 7th Circuit Court of Appeals in Chicago, Illinois, in 2013 and
2014.
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While I observed the Korean mediation in the Court-annexed mediation center, the duration
per session was only one hour per case. I found that because of the short time limitation of the
session, the mediator should stop and postpone discussion until the next session even when both
parties negotiate well and the standing mediator works well with the parties. When the mediator's
schedule is full, the mediator would be unable to extend their session. 329 According my
observations, the Korean standing mediator could not extend the session schedule. During the
session scheduled in one (1) hour, the mediator spent several minutes’ greetings both parties. Then
in fact, they had to stop the mediation session due to a tight schedule even when while they are
approaching an agreement. 330
In contrast with Korean mediation, the U.S. mediation follows a relatively flexible schedule
in order to extend and complete the mediation when everyone agrees to extend the duration of a
meeting. 331 Like the Korean mediation session, private mediators usually schedule sessions for
each case for one hour. However, the mediator could extend the session with parties’ consent,
because the mediator usually keeps his or her schedule open for a half day. Therefore, when the
mediator recognizes that the process of negotiation and mediation between parties turns smoothly,
approaching a possible agreement, the mediator suggests both parties continue the session instead
of reschedule the session. 332
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Observation in CMC on June 12 & June 14, 2013.
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Observation in CMC on June 14, 2013.
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JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 9, at 109 (Judge Jung mentions that it usually takes 30 to 60 minutes.
According to my observation, standing mediator schedules each mediation case for one hour).
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Interviewed a mediator on Oct. 23, 2014.
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However, it might be counter-argued that the parties could be pressured by the private
mediator or unable to make good decisions because they are not accustomed to negotiate for
several hours at a time. Such a situation might cause an unpleasant outcome of the mediation.
But the private mediator explained that most of the parties involved in a mediation are with their
lawyers and have enough time to discuss matters with them. Furthermore, they do not sign the
written agreement on the day they reach an agreement. 333 Therefore, the parties are not relatively
under pressure of extended time or physical fatigue.
Standing mediator waste time for fact-finding. During the observations of the Korean and
U.S. mediations, I found a significant difference in the distribution of time for fact-finding,
regardless of the joint and separate sessions. During my observation of the U.S. mediation, I found
that both private and non-private mediators tried to spend less time on fact-finding. One of the
U.S. private mediators explained that they are interested in the "number" or "figure" of dollars,
instead of fact-finding. They only spend time for fact-finding at the beginning of the joint session.
Therefore, they are focusing on the negotiation and the amount of money they might end up giving
or receiving at the end of the mediation. 334
However, I found a greatly different process in the Korean mediation. The Korean standing
mediator spent a time fact-finding in both joint and separate sessions. Unlike the U.S. mediation,
the parties frequently argued regarding the fact concerning who did or who did not. In addition,
the standing mediator also engaged in the fact-findings. 335 I believe that there is one significant
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Please see subchapter 6.
Interviewed a mediator on Oct. 23, 2014. (In CMC, it is important for standing mediator to gather
evidence and fact-finding in order to render his or her decisions instead of helping participants to make an
agreement.)
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Observation in CMC on June 14, 2013.
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reason that the Korean mediator spent time for fact-finding: the Korean standing mediators have
authority to make a biding decision the same as the judge of the court in a suit. When I observed
the mediation cases in the CMC, 336 all of the members tried to discuss the facts instead of
negotiating to approach the new binding agreement.
In the U.S. mediation, the mediator spent less time on the opening statement and factfinding in the joint session than that of the Korean mediation. 337 Unlike the U.S. mediation, the
Korean standing mediator explains his or her authority during the opening statement and gathers
information and evidence, such as a hearing of the courtroom, because the Korean standing
mediator should prepare to make a binding decision in certain cases under the JCCDA article 30.338
Therefore, the Korean standing mediators must be ready to provide the binding decision when both
parties cannot reach a consensual agreement. In addition, the parties might have less time to
mediate the issues with the mediators in the CMC because they focus on the argument of facts
instead of the negotiation for an agreement. During my interview with one of the Korean party in
the CMC, he said that he was satisfied with the chance that he could talk with the standing mediator
without hesitance or interruption from the mediator or other party. 339

336

Please see supra Chapter II, Charters of Med-Arb
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Observations on July 2, 2013 and Nov. 24, 2014.
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JCCDA art. 30. (“Where agreement has not been made or where the terms of agreement are
unreasonable, a conciliation judge (‘mediation judge’) shall make a decision on cases for fair resolution of
the case, considering interests of parties and all the relevant circumstances ex officio, unless unreasonable,
to the extent of the purport of the application.”); The JCCDA recommends the Korean standing mediators
make a binding decision when they could not find the reasons that the mediator had better not to make a
binding decision.
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Interviewed with a participant on June 12, 2013.
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In sum, the Korean parties in the mediation process might have relatively less time or
chance to mediate than the U.S. parties based on the different approaches to the role of mediators,
such as evaluative and facilitative mediators.
It is doubtful whether both disputants in CMC fully understand the difference of legal effect
of settlement and binding-decision by a standing mediator if either party does not make objection
within two (2) weeks. Both the Korean and the U.S. mediators kindly and carefully explained the
meaning of the mediation, role of mediator, and effects of mediation in the opening statement.
However, when listening to the opening statement of the Korean standing mediator, I was curious
to learn whether the parties really and fully understood the entire meaning of the opening
statement. 340
As mentioned above, especially in the mediation in the Indiana state and 7th Circuit Court
of the federal mediation programs, U.S. mediation could be classified as the facilitative mediation
while Korean mediation is classified as the evaluative mediation. Therefore, the opening statement
in the U.S. mediation is relatively simplified in comparison to that of the Korean mediation. 341
During the opening statement, the U.S. mediator explained several important elements of
the mediation process in order to promote the rate of successful mediation and satisfaction of
mediation. 342 In addition, according to my observations, because most of the mediation parties
attended the process with a lawyer, the parties could fully understand the meaning of the opening
statement. Furthermore, even when parties were assisted by their lawyers, the U.S. mediators
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Observation in CMC on July 2, 2014.
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Observations on July 2, 2013, Nov, 10, 2014, and Nov. 24, 2014
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Observation on Nov. 20, and Nov. 24, 2014.
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explained the difference of the mediation and arbitration. 343 Then they emphasized the informality
of the mediation and repeatedly explained the role of the mediator during the joint and separate
sessions.
Unlike the U.S. mediation, there is significant difference in Korean mediation at the
beginning stage with regards to the opening statement. Because the Korean standing mediators
have much more authority during the mediation than that of the U.S. mediator, their opening
statements would be complicated and might cause the parties to misunderstand the standing
mediator’s authority and the legal effects of the outcome. 344
During my interview with the U.S. mediators, I found that most U.S. parties already
recognized the meaning of the mediation and requested their lawyers to pursue the mediation
process instead of a trial. However, I also interviewed the Korean parties, who used the process
of the CMC, and I gathered important information about recognizing the meaning of the opening
statement. Even though the Korean standing mediator explained the legal effect of the CMC
mediation in the opening and closing statements, several parties could not fully understanding the
legal effect of the CMC mediation. 345 Furthermore, most parties were also confused about the
authority and role of the standing mediator.
In my opinion, it might be caused by three reasons. First, most of parties do not have
previous experience either with trial or mediation. Only one party of twenty (20) parties had
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Observation on Nov. 20, 2014.
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Observation on July 2, 2013.

345

Due to the interview with a small number of the parties, it is impossible for me to produce the percentage
of understanding the opening and closing statements. It could be another possible topic to research in the
future.
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previous mediation experience and fully understood the process and the legal effects of the CMC
mediation. Some other parties called the standing mediator a judge and some implored with tears
in their eyes while they explained the circumstances of their cases. 346 Second, only three cases
involved lawyers’ assistance out of the 12 mediation cases in the CMC. Then the parties that had
no previous legal trial or mediation experience might not know the process of mediation because
they had not previously consulted a lawyer in preparing for the mediation. Third, the process of
the CMC mediation is complicated due to the Med-Arb authority with the standing mediator. I do
not directly ask whether the mediation parties could understand the legal effect and outcome of the
mediation and the standing mediator’s authority.

However, some of the parties indirectly

mentioned or complained that they were surprised when the standing mediator made a binding
decision all of a sudden. 347 According to Bartel’s proposal, the ideal transition from mediation to
arbitration requires the both parties’ consent. 348 However, according to my personal observations,
the standing mediator suddenly addressed that he would make a biding decision based on his
observation during the mediation session. 349 Therefore, it seems that the transition would be
surprising for both parties even though they were notified of the possibility of transition from
mediation to arbitration, including the standing mediator’s binding decision. Then some of
interviewee-parties complained that they could not know the possibility of a sudden transition
without notification of the mediator’s decision. 350
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Observation and interview on July 2, 2013.
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Brian A. Pappas, supra note 70, at 199-200.
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Id, at 199 (reciting Barry C. Bartel, supra note 70, at 683.
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Observation in CMC on June 12, 2013.

350

Interviews with participants on July 2, 2013.
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Therefore, an insufficient explanation in the opening statement regarding the mediation of
the CMC could cause parties to misunderstand the process and legal effect of mediation and also
decrease their satisfaction with the mediation. Therefore, the standing mediator had better put
more effort into explaining the meaning of the CMC mediation and the legal outcomes of the
decision and agreement in the CMC even though the CMC standing mediators generally explained
to the parties the process and the legal effects of an outcome in the CMC.
The jurisdiction of the CMC mediation is the same as the civil jurisdiction because either
party files suit in the court located in the jurisdiction, regardless of the reference by the court or
voluntary filing by the party. 351 However, when a case is in a remote jurisdiction, one of the parties
might be distressing to attend the mediation. I found an interesting application of technology in
the scheduling of a telephone conference for the mediation in the 7th Circuit Court. 352 This might
be legally risky because the mediator may not be able to easily confirm the identities of each party.
However, the settlement attorneys of the 7th Circuit Court in Chicago, Illinois, have used the
telephone conference when either or all of the parties are located in a remote area in order to
prevent the hardship of travel to Chicago.
However, I observed a different case in the CMC. Because the CMC has not adopted the
telephone conference as a way to hold mediation sessions, one of the parties might spend many
hours traveling to the CMC for a small claim case. 353 During my interview with a party who had
traveled more than six (6) hours to the CMC, he complained that he had to pay all travel expenses
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JCCDA art. 3. (“A conciliation case shall be under the jurisdiction of the district court, the branch court
of the district court, the Si court or the Gun court….”).
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Observation on Nov. 10, 2014.

353

Observation on June 12, 2013.
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and also give up his work as a day laborer. 354 Therefore, he was under pressure to adopt the other
party’s suggestions. Even if he had tried to negotiate a different amount, he could not believe that
this would reduce the amount of his payment because if the process were prolonged or postponed
to another day, he might lose more money on travel expenses and also the chance to earn his wages
while away from work due to the mediation. In this case, if he could have had the chance to
schedule a telephone conference, the outcome might be different, or he at least would have had a
better chance to negotiate with the other party.
In sum, when I interviewed with a settlement attorney in Chicago, I found that it is useful
for parties who reside in other cities based on saving the time and relieving the pressure and cost
of travelling. 355 In addition, according to the settlement attorney’s statement, adopting the
program of a telephone conference does not create an expense to the court and, relatedly, provides
the better service to the parties.
Because of urging disputants to sign on an agreement, there is weakness that disputant do
not have enough time to consult with a legal adviser for post-agreement. While the U.S. mediator
might facilitate the mediation between the parties, the Korean standing mediators might try to
govern the entire process and outcome of the mediation. Therefore, the Korean standing mediators
usually try to complete a written agreement or make a binding decision before the parties. 356 There
is a wide TV-computer screen on the wall that every party in the mediation-conference room can
watch. 357 At the end of mediation stage, regardless of whether it ends with a binding decision by
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Interviewed with a participant on June 12, 2013.
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Interviewed with a mediator on Nov. 10, 2014.
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Observation on June 12, 2013.

357

Observation on June 12, 2013.
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the standing mediator or an agreement by parties, the mediator promptly types the decision or the
agreement before the parties who watch it on the screen. While they reach an agreement, the
mediator types and prints out the document of the agreement. As soon as the document is reviewed
by each party, both immediately sign a written agreement prepared by the mediator on the
conference room. 358 This situation presents possible unfairness because the parties are expected
to sign a written agreement without having had a chance to get legal assistance to review what they
are signing. In addition, based on the mediator’s neutrality, the mediator would not be permitted
to help or assist any parties who are not represented by legal professionals or have no experience
in the mediation process. 359
Unlike the U.S. mediation, most of Korean mediation cases, including Korean civil cases,
are not represented by an attorney. 360 Therefore, during interviews with U.S. mediators and
observations of U.S. mediation cases, I found that the U.S. mediators do not immediately request
the parties to review and sign a written agreement. When the parties reach an agreement, the U.S.
mediator requested that each part review it again or get assistance from a lawyer. In addition, the
mediator does not prepare the written agreement but asks either party’s attorney to prepare it.
During the interviews with U.S. private and non-private mediators, he explained the
reasons that mediators might not request, but also should not urge, the parties to sign an agreement
without being given extra time to review. 361 First, the process protects the mediator based on the
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Observation in CMC on June 12, 2013.
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Interviewed with a mediator on Oct. 23, 2014.
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Observations in CMC in June and July 2013.
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Interviewed with a mediator on Oct. 23, 2014 and Nov. 24, 2013.
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mediator’s neutrality. 362 Regardless of the positions of the private and non-private mediator, U.S.
mediators generally give the parties several days to reconsider what they agreed upon during the
mediation session. Some U.S. mediators explained that even though they try to take a neutral
position during the mediation, either party might believe that they were unfairly treated by the
mediators.

Therefore, giving extra time to reconsider by themselves following the mediation

session might reduce any possible dissatisfaction with the outcome and strengthen the mediator’s
neutrality. Second, taking time to consider the agreement might also protect the parties from
signing an unwanted or premature agreement even though they had voluntarily agreed on it in the
mediation session. In addition, I questioned that, after orally agreeing and before signing the
written agreement, taking time to review the agreement might cause the process to be prolonged
if one or both parties request to re-open the mediation conference. But the mediator interviewed
mentioned that the parties very rarely request to negotiate again or adjust what they agreed on.
In sum, it might be said that the efficiency of completing the mediation process and
participation of parties is improved because the Korean standing mediators prepare a written
agreement with the parties, by watching a computer screen on the wall. On the other hand, the
satisfaction or protection of the mediator and the parties might be sacrificed because the parties
might be urged to sign on the written agreement without having a chance for review.
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Please see chapter IV, 4, character of Med-Arb.
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Chapter VI. Structural elements (members) of in the CMC
This chapter reviews three members of the CMC: the standing mediator, the lawyer, and the
party. It provides the comparison with both the U.S. private and non-private mediators in the
theoretical and empirical viewpoints.
a. Standing Mediator

92

The authority of the standing mediators in the CMC is specially designed in order to
promote civil mediation based on the mixture of mediation and arbitration. Comparing with other
mediation programs in Korea, the CMC mediation is relatively independent from the court system
because the complainant could file the mediation without filing the litigation in the court. 363 Other
mediation programs could receive the mediation cases through the reference from the court. Even
though the complainant voluntarily wants to file the mediation case to the CMC, they file it into
the court. But the mediation cases which are voluntarily filed by the parties are not distributed by
the judge of the court. 364
During my interviews with Korean standing mediators, the U.S. private and non-private
mediators, I found the standing mediators are relatively suffering from the stressful environment,
such as the overloaded caseworks. 365 First, in order to reduce the overloaded working condition
for the judges, the courts try to refer the cases to CMC. At the beginning stage of the CMC, the
Korean Supreme Court expected that the CMC could get enough number of mediation cases
voluntarily filed by the party. Then the CMC could independently operate with voluntarily filed
mediation cases. However, in general, the number of voluntarily filed mediation cases has
gradually reduced while the number of referred cases from the courts has grown. 366 Therefore, the
courts selected a method to refer civil cases to the CMC. Meanwhile, the CMC would be suffer
from mediation cases overloaded because the court refer too many cases that would be above the
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JCCDA. art. 2 (“Parties of a civil dispute may file an application for conciliation (mediation) with a
court”).
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Interviewed on June 12, 2013.

365

Observation in CMC on June 12, 2013.
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Please see Table 5.
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CMC’s capacity. Since the standing mediators complained they are overloaded with work, the
CMC does not have a reason to develop any incentives that encourage possible parties to
voluntarily file into the CMC.
From a different view, the Korean Supreme Court already anticipated that the CMC could
not be an independent organization based on the previous experience. With the enactment of the
Civil Mediation Act of 1990, the first version of the act did not allow judges to refer civil cases to
mediation without the parties’ consent. 367 But the amendment of 1992 allowed judges to refer
cases into mediation without the parties’ consent. Some scholars indicated that the amendment of
1992 diminished the parties’ self-determination. 368 In other words, the parties might hesitate to
use the mediation program because if the case does reach the trial branch then they might want the
judge to review and rule on the issue instead of going through the mediation program.
Second, compared with U.S. mediators, the Korean standing mediators would be under
pressure because the Supreme Court is reviewing the results of the mediation in the CMC. The
judicial authority determines whether the mediation cases would be determined by his or her
authority as a Med-Arbitrator, and they should consider the rate of appealing against their binding
decision. 369 Relatively, the U.S. private or non-private mediators mentioned that they are not
influenced by whether the parties could not reach an agreement during the conference. 370 Because
U.S. mediation could be categorized as facilitative mediation, they only focus on the negotiation
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JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 13, at 85.
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Interviewed with a standing mediator on June 12, 2013; In Joo, supra note 4, at 622: The judiciary does
not review the contents but continuously review the rate of reaching an agreement.
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Interviews with U.S mediators on Oct 23, Nov. 10, Nov. 20, and Nov. 24, 2014.
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between two parties. Then their duty as a mediator is to help parties correctly share information
and adjust the agreement instead of evaluating the issues or evidence. 371 Therefore, U.S. mediators
are not interested in the outcome but in the process.
However, Korean standing mediators need to review the entire case before beginning the
mediation in order to prepare the role of arbitration when parties fail to reach an agreement. For
example, the standing mediator frequently reacted with a sigh when he heard the denial of their
communication during the separate session. 372 In my opinion, it looked good because the standing
mediator was impassioned and responsible for the case, but the standing mediator is also locked
into their role the same as a judge.
The standing mediator’s authority is similar to the neutral’s authority in Med-Arb. 373 In
general, the standing mediator makes a binding decision when both parties could not reach a
consensual agreement. However, unlike the Med-Arb, the standing mediator does not always or
mandatorily make the binding decision at the end of the stage. 374 The standing mediator also
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GOLDBERG, SANDER, ROGERS, & COLE, supra note 130, at 107 (“Mediation is negotiation carried out
with the assistance of a third party. The mediator, in contrast to the arbitrator or judge, has no power to
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decides whether they had better make a binding decision for the issues, instead of transferring the
case back to the court. For this reason, the Korean standing mediator’s authority is very similar
to the Med-Arbitrator, but not identical.
As more and more ADR programs have been developed over time, ADR has been
increasingly legalized, 375 and it is “becoming more evaluative and adversarial regarding U.S.
mediation.” 376 Moreover, some scholars have suggested that because arbitration has become
increasingly similar to litigation that it would be “too costly and too inefficient” and will become
the “new litigation.” 377
But some scholars support that Med-Arb “reduces the cost and increase efficiency” while
ADR is becoming legalized. 378 They believed that Med-Arb could provide parties with stable
opportunities by including the best of both mediation and arbitration.

379

First, Med-Arb might

provide a “flexible” process because they could begin with mediation and move to arbitration.380
Some scholars suggest that the “flexibility” of Med-Arb is useful in different ways for various
types of disputes and this could be a strong point when comparing with other ADR programs.381
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Second, Med-Arb could provide “efficiency” because the third-party neutral gets information
about the dispute during the initial mediation and the same-neutral does not need to review these
details again for arbitration. 382 Instead of hiring another neutral for the arbitration process, by
allowing the same-neutral to review the case, the Med-Arb process then promotes cost- and timeeffectiveness. 383 Therefore, Med-Arb could resolve the dispute quickly and efficiently. 384 Third,
Med-Arb could provide “finality” even though both parties could not reach an agreement. 385
Instead of prolonging the mediation process, the same-neutral gives a binding decision regarding
the mediation case. 386 Therefore, both parties possibly reach their goal when they agreed on an
agreement. In addition, when both parties agreed on it, the court also reduce the case-work on the
bench. Fourth, Med-Arb could be more effective than a simple mediation program. During the
joint or separate session of Med-Arb, the parties are “more conciliatory and less hostile than under
mediation alone.” 387 In addition, parties more actively take part in sharing information and
proposing the settlement during the process of negotiation. 388
In sum, Med-Arb not only provides arbitration with “flexibility,” but also provides the
mediation with “finality.” 389 Hiring the same-neutral med-arbitrator promotes an efficient process,
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without the need to repeat the hearing, as well as conservation of resources, including cost and
time. 390
Regarding disadvantage of Med-Arb, some scholars argue that Med-Arb takes advantage
of mediation and arbitration in order to improve the efficiency of the process. 391 However, others
could counter-argue that Med-Arb avoids the disadvantages of mediation and arbitration
programs. 392 It could be expected that the goals of Med-Arb could not be achieved by take
disadvantages of each mediation and arbitration. 393
First, the Med-Arb program might infringe on the core value of self-determination. 394
Because it is possible that the med-arbitrator could propose a binding decision against the parties,
their chance to reach an agreement by themselves with an assistance by the mediation might be
infringed based on the arbitrator’s authority. Second, the third-party neutral takes two different
position at the same time, as mediator and arbitrator. 395 However, the neutral could take one role
and its authority even though they take the other role and its authority in other stages of the process;
for example, the mediator still keeps the role and the authority of arbitrator during the mediation
process. 396
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Third, during the separate session, the role of the med-arbitrator is to facilitate communication, so
they could be trapped by the issue of confidentiality. The med-arbitrator could be made privy to
confidential information during the separate session. 397 One party might disclose a certain issue
during the separate session but requests that the mediator not release it to the other party. 398 In
such circumstances, the other party might not recognize the argument issued and might lose a
chance to make a counter-argument against it. Fourth, the experienced parties might not openly
discuss the issues with the other party.

399

Because the revealed information might be gathered

during the joint and separate sessions and used by the med-arbitrator for the arbitration session,
the parties might be afraid of being honest and frank when negotiating. If either of the parties
recognizes whether the med-arbitrator could obtain confidential information during the separate
session, the parties might be not be honest. 400 Furthermore, they deflect their efforts in order to
persuade the med-arbitrator instead of the other party because the med-arbitrator will prepare the
arbitrator’s final ruling if both parties fail to reach an agreement.
b. Lawyer
According to my personal interviews and observations, Korean lawyers do not accumulate
experience in the court-led mediation programs. Young lawyers from the U.S.-type law schools,
in particular, have relatively less experience than lawyers from the Judicial Research and Training
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Institute. 401 When I interviewed Korean lawyers, none of them revealed a preference toward the
CMC mediation. 402 As mentioned above, the lawyers’ reactions to the CMC mediation are
different. I believe that the difference comes from their own experience in the CMC. Basically,
they would like the mediation programs, regardless of the CMC or any other mediation programs
because they could save their time and efforts. But some revealed a slightly different opinions
I observed three (3) mediation cases which were represented by lawyers in the CMC in the
summer of 2013. Lawyers wanted to go back to the trial process and requested that the standing
mediator release the cases back to court. Then the mediator released the cases without persuading
either the lawyers or the parties to take part in mediation. 403 Therefore, I got the impression that
the cases involving lawyers are preferred to be reviewed by judges instead of going through
mediation in the CMC.
Regarding the fact mentioned above, I asked interviewee-lawyers why it seemed that
lawyers involved in mediation cases want to go back to trial. I got three (3) opinions: (1) it would
be a winning case in trial; (2) the lawyer wanted relief from complaints from client; or, (3) the
lawyers might receive a contingent fee if the case is decided in court rather than mediation. 404
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First, the lawyer might believe that the party had a good chance to win the case and advise
their client to pursue a trial rather than mediation. All of the interviewee-lawyers mentioned that
they strongly recommended that their clients pursue a trial instead of using mediation programs
after they evaluate whether their client’s case would win in civil litigation. 405 Second, the lawyer
should inform the client whether the ADR programs might be helpful in resolving the dispute and
that the case might be referred into mediation programs by the court and without client’s
consent. 406 However, even when client received this information, they would later complain to
the lawyer for referring the case into mediation program. At that point, the lawyer sometimes
requested that a mediator send the case back to trial without explanation but due to the client’s
complaints. 407
Third, according to the client-attorney agreement, reaching an agreement in mediation would be
treated as winning a case in trial. Therefore, the lawyer could receive the contingent fee related to
the amount agreed upon in mediation. However, some clients complained that the lawyer’s role
was less significant in mediation compared to trial, so they refused to pay the contingent fee, which
some lawyers then chose to give up rather than fight the client for payment. 408
On the other hand, some lawyers gave up receiving the contingent fee due to encouraging
their client to reach an agreement. One interviewee-lawyer gave me such an example: His client
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had almost reached an agreement except for a difference that was only a small amount of money.
But both parties were getting stuck on the small difference, so he instructed his client to step back
in order to meet the goals of both sides and he gave up his contingent fee as a way to persuade his
client that the agreement was good. 409
c. Parties
According to the statics of the Supreme Court, the satisfaction of the parties in the CMC
almost reached eighty (80) percent. 410 Similarly, when I interviewed parties, most of them showed
that they were satisfied with the mediation program. 411 But the interviews also indicated slightly
different results between satisfactions with the result and with the process of mediation. Most
parties in the CMC revealed that they were fully satisfied with producing outcomes of mediation.
However, a minority of interview-participants showed that they were urged to give up their
appropriate rights in order to reach an agreement by focusing on the outcome of mediation. 412
Most interview-participants indicated that they were satisfied with the process of mediation
regardless of the outcome of mediation. According to the interview, one party was fully satisfied
with the process of mediation in the CMC because he had experience in both the trial and mediation
with the same case. 413 Therefore, he could distinguish the differences between the courtroom and
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mediation-conference room. He mentioned he felt he had had enough chances to share his opinion
and arguments during the separate session while during the trial he had always been interrupted
by the judge.
The other interview-participant complained that he was disappointed with the sudden
referral by the judge without his consent. He mentioned that he had filed a suit to be determined
by the judge instead of resolving the dispute by themselves. According to the lawyer who
represented him, she had already explained the possibility of referral to the mediation programs,
including the CMC or other mediation programs. But she complained that some clients do not fully
understand the judge’s authority to refer and then might show their disappointment toward the
lawyer for not preventing the referral. 414
During observation of CMC mediation, on the condition that they were not represented by
lawyers, the parties who had previous experience in the CMC or other mediation programs might
have had an advantage during negotiation. In my personal observation, 415 one party had already
won the civil case but found it difficult to implement the ruling. He recognized that he could not
enforce the ruling until he got the result of the Supreme Court’s ruling. However, he also knew
that he could enforce a mediated agreement or the binding decision by the standing mediator in
order to implement the outcome of mediation. In this case, the party could distinguish the different
legal effects of mediation and trial based on the implementation of the ruling. Therefore, the party
knew the incentive of the mediation of the CMC. In addition, the experienced parties might fully
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understand the standing mediator’s opening statement and instruction and so could use the full
benefits of mediation.
However, inexperienced parties who were not represented by lawyers or any legal
professionals, Beobmusa (법무사, 法務士), had a relatively difficult time during the separate
session with the standing mediator. Even though the mediator tried to give equivalent time to
listen each party’s opinion and proposal toward issues, the inexperienced parties failed to submit
properly prepared documents and the mediator had been bored with the argument’s irrelevant
issues. 416
In sum, on the condition that parties are not represented by the lawyers, experienced parties
could be in a better position when negotiating with an inexperienced party and in persuading the
standing mediator through their presentation of the relevant legal issues. 417
In the above section, only a few percent of civil cases are represented by lawyers and a rare
portion of mediation cases are assisted by lawyers or other legal professionals, Beobmusa. 418 This
might put additional work on the standing mediator and infringe on the neutral position of the
standing mediator. In this section, regarding the issue that the majority of mediation cases are not
represented by lawyers, I will review two issues: first, the standing mediator should put additional
time and effort to mediate, and, second, the parties who are not represented by a lawyer may not
fully understand the process and legal effects from the outcome of mediation.
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First, even though I could not take any observation related with this kind of scene in the
CMC, several judges and mediators mentioned that they are cautious when they give advice to a
party during the joint or separate session. In addition, the mediators commonly mentioned that the
majority of mediation cases were not represented by the lawyer and the mediators faced difficult
circumstances because no lawyer was present to assist the party. I also observed a similar
mediation cases in the CMC; the parties were confused about the process and the legal effects of
the mediation even though the standing mediator had explained both during the opening
statement. 419 During the separate session, each party worried about the legal effects from the
outcome of the mediation. In this case, the standing mediator covered the role of the lawyer for
each party and put in additional time and effort to instruct them. 420 Then the mediators frequently
worried about the shaky neutrality of their role.
Second, during interviews with the mediators and judges, I learned that they do not
seriously consider whether the parties fully understand the process and the legal effects from three
outcome of mediation. 421 They believe that they fulfill their duty by explaining the legal effects
of mediation in the opening statement. It seems that they do not care whether the parties in the
mediation programs understand the process and legal effects regardless of being assisted by the
lawyers.
However, I observed several mediation cases in which the parties were still confused about
the process and the legal effects of mediation. 422 I considered that the mediation programs would

419

Observation on June 14, 2013 and July 2, 2013 (I observed three (3) cases represented by lawyers).

420

Brian A. Pappas, supra note 70, at 184.

421

Interviewed on July 4, 2013 and telephone interview on Apr. 14, 2015.
Observation in CMC on June 14, 2013 and July 2, 2013.

422

105

move actively forward if the parties could be helped by the legal assistants, such as lawyers or
Beobmusa (even though Beobmusa are not allowed to represent the parties in the conference
room). By actively being assisted by a lawyer, the standing mediators could be assured of
maintaining their duty of neutrality.
In sum, because of the low rate of the lawyers’ participation in mediation based on my
observations, the standing mediators must cover the lawyer’s role during the mediation sessions.
Then while the standing mediators gave advice and instruction to the parties who were not
represented by the lawyers, the other parties would complain that the standing mediator infringes
his or her role regarding the neutrality by giving excessive instruction.
As a fundamental member of the mediation, each party’s participation is the most
important element to promote the CMC program. However, I observed the parties’ hesitation to
share their opinions and propose their solutions against the other’s bargaining during mediation.423
Two significant issues affect whether parties might participate the mediation with good faith. First,
if the parties recognize that the third-party neutral could be an arbitrator, they might try to persuade
the med-arbitrator to adopt the arguments of their own side. 424 Also, neither party also has any
incentive to frankly share their confidential information or proposal with the standing mediator.
For example, in the observation of the CMC, the party hesitated to share confidential information
with the standing mediator after he recognized that the mediator showed some favor to the other
party, regardless of the reason causing the misunderstanding by the neutral’s behavior or by the
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party’s own opinion. 425

Because of this non-cooperation, the standing mediator might face

difficulties in gathering confidential information regarding the issues of mediation.
In addition, some parties might show bad faith beyond hesitation to reveal the proposal, by
misleading or lying to mediator during the separate session. 426 However, some argued that the
parties could be put in a better environment, such as a less structured and less formal conversation,
because they recognized the hybrid form of mediation and arbitration. 427 In order to prepare the
standing mediator’s binding decision, each party might have incentive to mislead the mediator to
obtain the better outcome from the mediation. Furthermore, related with confidentiality issues,
the parties might have no chance to counter-argue against the other party’s statement which was
spun or manipulated. 428
In sum, because the standing mediator has authority similar to that of a med-arbitrator, the
parties in the CMC might have a temptation not to frankly reveal the issues or opinions or to
mislead the mediator in order to get a better result when the standing mediator takes an arbitrator’s
position.
One of core values of the mediation, including entire ADR programs, is providing parties
with a chance to voluntarily reach a consensual agreement through informal and efficient methods.
There might be two different views to see this as promoting the party’s self-determination or
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diminishing it. 429 On one side, as both parties recognized the mediator could change their role into
an arbitrator at a certain point, they might be tempted to resolve the dispute by themselves, so that
the med-arbitrator does not rule on it. Therefore, they voluntarily share their ideas and the possible
proposals in order to reach an agreement. 430 However, the standing mediator’s authority, which
is similar to that of a med-arbitrator, might frustrate the parties’ core authority to voluntarily reach
an agreement. Based on the standing mediator’s strong authority, the mediation process in the
CMC might be more similar to a trial and, in turn, the role of the standing mediator more like a
judge. 431

Chapter VII. Possibility of Private Mediation in Civil Mediation
In this chapter, the question begins with whether the promotion of Korean civil mediation
might be too slow compared with the U.S.: it seems that while the U.S. ADR programs increased
about 260% from 1993 to 2002, 432 the Korean mediation programs are almost in a bottleneck. 433
In order to promote the mediation programs in Korea, this chapter reviews the possible solutions
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and problems of adopting private mediation programs, law school clinics, and independent outercouncil mediation organizations. 434
While several scholars conclude that the strong point of the CMC program is its reduction
of overloaded court work and its provision of a new or alternative method of resolving disputes
besides litigation, research into the weaknesses or promotion of the CMC program is rare. 435 This
dissertation reviewed the character of Korean civil mediation programs in chapter III and IV and
deeply investigated the character of the CMC in chapter V and VI. While previous Korean
research papers could not properly provide possible ways of promoting mediation, this dissertation
considers whether private mediation is possible to use in contemporary Korean mediation
programs.
This chapter reviews the possibility of private mediation by reviewing justifiability,
effectiveness, and the possible resources to adopt private mediation. Furthermore, in order to
accept a private mediation program in Korea, this dissertation also indicates the possible obstacles
and solutions to using private mediators for resolving disputes in Korea. 436
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First, under the Korean civil mediation system, it is impossible to directly compare it with
the U.S. private mediation programs. 437 And it would also be difficult to directly adopt the U.S.
type of private mediation without preparing regulations or assistive programs.
Unlike U.S. private mediation, the Korean court system does not allow private mediators
in judicial dispute resolution (“JDR”). 438 There are several outer mediation organizations outside
of the court, such as Korean lawyer associations and law schools, that the courts refer meditation
cases to outer-council mediation organizations.

439

But, they are not private mediation

organizations, because they could not survive without other organizational assistance and cannot
compete with other outer mediation organizations in the legal market. 440
Currently, several U.S. programs are described as private mediation programs, such as the
community mediation center or neighborhood justice. 441 But, they are not exactly equal to the
private mediation program under judicial dispute resolution (“JDR”), because these community
mediation center or neighborhood justice programs or organizations are operated as an
administrative ADR—such as by a city or other government organizations—and these U.S.
community mediation organizations do not provide enough private income to support a living by
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24,

2014;

the members of the organizations.442 Some of these organizations survive by getting case referrals
from cities or sub-city organizations and are maintained by government funding. 443
a. Why Korea Needs Private Mediation
This section reviews the necessity for private mediation in Korea. In previous chapters,
this dissertation already reviewed the difficulties associated with reducing overloaded caseworks
on the bench under the current mediation programs. It also reviewed the possibility of adopting a
private mediation process approach while considering the barriers associated with adopting private
mediation practice under the current Korean legal culture.
Since the enactment of the JCCDA in 1990, the Korean civil mediation programs have
been dramatically promoted and established several different programs, like the U.S. multi-door
courthouse. 444 Here, I emphasize that the Korean judiciary provides the several different
mediation or settlement programs in court-annexed and court-connected mediations. 445 They look
like the U.S. multi-door courthouse programs, which could provide several different dispute
resolution programs at one place. 446 As mentioned in Chapter II and III, the judiciary has
developed mediation and settlement programs, such as settlement before filing-suit and during
trial, and several different mediation programs that are mentioned in Chapter III.
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However, because the development of civil mediation was led by the court-centered
programs, there is no chance to consider a private mediation program. 447 Since the Korean civil
mediation programs have been continuously promoted under the Korean legal structural and
cultural backgrounds, the CMC was then established as an additional new promotion. Professor
Young-ju Ham mentioned that the CMC mediation is the most similar to U.S. private mediation. 448
Because Professor Ham does not provide the reason for his explanation regarding the similarity, I
could not provide a counter-argument against his reasoning. However, my reasoning is that, first,
while the standing mediator has the same authority as the judge, the other mediators do not. The
mediator of the inner or outer mediation organizations usually facilitates the mediation, instead of
evaluating the mediation. Unlike the U.S. private mediators, the standing mediator in the CMC
adopts the evaluative method in the mediation process to make a binding decision for parties’
deadlock. Therefore, I disagree that the CMC is the most similar to U.S. private mediation. The
outer-council mediation organization would be more similar to private mediation, because the
process of location and mediator are isolated from the court’s territory and the judiciary’s
interference. Furthermore, because it might protect the core value of self-determination by noninterference of any judicial authority, the outer council mediation provides the most similar
environment to private mediation.
Conversely, the conference attorney is the most similar to the Korean standing mediator.
The reasons for this are that the settlement program in Chicago is strongly annexed with the federal
court, and the conference attorneys has their “strong authorities” in the process. There are three
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ways for a conference attorney to obtain mediation cases: referrals from the court, voluntary filing
by the parties, and selecting mediation cases by the conference attorney. 449 Even though a Korean
standing mediator has the same authority as a mediation judge, the standing mediator could not
pick up mediation cases from the court without the judge’s consent. 450
First, the core value of mediation should be provided through the private mediation
program. As discussed in previous chapters, the contemporary civil mediation programs could not
adequately provide the core values of “self-determination,” “informal method,” and
“confidentiality” through the med-arb or evaluative mediations of current Korean civil mediation.
Second, the “core” type of private mediation program might provide more efficient
methods than med-arb or evaluative mediation. 451 Some scholars might argue that the med-arb or
evaluative mediation programs could be more productive, by assembling the advantages of each
mediation and arbitration. 452 But other scholars counter-argue that there is a possibility of taking
the disadvantages of both mediation and arbitration. 453 Even though the Korean standing mediator
could save time by making a binding decision, it would be condemned under an argument that the
CMC was trying to wrap up cases to improve efficiency.
Third, the public still has doubts that the standing mediator could carefully complete
discovery and hearing before making a binding decision. This might also cause a problem in
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implementation of the binding decision, because it was not made by each party under a consensual
agreement. For example, the community mediation center located in Kwanju city is fully
sponsored by the city and it is acting similar with the U.S. neighborhood dispute resolution center.
This center reports that it received 138 cases and resolved 115 cases in 2015. 454
In sum, the Korean judiciary could not successfully reduce judges’ overloaded casework
through the contemporary Korean civil mediation programs. Furthermore, the current courtannexed and court-connected mediations could not keep intact the core values of mediation, such
as self-determination and confidentiality.
b. Justifiability, effectiveness and possible resources for private mediation
This section reviews the justifiability, effectiveness, and possible resources to adopt a
private mediation program in Korea.

In previous chapters, this dissertation reviewed the

justifiability of adopting ADR and mediation programs in Korea and, at first, reviews whether
there is justifiability to adopt private mediation. It also reviewed, in previous chapters, the
contemporary Korean mediation programs and concluded that they are ineffective in reducing the
judges’ casework. This dissertation reviews whether a private mediation program would be
effective in reducing overloaded casework, and whether the Korean judiciary has enough financial
and human resources to establish private mediation.
The Korean Supreme Court has a strong intent to establish civil mediation programs and
tries to expand the programs—from court-annexed mediation, which is mediated by the judge of
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a court of first incident, to court-connected mediation, which is mediated by inner or outer-council
mediators appointed by the judiciary. 455
In contrast to the Korean Supreme Court’s progressive support, the civil mediation
programs still struggle to settle down in the legal system. I agree that the mediation programs are
fairly successful. But I cannot agree that the mediation programs have successfully reduced the
benches’ overloaded work and settled down in the legal system as a system of dispute resolution.
Per the current mediation programs, the Supreme Court allows the court to refer cases to
outer-council mediation organizations. 456 These organizations consist of professional and welltrained members, but they are not trained as private mediators. The private mediator who
completes education and training courses for mediation might provide a better service than one
who does not obtain the certification.
In sum, the court already releases mediation cases to appointed outer-council mediators but
does not require a certification. As the judiciary provides mediation courses to certify private
mediators, the private mediation program might rapidly expand and provide a better mediation
service.
The judiciary’s strong authorities in the current mediation programs might be the weakness
to promote and apply for resolving disputes in the contemporary Korean legal system. Then, it
assumes that the current court-annexed and court-connected mediation programs might be
insufficient or inefficient in the legal system, because the number of civil cases per judge is still
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increasing and judges of courts are still suffering from overloaded casework since the enactment
of the JCCDA in 2009. 457
What if Korea adopts a private mediation program, could the mediation programs be more
efficient than current programs? As mentioned above, even though the Supreme Court reveals a
progressive intent to expand the mediation programs, the size of mediation organizations is still
too small to take over the mediation process from the court of first incident. Even though the civil
mediation programs have aggressively expanded since enactment of the JCCDA 1990, the number
of civil cases per judge has gradually increased. 458 Therefore, under the current mediation
programs, it is clearly difficult to reduce the civil judges’ workloads.
Under the current referral system, the court of first incidents could release civil cases to
certain organizations, which might mediate cases. Unlike the expectation of the outer-council’s
usage selected and appointed as a mediation organization by the administrative courts, the private
mediation program would take over more volume of mediation cases from the courts, because the
civil courts would release the cases to a private mediator. 459
In order to be an effective private mediation program under the current referral system, is
it necessary to change the fundamental legal system, such as changing from the reference to
mandatory mediation before being reviewed by court? Like the mandatory mediation process of
civil cases in Monroe County, Indiana, the mandatory mediation program might promote the
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private mediation program, because all civil cases should go through the mediation process. 460
Without considering whether or not the Korean judiciary should adopt mandatory mediation, in
my opinion, it is unnecessary for the Korean judiciary to fundamentally change the civil procedures
in order to adopt a mandatory mediation process. 461
Currently the Korean civil court system only requires domestic matters to go through
mandatory mediation before going to court. If the civil court requires a mandatory mediation
process for all civil matters, it might cause massive antipathy toward adopting mandatory
mediation based on two reasons: first, there are too many civil cases filed; second, for similar
reasons, the mediation programs are not prepared for it. 462
Like the outer-council mediation program, the court of first incident could refer civil cases
to a mediation process outside of court territory. Because the private mediator might be certified
by completing the required training course, the private mediator might be more reliable and
provide more optimal solutions through agreeable informal methods. 463
When it comes to the effectiveness of mediation, there are two important facts in Korean
civil mediation. The mediation programs should not only reduce the overloaded casework in lower
level court, but also cut off the number of appeals to higher levels of court. For example, the
Korean Supreme Court consists of 12 judges and handled 37,652 cases in 2013. With similar
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Interview a mediator on Nov. 24, 2014.
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In Korea, all divorce cases should be mandatorily go to the mediation process before going to the court.
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Interviewed with a scholar who was a former judge on Dec. 12, 2014.
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conditions in their civil law culture, 15 Japanese Supreme Court judges took 5,000 cases in the
same year. 464
It is important that a majority of civil cases could be released to the mediation process
while maintaining high satisfaction.

Because of the authority to make binding decisions,

dissensions to the binding decision during the mediation process lower the satisfaction toward
mediation. 465 In addition, under the current mediation programs, only a limited number of civil
cases could be exposed to the mediation process. 466 Therefore, private mediators who are qualified
and certified by the judiciary could provide a wide range of mediation services for the majority of
civil cases.
In sum, the current Korean civil mediation programs have progressively operated since
1990, but it remains to be seen whether the contemporary mediation is effective in the Korean
legal system, because it failed to reduce judges’ overloaded casework. Private mediation might
comparatively reduce the number of civil cases filed per judge.
In order to adopt a new private mediation program, the Korean judiciary might need
additional resources to launch it. But is it a massive expense to the judiciary to train a private
mediator? It probably does not need a significant financial expense for three reasons: first, there
are several currently mediating entities, such as outer-council mediators; second, there are well-
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JUNYOUNG JUNG, supra note 9, at 76.
118

qualified young lawyers who just graduated from U.S. type law schools; and there are wellqualified and experienced standing mediators in the CMC who can train applicants to be private
mediators.
First, the court already uses outer-council mediation organizations, such as Korean lawyer
associations and law schools—categorized as court-connected mediation. As mentioned above,
the court currently refers civil cases to outer-council mediation organizations. Even though current
outer-council mediators do not need to be regularly trained by officially certified mediation
courses, they already accumulate mediation experience in the mediation field.
Second, as mentioned above, since the judiciary adopted the U.S. type law school system
in 2009, law schools are releasing a huge number of graduate law students every year, and 2,000
students pass the bar exam and obtain a bar license. Within the small legal market, young lawyers
are facing tough legal competition and struggle to survive in it. 467
Third, there are about 30 standing mediators in the CMC. As mentioned above, they not
only have terrific legal experience and knowledge as a high level judge or well-experienced
lawyer, but also have accumulated mediating experience since 2009. 468
As mentioned in chapter III, not only the civil courts but also the Korean Supreme Court
are suffering from overloaded casework. 469 All civil courts and the Supreme Court are struggling
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http://v.media.daum.net/v/20161010194633157 (Last visited on Dec. 11, 2016).
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Interviewed with a standing mediator on June 12, 2013.
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Sang-Chan Kim & Young-hwa Yang, supra note 20, at 248.
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with the massive number of cases filed and the judiciary might spend tremendous financial and
human resources to maintain the current operation of the legal system.
The Korean judiciary could spend less financial and human resources by establishing a
private mediation program, providing certification to private mediators who complete a training
program. It could be similar to the Indiana mediator program or Japanese certification program.470
Because the judiciary could provide the training programs for the private mediator applicants, this
private mediator program does not need to be a massive mediation entity.
Several law schools have participated in the mediation program as outer-council
mediators. 471 These law schools might develop mediation legal clinics, where participants could
not only train to be private mediators, but which could also be a place to provide mediation training
courses for law school students. In addition, the CMC has already accumulated mediation
experience by developing Korean mediation customs. Therefore, the CMC could easily transform
its role into being a training course provider.
In sum, the judiciary could comparatively save financial and human resources by
establishing a private mediation program under the current Korean legal system without a
significant change.
c. U.S. private mediator program
As briefly mentioned above in chapter IV, it is hard for a researcher to generally review
U.S. mediation, because the U.S. mediation programs do not exist as a unified form. 472 But, this
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Generally see GEONHO CHOI, DONGKYOUNGJIJAE JOJEONGJEONMUNBUYI SILMUUNYONG [TOKYO
SPECIAL MEDIATION OPERATION OF JAPAN] 39 in THE OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION, CONFERENCE
OF 20 YEAR ANNIVERSARY OF KOREAN JUDICIAL CONCILIATION OF CIVIL DISPUTES ACT (2010) (Korean).
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dissertation reviews the Indiana private mediator program and the conference attorney program in
the 7th Circuit, in order to predict the possible promotion of Korean civil mediation.
During my research, the U.S. private mediators, all of them except the community
mediators, had typically obtained two certifications: bar license and mediation training
certification. The Indiana private mediation program especially requires that an applicant to the
mediation education program should have previously obtained the bar license. 473
Even though a private mediation program might be the best way to provide the “pure”
values of mediation, adopting the “pure” meaning of private mediation could face three difficulties.
Furthermore, the court could efficiently reduce backlogs and provide multiple methods of
resolving disputes through a private mediation program. 474

This dissertation reviews the

difficulties from the viewpoint of the extra expense or cost between the Supreme Court, disputant
parties, and lawyers related to mediation by the parties.
The disputant parties should feel an obligation to pay for their privately retained legal
services even though the parties previously paid the filing fee for the court. 475 In order to hire a
private mediator, the disputant parties should pay him or her based on the hourly-rate. In Indiana,
the website of the Supreme Court provides a list of private mediators, showing how much each
private mediator charges per hour. 476
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http://www.in.gov/judiciary/cle/files/fillable-form-mediator-registration.pdf
2017).
474
Interview with a current U.S. mediator on Nov. 24, 2014.
475

Interview with Korean lawyers on June 8, 2014 and Nov. 28, 2014.
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(last visited in Jan. 9,

Because of this additional possible expense, which should be paid by each of the parties,
there are three possible obstacles. First, it might be against the Supreme Court’s policy. The court
has reduced the filing fee by ninety (90) percent, 477 in order to provide parties with an incentive to
voluntarily file with the CMC. The policy for increasing voluntary usage of the CMC also includes
reducing the cost and expense of mediation programs. 478 However, paying an additional expense
for a private mediator might be against the Supreme Court’s policy of establishing a stable CMC
mediation program, because the private mediator program might cause the parties to pay extra
money. 479
According to interviews with both Korean lawyers and disputant parties in the CMC, they
negatively responded to the U.S.-type private mediator requiring an additional fee for the private
mediator. According to the interviewee-disputant parties, I might conclude that parties do not want
to pay an additional payment for the private mediator. But I do not care whether their mediation
cases are reviewed by private or non-private mediators. 480 Most of my observations in the CMC
were related to small claims, and most of the parties were not represented by lawyers. Therefore,
the parties tried to save money in resolving their disputes and did not want to pay additional money.
Per these parties’ responses, the parties might refuse to use private mediators and paying that extra
expense based on an hourly-charge. This might be a significant obstacle in adopting a private
mediator program.

477

https://gwangju.scourt.go.kr/dcboard/new/DcNewsViewAction.work?seqnum=360&gubun=81&cbub_

code=&scode_kname=광주지방법원&searchWord=&currentPage=49 (last visited in Dec 11, 2016).
478

JAEHONG LEE, supra note 110, at 82.

479

Sang-Hyuk Im, supra note 162, at 44-45.

480

Interviews on June 14, 2013 and July 2, 2013.
122

Korean lawyers might resist adopting a private mediation program, because they are afraid
of losing revenue. 481 As mentioned above, Korean lawyers showed two different opinions for and
against the mediation program. In addition, because young lawyers are in a tough legal market,
they might hesitate at finding a new method in hopes of making a bigger pie of the legal market.
There are more than 20,000 lawyers in Korea. After the Korean government adopted the
U.S.-type of law school system, a law school could produce more than 2,000 lawyers per year.
Therefore, the legal market could be getting tough, and each young lawyer could represent less
than two cases per month in the Seoul area. 482

(Table 7) Numbers of Cases Represented by Young Layers in Seoul rep Per Month
Year

2011

Number of cases represented 2.83/mon

2012

2013

2014

2015

2.33

2.0

1.97

1.99

481

Cf. Calvin Morrill & Cindy Mckee, Institutional Isomorphism and informal Social Control: Evidence
from a Community Mediation Center Social Change and Control, 40 SOC. PROBS, 445 (1993).
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http://media.daum.net/society/others/newsview?newsid=20161010194633157 (Last visited in Oct. 10,
2016) (this newspaper reports that community mediation center located in Kwangju city opens for the one
year celebration. It reports that the center received 138 cases and resolved 115 cases for one year).
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As seen above, the Korean legal market is getting tough, and young lawyers graduating
from law schools might face a difficult environment. However, there might be another viewpoint
to reduce excessive competition in the tough Korean legal market.
There are no private mediation programs in Korea.

Currently, the outer-mediation

programs, such as lawyers associations, might provide similar work to a private mediation
program. It could be called a transition-to-private mediation program, because it might have a
mixture of characteristics between court-connected and private mediation. The primary difference
with the U.S. private mediator: the mediators in Korean lawyer associations do not compete with
other mediators. Generally, the association gets the mediation cases through referrals by the court,
and it distributes to pro bono lawyer-mediators. 483
In addition, a private mediation program might open up a new legal market, in order to
expand the size of the pie. As mentioned above, most of the U.S. civil cases could be resolved by
mediation before reaching the bench; it is necessary for all U.S. practicing lawyers to understand
the mediation process in order to provide proper service to their clients. 484
d. Alternatives to promote Korean Mediation
As mentioned in Chapter III and Chapter IV, Korean civil mediation might be closed to
private mediation in certain views. Indeed, in order to go forward with private mediation, the

483

http://www.kjaa.or.kr/public_html/news/news.asp?div=VIEW&Number=1114&gubun=new
visited in Dec. 15, 2016).
484
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Laurie A. Lewis, Law Student Mediators Wear a Triple Crown: Skilled, Sellable & Successful, 50 U.S.
F.L. REV. 165, 167 (2016).
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system still needs to prepare the required programs, such as education and training programs and
a unified ADR act. 485
First, it needs training programs for educating private mediators, in order to provide
certification that a private mediator is qualified. 486 Like U.S. law school students, Korean law
school students are suffering from high tuition and bar exam pressure. 487 There is an over-heated
Korean legal market, based on an oversupply of lawyers compared with the demand in the Korean
legal market. 488 Therefore, young Korean lawyers could face difficulty in settling down in the
tough lawyer-legal market. 489
However, only a small number of Korean lawyer schools provide ADR programs in their
curriculum. 490
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Furthermore, law school students do not have a chance to have as marketable of

YOUNGJU HAM, supra note 54, at 593.
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an experience compared with lawyers from the legal institute. 491 In preparing the practice-ready
law graduate, the law schools provide legal clinic programs. 492 Before considering the private
mediator program, the training or educational program for mediation should be established in the
law schools. 493 Without the lawyers’ or law graduates’ previous preparation, the private mediator
program should be settled in the Korean civil mediation system.
In this regard, the possible solution is that the current CMC could become the educational
institute, because the CMC’s standing mediators might have better mediation experience than any
other lawyers in Korea. Then the standing mediators could share their advanced experience with
law graduates in the legal clinics of law schools, even though they did not take educational
mediation programs themselves.
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VIII. Conclusion
Disputes have always existed, and methods for resolving disputes have developed in every
society in history. 494 Similar to contemporary ADR forms, such as mediation and arbitration,
ancient Koreans had their own forms for resolving disputes. 495 Unfortunately, after independence
from Imperial Japan in 1945 and the Korean civil war in 1950, the current legal system was
instituted independently, rather than evolving naturally, to replace the traditional legal methods for
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resolving disputes. 496 Then the Korean judicial authority continuously developed the Korean
mediation programs, which can be categorized as court-related mediation, including court-annexed
and court-connected mediations. 497
Similar to other states’ judicial problems, Korea has also faced overloaded case dockets,
congestion of the civil process, an expensive legal process, and emotional stress on parties during
the procedures. 498 This dissertation might serve to offer a viable, transitional example to promote
the incorporation of ADR process in Korea. As mentioned above, although both judicial areas
considered in this study—i.e., Korea and Indiana in both its State & Federal appeals fora—have
conservative legal cultures, both judicial authorities have aggressively established mediation
programs. Currently, the Korean judiciary is particularly involved in providing a set of lessons for
the adoption and implementation of civil mediation programs.
With similar desires of providing inexpensive and fast track of legal process, the Korean
Supreme Court has a strong desire to promote civil mediation programs and tries to expand the
programs. 499 Unlike U.S. mediation, court-led civil mediation does not need to be attractive to all
participants, such as the lawyers and disputant parties. 500
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The judicial authority has mainly led during the development of the civil mediation
programs in Korea. 501 The Korean Supreme Court has led a series of improvised changes to
extend judicial power. 502 It launched court-annexed mediation and outer-council mediation
programs as pilots in 2009, but it is doubtful whether it was successful enough to extend to other
cities and other outer mediation organizations. Ultimately, Korean mediation programs are
extemporaneously promoted according to the court’s need. 503
The Korean Supreme Court has usually developed the court-annexed mediation and
gradually promoted the court-connected mediation. But the court of first incident still handle more
than ninety (90) percent of mediation cases in their courtrooms.
The promotion of Korean civil mediation can be reviewed from two different viewpoints.
At the beginning, it should be known that the promotion of civil mediation was mainly led by the
Korean judiciary based on its necessity. The judiciary recognized an urgent need to promote
mediation based on the quality of legal services for two reasons. First, judges were already under
pressure from overloaded dockets. 504 Second, they recognized that as the U.S. law school system
was adopted in Korea, apprenticeship training for judges would not be sustainable. 505
As an external promotion, the Korean judiciary has established five (5) different mediation
organizations in order to resolve civil disputes.
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Interview with a current standing mediator on June 12, 2013 and current judges on Apr. 15, 2015.
Please see supra Table 1 and Figure 1.
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Interview with a Korean judge on Apr. 15, 2015.
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authority established the court-annexed mediation center and outer-council mediation programs to
provide independent authority to the court of first incidents. 507
Even though the judicial authority has exerted effort in promoting the mediation program,
I conclude that court-led civil mediation cannot be popular to the public and the judiciary has also
hardly completed its main goal of reducing the case-load on the bench.
While the judges were under pressure from overloaded cases, the Korean Supreme Court
recognized the necessity of adopting ADR programs. In the earliest stages of their promotion of
mediation, the courts used the mediation program for disputes involving the lease of properties
since 1962 and in small claims since 1973. 508
Korean mediation was reviewed in this dissertation based on theoretical and empirical
approaches. First, it reviewed whether the current Korean mediation programs might infringe on
the right to a trial. There are two different points about this issue: referring a case to mediation
process without a party’s consent and providing a binding decision by a mediator.
Some might argue that reference to mediation without a party’s consent infringes on the
right to a trial because, by filing suits in the court, disputants want a judge to review their cases.
However, others also might argue that because referred cases could return to the courtroom per
disputant’s will, the right to a trial is not deprived. In addition, the financial barrier to access to
the court would be lowered by reducing by ninety (90) percent the filing fee. 509 In contrast to Lok
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Adalat, a binding decision by a standing mediator is not “final and binding with no appeal.” 510 In
Korea, even though the mediator could make a binding decision when the parties fail to reach an
agreement, each party has a chance to appeal in two weeks. 511
Second, under the empirical approach, I observed both U.S. and Korean mediation cases
and interviewed mediators from both countries in 2013 and 2014. I found that the Korean judiciary
could not successfully reduce judges’ overloaded casework through the contemporary Korean civil
mediation programs. Furthermore, the current court-annexed and court-connected mediations
could not keep intact the core values of mediation, such as self-determination and
confidentiality. 512
In chapter VI, comparing Korean and U.S. mediation cases, I provide differences based on
observations of both mediation cases. According to the CMC standing mediation program, the
CMC mediator uses only one mediation conference room for a short time period (about one hour)
per session. Based on the CMC mediator’s authority to make a binding decision, the mediator
spends time for fact-finding in a joint session. Regarding the CMC mediator’s authority, I worry
about disputing parties’ misunderstandings and dissatisfaction with the process and legal effect of
mediation, based on the mediator providing an insufficient explanation of those details in the
opening statement. Furthermore, there is no post-settlement period. The standing mediator drafts
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Observations on July 4, 2013; Brian A. Pappas, supra note 115, at 171-72, 184-85.
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the agreement before the parties and asks them to sign it. Even though parties are not represented
by a lawyer, they do not have a chance to review the document with legal assistants. 513
Therefore, I conclude that most Korean mediation programs, including CMC mediation,
are Med-Arb type, because the standing mediator can make a binding decision. 514 This judge-like
mediator may delay the propagation of mediation. They might lose disputants’ trust by providing
intuitive justice, due to the absence of lawyers’ assistance and insufficient evidence to make a
binding decision when parties could not reach a consensual agreement during the mediation
process.
Why does Korea need private mediation? Why ADR provides convenient and useful legal
service that formal adjudication could not complete? According to Professor Galanter, “only small
portion of troubles and injuries become disputes; [and] only a small portion of these become law
suits.” 515 The Korean judiciary’s strong tie to mediation programs might delay the propagation of
the mediation process. 516 In my opinion, the mediation program is fairly successful, but still
struggles to settle down in the legal system despite the Korean Supreme Court’s strong support.
While the U.S. ADR programs increased about 260% in the last two decades, the Korean mediation
programs are in a bottleneck. 517 In order to promote the Korean mediation programs, considering
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education and training programs for independent outer-council mediators, it is necessary to adopt
private mediation programs. 518
This dissertation not only reviews the possibility of private mediation, by reviewing
justifiability, effectiveness, and the possible resources to adopt private mediation, but also reviews
the possible obstacles and solutions to using private mediators for resolving disputes in Korea.
The Korean judicial authority already allows courts to release civil mediation cases to outercouncil mediation organizations, and current Korean mediation programs could not successfully
reduce the benches’ overloaded work. 519
The sizes of mediation organizations, except the court of first incident, are too small to
take over the mediation process from the court of first incident. 520 Therefore, the current courtrelated mediation programs could not reduce the civil judges’ overloaded work. In order to
effectively reduce the benches’ work, the court should release its cases, not only from the court’s
territory, but also from the court’s authority.
Even though there are several outer-council mediation organizations in Korea, they are not
equal to the private mediator per the traditional ADR definition, because they are acting pro
bono. 521 Outer-council mediation organizations are not purely from the private sector, but feature
court-related process (they are merely out-of-court territory). Therefore, in order to create a private
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mediation system, it is necessary to make mediation out-of-court process and independent from
the judicial authority. In Korea, the civil mediation cases are still referred and released to the
outer-council mediation organization. Furthermore, the private mediator should be independent
from the judicial authority when it comes to making money.
In addition, a private mediation program might open up a new legal market, in order to
expand the size of the pie. 522 In order to establish private mediation, the judiciary needs to set up
training and educational programs: because the judiciary should take responsibility for the private
mediator’s function during the mediation process, it is necessary for them to be the ones
responsible for preparing these training and certification programs. Because of an over-heated
Korean legal market, law school students might struggle in such a tough environment. The private
mediation program would be a new legal market in Korea for these new graduates to find
employment, if the additional legal cost and expense would not be imputed to disputing parties.
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[Statement]
Professor Edwin Greenebaum’s statement in CJAM training on September 2015

APPENDICES
Questions for interviewing mediators
Mediator’s role-How to make a mutual agreement through mediators or parties
What is the role of mediator in the CMC?
Does mediation help parties find causes of disputes (fact-finding) or propose a solution for
parties?
What is the legal foundation in determining or proposing an agreement to the parties?
Are you trained to propose an agreement?
Do you use any specific techniques to induce the agreement between the parties? Is there
any pressure on parties or mediators to reach an agreement?

Mediator’s previous work experience
What is your work experience before joining the CMC?
What approach does the CMC take to hiring mediators without a legal background?
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Standard to induce an agreement
If the processes and determinations in the CMC are not based on a legal standard, what is
the main standard?
Without applying for the rule of law in CMC, how can a mediator fairly reach an agreement
and strike a balance between the parties?
Between a disadvantage party and an economically and socially strong party, how can a
mediator protect the disadvantage party’s rights?
Do disadvantage people have a fair and equal chance to argue in the CMC?
Does the CMC consistent induce similar outcomes in similar cases?
If the CMC produces various outcomes from similar cases, how does it make the social
integration from the Korean Constitutional Law?

Development of CMC
After the CMCs were established in 2009 in Seoul and Pusan, how did the CMC expand
three more major cities? What is the CMC’s own perception of efforts?
What is the rate of parties’ satisfaction with the CMC?
How does the CMC cooperate with private ADR?
Do you have a general idea of how to improve the CMC or ADR system in Korea under
the Korean Constitutional Law?

(Korean) 조정위원에 대한 질문
조정위원의 역할-조정위원과 당사자들사이에서 어떻게 쌍방의 동의를 유도해 내는가
법원조정센터내에서 조정위원의 역할은 무엇인가?
조정이 분쟁의 원인을 확인하거나 당사자들에게 해결책을 제공하고 있는가?
당사자들에게 동의할 만한 해결책을 제시하거나 해결책을 결정할시에, 법적인
근거는 무엇인가?
동의안을 제시할수 있도록 별도의 교육을 받은적이 있는가?
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당사자 사이에서 동의안을 도출해 낼수 있는 특별한 기술을 가지고 있는가? 쌍방
동의가 이루어져야 하는 압력이 조정위원이나 당사자들에게 있는가?
조정위원의 경력
법원조정센터에 참여하기 이전의 경력은 무엇인가?
법원조정센터는 법적 경력을 제외한 조정위원의 선발에 어떤 방법을 쓰고 있는가?
쌍방 동의를 도출하기 위한 방법
법원조정센터가 법적인 방법이 아닌 과정과 결정을 통한다면, 센터는 어떤 근거를
가지고 조정을 이루어 내는가?
법원조정센터가 법원칙의 적용이 아니라면, 조정위원은 어떤게 공정한 쌍방 동의를
도출할수 있는가?
사회적 약자와 경제적, 사회적 강자 사이에서, 어떻게 조정위원은 사회적 약자의
권리를 보호할수 있는가?
법원조정센터내에서, 사회적 약자는 공정하고 평등하게 자신의 권익을 주장할수
있는가?
법원조정센터는 비슷한 사례에서 비슷한 결론은 유출하고 있는가?
만약 법원조정센터가 비슷한 사례에서 서로 다른 결과를 이끌어 냈다면, 한국헌법에
보장된 사회적 통합을 어떻게 만들수 있는가?
법원조정센터의 발전
법원조정센터가 2009 년 서울과 부산에 설립된 후에, 다른 세 도시에 어떻게 (어떤
계기로) 법원조정센터를 확장하였는가? 법원조정센터는 어떤 노력을 하였는가?
현재 법원조정센터에 대한 신청인의 만족도는 어느정도인가?
법원조정센터는 사적 대체적분쟁해결제도와 어떤 협업체계를 갖추고 있는가?
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한국의 헌법체계에서 ADR 시스템또는 법원조정센터의 기능을 향상시키기 위해서
어떤 아이디어를 가지고 있습니까?

Questions for interviewing parties
1. How do you get information about the Mediation Center?
a. Does a legal provider, such as a lawyer, introduce this mediation center?
b. Does a legal provider also introduce other alternative methods?
2. During the mediation, do you have enough chance to express your opinion?
a. Do you have any legal assistance from legal providers for this mediation?
b. Do you think that this mediation proceeding for your case produces win-win result
and benefits for both parties?
3. Are you satisfied the result of this mediation?
a. If not, why are you unsatisfied?
b. If not satisfied, will you file a suit in the court?
c. If you have same or similar problems, will you use this mediation program?
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i. If not, what is the reason?
(Korean)
1. 신청인은 조정센터에 대한 정보를 어떻게 구하였습니까?
a. 변호사와 같은 법률전문가가 조정센터를 소개하였습니까?
b. 법률전문가가 다른 대체적 방법을 소개해 주었습니까?
2. 조정하는동안, 신청인은 자신의 의견을 밝힐 기회를 충분히 받았습니까?
a. 이번 조정을 위하여 법률전문가로부터 법률자문을 받았습니까?
b. 이번 조정이 신청인 쌍방에게 이익이 되는 결과를 이끌어 냈다고 생각하십니까?
3. 신청인은 이번 조정의 결과에 대하여 만족하십니까?
a. 그렇지 않다면, 왜 만족하지 않습니까?
b. 만족하지 않는다면, 법원에 소를 제기하시겠습니까?
c. 신청인에게

동일하거나

비슷한

분쟁이

있다면

이용하시겠습니까?
i.

그렇지 않다면, 이유는 무었입니까?
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신청인은

조정을

다시

JUDICIAL CONCILIATION OF CIVIL DISPUTES ACT523
[Enforcement Date 31. Mar, 2010.] [Act No.10200, 31. Mar, 2010, Partial Amendment]
Article 1 (Purpose)
The purpose of this Act is to settle civil disputes according to a simple procedure based on the
mutual concession between the parties, common sense and actual circumstances.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010]
Article 2 (Case of Conciliation)
Parties of a civil dispute may file an application for conciliation with a court.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010]
Article 3 (Competent Court)
(1) A conciliation case shall be under the jurisdiction of the district court, the branch court of the
district court, the Si court or the Gun court (hereinafter referred to as "Si/Gun court"), which has
the jurisdiction over one of the following subparagraphs:
1. The place of general forum of a respondent under Articles 3 through 6 of the Civil
Procedure Act;
2. The place of business or business office of a respondent;
3. The place of work of a respondent;
4. The location of the subject-matter of disputes;
5. The place where damage occurs.
(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), a conciliation case may be placed under the jurisdiction of an
exclusive competent court of a case equivalent thereto, or a court determined by agreement of
parties.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010]
Article 4 (Transfer)
(1) A judge in charge of a conciliation case, as designated by the chief justice of the high court,
the chief judge of the district court or the chief judge of a branch court of the district court, or a
judge of a Si/Gun court in charge of a conciliation case (hereinafter referred to as "conciliation
523

Available at
http://www.law.go.kr/engLsSc.do?menuId=0&subMenu=5&query=%EC%98%81%EB%AC%B8%20%
EB%AF%BC%EC%82%AC%EC%A1%B0%EC%A0%95%EB%B2%95#liBgcolor0 (last visited in Jan.
10, 2017)
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judge"), shall transfer cases to the competent court by means of a ruling, if no jurisdiction exists
in his/her court: Provided, That this shall not apply where a respondent makes a statement in a
conciliation procedure without a plea of non-competence or if a stay is deemed particularly
necessary to resolve a case.
(2) A conciliation judge may transfer a case to another competent court ex officio or by decision
according to the application of a party, if recognized as reasonable notwithstanding its competence
thereof.
(3) No appeal against decisions prescribed in paragraphs (1) and (2) shall be made.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010]
Article 5 (Form of Application)
(1) An application for conciliation may be filed in writing or orally.
(2) In cases of an oral application, an applicant shall make a statement in the presence of a court
official of Grade Ⅳ, Ⅴ, Ⅵ or Ⅶ (hereinafter referred to as "court official of Grade Ⅳ, etc.").
(3) In cases under paragraph (2), a court official of Grade Ⅳ, etc. shall make a court record of the
application for conciliation, and sign his/her name and affix his/her seal thereto.
(4) In cases of application for conciliation, an application fee shall be paid, as prescribed by the
Supreme Court Regulations.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010]
Article 6 (Conciliation Referral)
A court of a suit may, if deemed necessary, refer a case pending therein to conciliation by a ruling
before a judgment in an appellate trial is given.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010]
Article 7 (Organs of Conciliation)
(1) Cases of conciliation shall be dealt with by the conciliation judge.
(2) A conciliation judge may directly conciliate cases or have the commissioners (hereinafter
referred to as "standing commissioners") who regularly deal with the affairs related to conciliation
under this Act and a council of conciliation conciliate cases: Provided, That he/she shall allow the
council of conciliation to conciliate cases if a party makes such application.
(3) The court of a suit may directly conciliate cases, notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), if the
court of the suit refers cases to conciliation pursuant to Article 6, and if deemed appropriate to
directly handle cases.
(4) The standing commissioners and the court of the suit that conciliate cases under the main
sentence of paragraph (2) and paragraph (3) shall have the same power as a conciliation judge.
(5) In cases under paragraph (3), the court of the suit may have a commissioned judge or an
entrusted judge take charge of conciliation. In such cases, the commissioned judge or the entrusted
judge shall have the same power as a conciliation judge.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010]
Article 8 (Council of Conciliation)
A council of conciliation shall be comprised of a chief commissioner and two or more
commissioners.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010]
Article 9 (Chief Commissioner)
A chief commissioner shall be as follows:
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1. In cases under Article 7 (2), a conciliation judge or a standing commissioner;
2. In cases under Article 7 (3), the chief judge of the court of the suit;
3. In cases under Article 7 (5), a commissioned judge or an entrusted judge;
4. In cases under a Si/Gun court, a judge of the Si/Gun court.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010]
Article 10 (Commissioner)
(1) A commissioner shall be appointed, in advance, by the chief justice of a high court, the chief
judge of a district court or the chief judge of a branch court of a district court from among persons
who have advanced knowledge and high moral reputation: Provided, That a standing
commissioner shall be appointed by the Minister of National Court Administration from among
persons who are a licensed attorney with certain careers determined by the Supreme Court
Regulations.
(2) The term of office of commissioners shall be two years: Provided, that under special
circumstances, a commissioner may be commissioned with his/her term of office fixed within two
years.
(3) Any commissioner under paragraph (1) shall execute the following affairs:
1. Participating in a conciliation case;
2. Hearing opinions of persons involved in cases to resolve disputes or conducting affairs
necessary to deal with conciliation cases according to entrustment of a conciliation judge
or a chief commissioner.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010]
Article 10-2 (Commissioner Comprising Council of Conciliation)
Commissioners, who comprise a council of conciliation, shall be designated under agreement of
the parties or by a chief commissioner, from among commissioners under Article 10 (1) for each
case.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010]
Article 11 (Conciliation Proceeding)
The conciliation proceeding by a council of conciliation shall be conducted by the chief
commissioner.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010]
Article 12 (Allowance, etc. of Commissioners)
In accordance with the Supreme Court Regulations, a commissioner shall be paid an allowance
and, if necessary, travelling expenses, daily allowances, and lodging cost.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010]
Article 13 (Examination of Payment of Fees)
(1) If an applicant fails to pay fees prescribed by Article 5 (4), the conciliation judge shall
determine an appropriate period and issue orders for payment of such fees within such period.
(2) If an applicant fails to comply with an order under paragraph (1), the conciliation judge shall
dismiss the application by order.
(3) An immediate appeal may be made against an order under paragraph (2).
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010]
Article 14 (Service of Written Application for Conciliation, etc.)
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A written application for conciliation or a court record of an application for conciliation shall be
served on a respondent without delay.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010]
Article 14-2 (Separation or Joinder of Cases)
Conciliation organs provided for in Article 7 may order a separation or joinder of conciliation
cases, or may revoke such order.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010]
Article 15 (Date of Hearing for Conciliation)
(1) The hearing date for conciliation shall be notified to the parties.
(2) Notification of the date may be made in any appropriate manner, such as the service of a writ
of summons.
(3) Where both parties appear before the court and apply for conciliation, a hearing for conciliation
shall be held on the day of the application, except where any special circumstance exists.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010]
Article 16 (Joining by Interested Person)
(1) A person interested in the result of conciliation may join the conciliation proceedings upon
permission from a conciliation judge.
(2) The conciliation judge may, if it is deemed necessary, allow a person interested in the result of
conciliation to join the conciliation proceedings.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010]
Article 17 (Rectification of Respondent)
(1) If it is obvious that an applicant has designated a wrong respondent, a conciliation judge may,
upon application of the applicant, grant permission for rectification of the respondent by decision.
(2) When the decision of permission is made under paragraph (1), an application for conciliation
on a new respondent shall be regarded to have been raised at the time an application for
rectification is filed under paragraph (1).
(3) When the decision of permission is made under paragraph (1), an application for conciliation
against the previous respondent shall be regarded to have been withdrawn at the time of an
application for rectification is filed under paragraph (1).
(4) With respect to cases referred to conciliation by the court of first instance pursuant to Article
6, the rectification of a respondent made under Article 260 of the Civil Procedure Act shall be
binding in the legal proceedings.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010]
Article 18 (Representative of Party)
(1) If a party consists of not less than one person with a common interest, those in the party may
appoint one or more persons among themselves as the representative of the party.
(2) The appointment under paragraph (1) shall be attested in writing.
(3) The conciliation judge may, if necessary, order the party to appoint the representative of the
party.
(4) The representative of the party may, for the interest of the party, perform all conciliation
activities individually except the following cases:
1. Acceptance of conciliation condition draft;
2. Withdrawal of application for conciliation;
3. Activities related to decisions under Articles 30 and 32;
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4. Appointment of an attorney.
(5) If the representative of the party is appointed, a notification of the hearing date for conciliation
may not be served on the persons in the party, other than the representative of the party.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010]
Article 19 (Place of Conciliation)
A conciliation judge may hold a conciliation hearing, according to the actual circumstances of the
case, in an appropriate place out of a court.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010]
Article 20 (Non-Publicity)
Conciliation proceedings may not be disclosed publicly: Provided, that a conciliation judge may
allow other persons to attend conciliation proceedings, if deemed appropriate, even if such
conciliation proceedings are not open to the public.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010]
Article 21 (Disposition before Conciliation)
(1) Where deemed particularly necessary for conciliation, a conciliation judge may, upon
application of one party, issue the following orders to the other party or other person interested in
the case, before such conciliation:
1. Prohibition of changing the status quo (the site), or disposing of goods;
2. Prohibition of other acts which make it impossible or considerably difficult to
accomplish the purpose of the conciliation.
(2) In taking measures under paragraph (1), a sanction against infringement under Article 42 shall
be informed.
(3) An immediate appeal may be made against any measure under paragraph (1).
(4) Any measure under paragraph (1) shall not have the executive power.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010]
Article 22 (Hearing of Statement and Investigation of Evidence)
If a conciliation judge hears the statement of a party or any person interested in the conciliation
and, if deemed necessary, he/she may investigate the facts and the evidence by appropriate means.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010]
Article 23 (Restriction on Use of Statement)
The statement of a party or any person interested in conciliation proceedings shall not be used as
evidence in a civil procedure.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010]
Article 24 (Preparation of Court Record)
The court official of Grade Ⅳ, etc. attending conciliation, shall keep a court record: Provided, That
he/she may omit a part of its content with permission of a conciliation judge.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010]
Article 25 (Dismissal of Application for Conciliation)
(1) Where the hearing date for conciliation cannot be served on the party, a conciliation judge may
dismiss an application for conciliation by decision.
(2) No appeal against dismissal under paragraph (1) shall be filed.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010]
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Article 26 (Rulings Not to be Proceeded with Conciliation)(1) Where a case is deemed not
suitable in its nature for conciliation or a party is deemed to file an application for conciliation
with unjustifiable intent, a conciliation judge may terminate the procedure by decision under which
no conciliation shall be proceeded with.
(2) No appeal against the decision under paragraph (1) shall be filed.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010]
Article 27 (Failure of Conciliation)
If a case falls under any of the following, and a conciliation judge makes no decision under Article
30, he/she shall terminate such case as failed conciliation:
1. If an agreement fails to be reached between the parties;
2. If it is deemed that details of agreement are inappropriate.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010]
Article 28 (Completion of Conciliation)
Conciliation shall be made by writing the terms of agreement between the parties in the court
record.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010]
Article 29 (Effect of Conciliation)
Conciliation shall have the same effect as a settlement in court.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010]
Article 30 (Decision in Lieu of Conciliation)
Where agreement has not been made or where the terms of agreement are unreasonable, a
conciliation judge shall make a decision on cases for fair resolution of the case, considering
interests of parties and all the relevant circumstances ex officio, unless unreasonable, to the extent
of the purport of the application.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010]
Article 31 (Non-Appearance of Applicants)
(1) Where an applicant fails to appear for the hearing for conciliation on the hearing date, another
hearing date shall be determined and served on the applicant.
(2) Where an applicant fails to appear for hearing on the new hearing date under paragraph (1) or
one of subsequent hearing dates, the application for conciliation shall be regarded to have been
withdrawn.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010]
Article 32 (Non-Appearance of Respondent)
Where a respondent fails to appear for hearing for conciliation on the hearing date, a conciliation
judge shall make a decision provided for in Article 30ex officio unless any reasonable ground
exists.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010]
Article 33 (Service of Court Record on Conciliation)
(1) If falling under any of the following subparagraphs, the court official of Grade Ⅳ, etc. shall
write such fact in the court record:
1. If there is a ruling not to proceed with conciliation for cases;
2. If conciliation fails;
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3. If a decision is made in lieu of conciliation.
(2) The court official of Grade Ⅳ, etc. shall serve a copy of the court record stating a ruling not to
proceed with conciliation or failure of agreement, and an authentic copy of the court record under
Article 28 or the court record stating a decision made in lieu of conciliation, on each party.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010]
Article 34 (Objection)
(1) A party may file an objection against the decision under Article 30 or 32 within two weeks
from the date on which an authentic copy of the court record was served on him/her: Provided,
That an objection may be filed prior to the service of the authentic copy of the court record.
(2) Where an objection is filed within the period under paragraph (1), the conciliation judge shall
notify the other party without delay.
(3) A party who has filed an objection may withdraw the objection with the consent of the other
party until any court of a corresponding level makes judgment on the case. In such cases, Article
266 (3) through (6) of the Civil Procedure Act shall apply mutatis mutandis, but "suit" in the
provisions shall be regarded as "objection".
(4) Where it falls under any of the following subparagraphs, the decisions under Articles 30 and
32 shall have the same effect as a settlement in court:
1. When no objection is filed within the period under the provisions of paragraph (1);
2. When an objection is withdrawn;
3. When an objection is dismissed under the Supreme Court Regulations.
(5) The period mentioned in paragraph (1) shall be peremptory.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010]
Article 35 (Interruption of Extinctive Prescription)
(1) An application for conciliation shall have the effect of interruption of extinctive prescription.
(2) If any ground falling under any of the following subparagraphs exists with regard to the case
for conciliation filed by an applicant, it shall not have the effect of interruption of extinctive
prescription unless he/she files a suit within one month: <Amended by Act No. 4505, Nov. 30,
1992>
1. When an application for conciliation is withdrawn;
2. When an application for conciliation is regarded to have been withdrawn under Article
31 (2).
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010]
Article 36 (Shifting to Civil Procedure Due to Objection)
(1) Where it falls under any of the following subparagraphs, a suit shall be regarded to have been
filed at the time an application for conciliation is filed:
1. Where there is a ruling not to proceed with conciliation pursuant to Article 26;
2. Where a case is terminated by the ruling that agreement has failed to be reached pursuant
to Article 27;
3. Where an objection is filed within the period mentioned in Article 34 (1) against the
decision in lieu of conciliation under Article 30 or 32.
(2) Where a suit shall be regarded to have been raised at the time an application for conciliation
pursuant to paragraph (1) is filed, the fee shall be added to the amount needed to file a suit.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010]
Article 37 (Procedural Costs)
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(1) Where agreement of conciliation has been reached, expenses incurred therein shall be borne
by each party unless otherwise specially agreed upon between the parties, and where agreement of
conciliation has not been reached, they shall be borne by the applicant.
(2) Where an application for conciliation has shifted to a civil procedure under Article 36 (1), the
expenses under paragraph (1) shall be regarded as part of the costs involved in a suit.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010]
Article 38 (Application Mutatis Mutandis of Civil Procedure Act)
(1) With regard to conciliation, Articles 51, 52, 55 through 60 (excluding the latter part of Article
58 (1)), 62, 63 (1), 64, 87, 88, 145, and 152 (2) and (3) of the Civil Procedure Act shall apply
mutatis mutandis.
(2) The provisions of the Civil Procedure Act shall apply mutatis mutandis to the fixed date, period,
and the service of documents, as prescribed in this Act: Provided, That Articles 185 (2), 187, and
194 through 196 of the Civil Procedure Act shall apply mutatis mutandis only to the service of the
court record prepared under Article 28 of this Act.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010]
Article 39 (Application Mutatis Mutandis of Non-Contentious Case Litigation Procedure
Act)
Part I (excluding Article 15) of the Non-Contentious Case Litigation Procedure Act shall, unless
it is contrary to its nature, apply mutatis mutandis to the conciliation, except as especially provided
for in this Act.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010]
Article 40 (Authority of Council of Conciliation and Chief Commissioner)
Where a council of conciliation conciliates a case, the council of conciliation and the chief
commissioner shall have the authority of a conciliation judge, as classified below:
1. Council of conciliation: The authority vested to a conciliation judge prescribed under
Articles 16, 17 (1), 18 (3), 19, 21 (1), 22, 25 (1), 26 (1), 27, 30 and 32;
2. Chief commissioner: The authority vested to a conciliation judge prescribed under
Articles 13 (1) and (2), 20, 24, 34 (2) and 42.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010]
Article 40-2 (Legal Fiction as Public Officials of Standing Commissioners)
In the application of Articles 129 through 132 of the Criminal Act, standing commissioners shall
be deemed public officials.
[This Article Newly Inserted by Act No. 9417, Feb. 6, 2009]
Article 41 (Penal Provisions)
(1) A person, who is or has been a conciliation commissioner, has revealed the process of
conference, the opinion of the chief commissioner or the conciliation commissioner, and the
number of conciliation commissioners by opinion without a justifiable ground, shall be punished
by a fine not exceeding 300 thousand won.
(2) A person, who is or has been a conciliation commissioner, discloses any confidential
information of another person he/she has become aware of while performing his/her duty, without
a justifiable ground, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than two years or a fine not
exceeding one million won.
(3) The public prosecution against the crime under paragraph (2) shall not be charged without
accusation.
158

[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010]
Article 42 (Sanction against Breach of Order before Conciliation)
(1) Where a party or a joiner fails to comply with the order before conciliation under Article 21, a
conciliation judge shall impose upon him/her a fine for negligence not exceeding 300 thousand
won ex officio.
(2) The provisions concerning the public prosecutor in Articles 248 and 250 of the NonContentious Case Litigation Procedure Act shall not apply to a trial for a fine for negligence under
paragraph (1).
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010]
Article 43 (Delegation Provision)
Except as provided for in this Act, the hearing of opinions, the examination of facts, the
investigation of evidence, the prepayment of procedural costs in conciliation procedures, the
relationship with civil procedures, the relationship with executory procedures and other matters
necessary for conciliation shall be determined by the Supreme Court Regulations.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10200, Mar. 31, 2010]
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Article 451 (Grounds for Retrial)(1) A petition for a retrial against the final judgment which
has become conclusive may be made when falling under any one of the following subparagraphs:
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http://www.law.go.kr/engLsSc.do?menuId=0&subMenu=5&query=%EC%98%81%EB%AC%B8%20
%EB%AF%BC%EC%82%AC%EC%86%8C%EC%86%A1%EB%B2%95#liBgcolor0 (last visited on
Apr. 11, 2017).
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Provided, That the same shall not apply when a party has alleged such grounds by an appeal, or
has not alleged them even while he/she became aware thereof:
1. When an adjudicating court has not been constituted pursuant to the provisions of Acts;
2. When a judge, who is ineligible to take part in the relevant judgment pursuant to the
provisions of Acts, has participated therein;
3. When there is any defect in granting a legal representation right, powers of attorney, or an
authority required for the procedural acts of a representative: Provided, That the same shall not
apply when it has been ratified under Article 60 or 97;
4. When a judge, who took part in the judgment, has committed a crime as to his/her official duty
in respect of the case;
5. When a party has been led to make a confession, or obstructed in submitting the method of
offence and defense to affect the judgment, due to the criminally punishable acts of another
person;
6. When a document or any other article used as evidence for the judgment has been forged or
fraudulently altered;
7. When the false statements by a witness, an expert witness or an interpreter, or those by a
sworn party or legal representative have been adopted as evidence for the judgment;
8. When a civil or criminal judgment or other decisions or administrative dispositions on which
the judgment was based have been altered by a different judgment or administrative disposition;
9. When judgment has been omitted in respect of an important matter which might have affected
the judgment;
10. When a judgment, against which a petition for retrial is to be filed, is contrary to the final and
conclusive judgment which has been previously declared;
11. When a party has, in spite of being aware of an address or residence of the other party,
instituted a lawsuit by stating that he/she has been unaware of the latter's whereabouts, or by
telling a false address or residence.
(2) In cases falling under paragraph (1) 4 through 7, a lawsuit of retrial may be instituted only
when a conviction or a judgment to impose an administrative fine has become final and
conclusive against the punishable acts, or when it is impossible to render a final and conclusive
conviction or a final and conclusive judgment to impose an administrative fine, on account of
other grounds than the lack of evidence.
(3) When the court of appeals has rendered a judgment on the merits of the case concerned, no
lawsuit of retrial shall be instituted against the judgment of the first instance.
Article 461 (Quasi-Retrial)
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Where the protocol under Article 220, or a ruling or an order objectionable by an immediate
appeal, has become final and conclusive, if it has the grounds as referred to in Article 451 (1), a
retrial may be petitioned by correspondingly applying the provisions of Articles 451 through 460
against the final and conclusive judgment.
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